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FOHEWORD
A. I. D. aims to help countries become self-support-
ing - - Korea increased annual exports from less than
$85 million in 1963 to neaJ'ly $500 million in 1968, a 6-
fold growth! Exports climbed from 3% of GNP in 1958
to 14% of a larger GNP in 1967.
A. 1 D. be!ieves pr:"vate enterprise is the effective
engine of development -- the Korean export drive en-
listed thousands of firms r~laking nearly 600 new products.
A 1. D. emphasiz.es self-he'~ by developing coun-
tries - _. Kor~a stabilized its eco: my, enacted a battery
of export in<..~ntives, and mobilb.cd every go,!prnment
economic ministry, every bank, and every trade associ-
ation.
Some people hold the misconception that Korean
success depepded on sules to the U. S. military forces
anG to Vietnam. Actually, the U. S. Army in Korea
increased its purchases by only $15 million during the
period of export promotion. This amount is excluded
from the increase of $415 million cited above. Commod-
ity sales to Vietnam averaged only 5% of annual exports
and dropped to 2% by ::'967.
Instead of advantages, Korea started with handicaps:
- - She possessed f~w exportable raw materials.
Now 70% of h~r exports are manufactured
produ(:ts.
- - She had been tile "hermit kingdom" with little
foreign experiepce. Now ~~e sells to 76
countries.
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- - She depended on tramp ships charging
discriminatory rates. Now there is
regular shipping at competitive rates.
While the Koreans themselves did the job, the
A. 1. D. Mission in Korea assisted with advice and tech-
nical assistance.
This r'eport is a case study of the Korean experience
with export development. Its author, Amicus Most, was
the Senior Adviser for Export Development to the A. 1. D.
Mission and the Korean Government for four years, 1964-
1968. During this time, he also inspected Korean trade
operations in twenty-two countries. Mr. Most spent his
lifetime as an engineer and businessman in such varied
enterprises as foundries, watches, and housing. He also
served three years in the 1950' s as Industry Chief for
the Marshall Plan in France, Italy and Germany.
The failures as well 2.S the succes::es are frankly
set forth. Each facet of the program and the methods
used. get a detailed analysis. A glance at the Table of
Contents will show the extent of the coverage.
These experiences can pt'ove useful to other coun-
tries and A. I. D. Missions wishing to undertake similar
activities Additional copies of this case study may be
obta· ed f . the Office of Public Information, Agency
for I1,',2r'1_ . ,-_131 Development, Washington, D. C.
Robert L Hubbell
Deputy Director for Program Evaluation
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This study evaluates the work of the A. 1. D. l\1ission
to Korea during the years HJ64 to 19f;B in assisting the
Korean Government to develop its successful export
progra.n. Its purpose is to determine the factors and
reasons that led to the success of thiis export develop-
ment. A detailed arnalysis wiB be made of every facet
of the export activities of the J\. I. D. Mission, the Korean
Government and business community, looking at the
successes and faHlI.ures of each component, and making
comparisons with similar programs in other developing
countries.
The Korean success was not an accident, but was the
result of planned programs and activities by the Korean
Government with the assistance of A. 1. D., which added
up to a well-rounded effort.
It is hoped that this study will provide lessons and
guidelines that may be applied to similar future 2.ctivi-
ties in other developing countries. This analysis will
suggest general principles as ,vell as describe specific
activities that may be applicable elsewhere. \Vhile it
is obvious that a program of export development is con-
ditioned in any country or area by history, economics,
geography, climate, natural resources, traditions,
culture, and political factors, certain general patterns
may, nevertheless, be applicable in whole or in part to
other developing countries.
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CHAPTER II
REASONS FOR AND FOUNDATIONS
OF EXPORT DEVELOPIVIENT
The development strategy adopted by the Korean Gov-
ernment deliberately stressed export expa'lsion as a lead
factor in economic growth, particularly fr om 1964 onG
This was done both to pay for imports rising in the typical
pattern described below, and to encourage and permit a
faster rate of growth of manufacturing and thus of the whole
economy, than the growth of the domestic market aione
would have permitted.
The economic growth of almost every develop~ng coun-
try, which includes industrial and agricultural develop-
ment, requires foreign exchange earnings to pay for large
inputs of advanced technical know-how and for capital in-
vestment in modern equipment and machinerYG Often eco-
nomic growth also requires great inputs of imported raw
material and consumer goods. Almost every developing
country is therefore seeking sources of foreign exchangeG
This is particularly necessary for those with a negative
balance of payments. More foreign exchange may be ob-
tabled through increased commodity exports and "invisible"
fOrIns of exports, such as earnings from tourism, trans-
portation and remittances from residents living abroad.
Also, exchange may be stretched by means of import sub-
stitution.
Countries that have primary agriculture crops, sea-
food and certain raw materials, require improved mach-
inery and transportation and imports of "know-how" to
enhance the quality and quantity of these priInary exports,
and to discover and develop new products. M0reover,
many of them are now turning to manufacturing, agro-
industry and other non-traditional forms of export devel-
opment based on imported capital items.
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Other countries have only a large and usually low-cost
labor supply as a component for exportable products.
Though the products exported contain a large input of
labor, they also often require imports of raw materials
and semi-processed goods. Other dernands for imports
are created by rising aspirations for an ever increasing
standard of living despite population growth. Both the
aspirations and the greater population require consumer
goods that cannot always be supplied by domestic pro-
duction. This in turn creat~s further demand for foreign
exchange earnings.
In short, the achievemlent of rising living standards in
the less-developed countries inevitably depends on their
development of nnore corD1lpUex pJ"oduction and trade pat-
terns, at constantly rising levels of activity. In f~ct.
the rate of growth of exports has proven to be a critical
bottleneck to the overaU development of most of these
countries.
Historically, many of the no,\' advanced _0untries built
their economies and created their present high standard
of living by concentratiiU'llg on the processing of raw mate-
rials for export. Such countries as Great Britain, Belgium.
Holland, Switzerland and! Japan are good e-xamples of this.
Korea. Hong Kong, Taiwa11l. Jar-an. and Singapore are
exannples of developing Asiatic count.ries in wh~ch their
chief exportable product is inexpel1lsive labor. The
Philippines, Indonesia, ThaHand and l'flalaysia are ex-
amples of developh~~Asiatic countries in which there exist
primary produC"ts for expart' but which now must also de-
velop processed foods. agro-industrial and manufactured
products in order to absorb their increasing labor supply
and the demands of a rising economy., There are many
other examples of both (categories throughout the \l..~o:rld.
\Vhile the study of what happened in Korea \\'ill be particu-
larly applicable to the countries dependent nllaiIDy em inex-
pensive labor, man: aspects of its development win be u.lse-
ful to countries 'l/hich also have raw materials.
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\Vhile this study deals with the contents of Korea's
comprehensive export development program as such --
that is with the direct efforts to expand exports -- the
success of the program depended heavily on the presence
of a favorable economic environment. Aside from the
factors of physical and human resources already de-
scribed, the key environmental influence was the overall
economic policy of the government, in particular the
policy on exchange rates and price stabilization. Obvi-
0usly, both affect the price and therefore the competitive-
ness or saleability of exports. No amount of direct sales
efforts can make up for high prices.
Korea's export effort worked because of a good com-
bination of the efforts c:"c:sc.ribed in this report with the
establishment of realistic and more favorable exchange
rates in the 1964/65 period, and with a great improvement
in domestic price stability brought about by strong govern-
nlent policy measures. The export drive was also support-
ed by a variety of other government policies and programs
to increase Korean output, improve productive efficiency
and rationalize the supply of production inputs. Many
problelns of potential conflict and co~promisebetween
these overall policy drives needed to be worked out, and
the nature of the reconciliations achieved is anothE=r sub-
ject for policy analysis, but one beyond the scope of this
report except for incidental mention. An important ex-
ample is that of reconciling the inflationary impacts of
export expansion, especially when it is supported by credit
expansion, with the need for a reasonably stable domestic
monetary clinlate. Another is balancing export incentives
with the need to avoid the creation or expansion of uneco-
nomic production facilities.
Thus, the direct export develo~mentmeasures consid-
ered in this report are a necessary and important part of
any program to bring a very rapid increase in exports,
but are by no means sufficient to do the whole job.
-5-
CHAPTER IIIZil _
THE mSTORY OF KORE:AN EXPORT
DEVELOPMENT
A. General Background
Korea for many centuries was known as the "Hermit
Kingdom, " and did not open itself to the western world
until 1883. Korea developed its own culture, but there
was a strong Chinese infiuence. This combination of
Chinese and Korean culture included agricultural and
technical know -how and the development of indigenou--
projects utilizing its own natural resources.
Korea exported a good deal of its knowledge and
culture to Japan and also acquired both knowledge and
supplies from Japan. From 1905 to 194~ Korea was a
province of Japan, although it had an essentially colonial
status. Just as with many colonies, Korea during this
period was essentj:=!lly a source of raw materials and
labor as well as a market for Japan. Some industrial
and agricultural development occurred, including textiles,
sericulture, small manufacturing, and processing of agri-
cultural products. However, the country v!as still to <J.
.large degree cut off from the rest of the world. \Vhatever
small contacts and commerce it had were through J apaJl_
Korea had almost no commercial contacts of its own uqtil
after its liberation in 1945. At that same time. all of the
Japanese technicians, executives and admir:istrators left.
The division of the country into Northern and Southern
sections brought problelns for the Southern part. Much of
the basic industry and power generation was located in the
North. lVlany of the trained people were located where the
industry was.
The war between Commul1ist North Korea, and Korea
started in 1950. As a result of the war the South suffered
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greatly. She lost approxinlately a million people,
including many of the most capable ones. At one point
over half her people were refugees. Much of the physi-
cal plant was destroyed. After the 1953 armistice,
Korea needed restoration of housing, agriculture, trans-
portation, and education. She faced the problem of cre-
ating new electrical generator plants and basic industries.
It was also necessary to bE~gin to educate and train a new
administrative and technical staff at almost every level
and for every aspect of Korean life.
With United States n help, the period directly subse-
quent to the Korean war was devoted to ithis effort. Korea
imported supplies, foodstuffs, raw materials, machinery
and equipment. Rebuilding the country and erasing the
war damages were the first steps. Subsequently, hydro-
electric and steam generators, fertilizer and cement plants
and other basic primary industries were built. Schools,
housing, roads, bridges, water supply and irrigation canals
were recreated or newly built.
In 1960 and 1961 there were hvo revolutions in which
the existing goverlUl1ents were overthrown and new govern-
nlents installed. From the time of the Japanese departure
until the Korean war, and between the Korean war and 1961,
a whole new staff of administr...ttive and technical personnel
had been developed in both government and private sectors.
As a result of the two revolutions many government and
private sector personnel were once again removed. It was
therefore necessary to train new staffs to carryon the
functions of government.
The Japanese during their forty years of occupation
had allowed the existence of only a few universities, and
only a few Korean students studied in Japan. The culture
and traditions of Korea gave high priority to philosophy,
religion and the learned disciplines. The status of the
learned man, go'rernment official and the Yangban (ruling
class) was the highest. :Merchants, technicians and busi-
nessmen were looked upon. as "'low status!1 occupations..
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Engineeri ng schools and technical education were
almost non-existent. \Vith the end of the Japanese
occupation, the great desire iOle learning created a
tremendous rush into the schools and universities.
Existing universities expanded rapidly and many new
universities were created. However, they had neither
the physical, administrative, nor educational capacity
to give adequate training and education to the great
number of new students, nor were there enough jobs
available if. the fields for which the graduates prepar~ j.
These problems were made worse by the North Korean
Communists, one of whose objecti V~!=; was to destroy
the school system and kill as nlany teachers as possible.
Since 1953 there has been great improvement in the
quality of education, and a change in its direction toward
more science, engineering, business and - at lower
levels - vocational training. However, as with most
former colonies, a dearth of middle level administrators,
executives and technicians has remained in both business
and governnlent. The few trained men very rapidly rose
to the top, and top-level govei'nment officials and business
executives are surprisingly young - despite the Korean
family system which dictates ~hat the head of the family
makes all of the decisions, thus inhibiting effective
exercise of responsibility by relatively young men. None-
theless, there is yet a lack of trained, and particul3.rly
experienced personnel necessary to administer and develop
the economy of the country.
To the credit of the Koreans, they took surprisingly few
years to create a cadre of personnel to man the various
Jobs and to begin developing competent technicians and ad-
ministrators. One strong, positive factor throughout the
transition was the retention of the traditional virtues of
hard work and personal productivity. In fact, Korean
work attitudes and habits facilitated quick learning and
high productivity when guided by sound management.
Prior to 1958, I<or"ea did <.hhnosl no eXIP'0lrlnnJ{. It
\vas only then that a snnaH h'ickle of produch;; hcg;nm to
be exported. I n that yean" thc~y lotaUed :aboutt $n 1 millHolJ1l.
consisting mainly of hmgslcn. coal. nrolJ1l ore. CH~lIYS.
silk yal~ns. primary agn"kuHur;,'JiI and se:a fOHO)(C; pn"o(hncas.
In 1H61 exports were sUB on~y $4~ nnUHon..
By 1963 eyport.s Urucreased fto ~~id:4 1111 iUllion. The p~·lIttttern
of exports began 11.('\ shiH tm'f:?': dis malmfachuu"edl goods:.
DUI'ing this pen"nod the economy I..,.~as suHedng, 11".'011111 :rJl high
rate of inflation which by Hs Vel"Y n:cuttllu"ett,ell1ldedtto dis-
courage export acUvnUes. iU the sm1l1lC Ulra1JC tthe grmvtth
rate of the economy arndt,he iCBeve]opi ngi ndtLusttJr"nes Jr"€'-
qUi;::ed hH~ge innporls. Inll9€):3nmpou"tts: amo\!.ulntted H'll $560
miHion, making Une iunp>ol.. tt-expou~tt nU1J~b<lnanee sonne $;,:»'16
miHion, The ove.'aU totan b;ahullce-ott"-payn1l1lenlltt.s de-nelltt
for that yeau' was .$403 ttlJ1lllllHol1l, :amdl fou"ll916i4 $22R mlillHol1l.
\Vith A. 1. D. "s shiH (u"Ottll'n gu":aml aid to dleve]opmentt Roams,
and with the pll~ospect of dlecll"eased aid hll Hne fll.ll1Lll.llre.
Korea's future economic health depended increasingly
upon planning to correct Hne balance-of-paylnents sHu:al1liiOll],
and developing its nn:cHnufachuriiLJ, industries andl export
trade to ac::mnplish thus objective.
The first step. uf necessHy. was the establishment of
the stabilization prograull and a more realistic rate of
exchange. \Vith the assistance and advice of A. I. D., the
Korean Government developed measur{..3 to accompHsh
this. The staiJHization program was announced in 1\1[ay
1963, and the currency \\ras devaJlued in 1\!lay 1964. The
official rate of exchange moved from 130 to 255 won per
dollar. (The existence of an export-import Hnk system.
whereby export earnings could be s.:>ld at a free exchange
rate had gradually raised the eA-port exchange rate to 220 -
230 won by the time of devaluation.) \Vhen the rate of
exchange was allowed to float, starting' in Februa.ry 1965.
it moved up from approximately 250 to 270 won to ~h.e
dollar, and it has remained at about that level until re-
cently.
-[)J-
Thus h"eunendofUlS exporl gro"'llh helped to s'UmllD~~~te :a
surge nn prod1l1cUon~ "'Jhtfich fin hu"n SlllplPowled If'm''aheJ
exporls. Fr"oml:)59 to H!J62 the mU1Jual gr'«)l'lth r:DIae of
the Korean ecoU1Jomy was :3. 6 percent. Frott'll1J ]963 to
1967, foHowhug Sitabi~uzaUon, this muutLu,,1lD gtt"O'\'dh r,,1iae
was 9••3 perc~nt. The cdevcDopmcnt or second:cu"y indus-
try was a key feahn-c of this grm'lLh -. :"lIDll the U1l1Jore
remarkable when corulJr"~b:s;ted wHh Hlle U'eeb]eum:Bm;;ttr]:1llD
capacity of HJ53. The eUlllleU'''gence of 1I'(ott"ca ~~s a U1l1IarbU.U-
fachu."ung counttt·y has been poeUca.nDy 1"e~erred to a~ ahe
~~mir'aclle of the lian" II Oliveu" in Seoll.uD), bud as wHh U1l1Jost
miracles, it u'e~onves UseU hllto hard work. con1i.iiUlI1!.llOUS
e rfort :en nd urote H ~ gent d Drec' Uon.
In HUlS exports wiDD lIu"obablly reaeh the government
estahHshed taq~et of $50OJ mnHuon. In Decemberll~68,
the govcrrul"'ent esh'1lbllhsll1led a ta't"g,et or $7{))(Ql un HUon for
1969. The increase of about 600 peu"cell1ltt. in nve years~
froan a nevel of $84 J11lllin~oJl1 un 1963, us themeas\Ulre of
the success stOI1"Y olf Korean export devellopmenL The
above fig\Lures do not UnllCn \Lude foreign exchange earn:ngs
through salles to the United States AJr'D1llled Forces located
in Korea, or thtt....olluglu !!I!UIr1l\,'Rsublle'" expol1"ts rroun sO\Ullr"ces
such as tOUr]SllU, tr:alll1lsportation, overseas labor ~'Hull
sondier renliUances. ete~
The pattern of exports shined so that .iin ]967 ll1l'lldinil.ll-
factured products represented 69 percent of the total
exports in lmndreds of new itenls in a w.iide variety of
products. TextHes :Blind cloth.iing of cotton, silk, woo]
and synthetics; l"llubber and canvas If'ooh,,,'ear; tires; knit
goods; handicraft; dishes; ceramics; musical instruments;
pharamaceuUcals; grass cloth 'f/allpaper; ~..' jigs; Oat glass;
brass; artificial Oowers; eyeglass frames; baUeries~ and
even heavY nlachinery are included in this wide variety
of items. In 1961 total pl)"\'lood expor1l:s ,..'ere $36 minion~
~!le Un.ii.ted States taking approximateJl,Y $32 nllillion.
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Unfortunately, compl('!tc staHsUc~;; are U1IOt avaUablle.
However, as shown in the CoHowing' table, they "u-e
sufficient to indicate U1E~ shirts fronll Iprtimary exports to
new manufactured pn-odtllcts. (See TableR. )
Whine this report "v,t" HI devote aUenUoa] to .rnany
prOthucls and many pn"oblems. it car-mott, discuss the hun-
d."eds of Herns Ull"d wea"e deveDoped :.:mdl lhethousalnd-and-
one problems (,hat aros(!~. Tables 3-~. on the sh"\luchllre and
destUnaUon of expon"ts for the years HJJ59, HJ6:~ and 1967,
give some concept of U]4~ large varie(..nes of prooUicts
involved and the dfimensfions ofuncre«llsc.
The six table~ repn"cKhllced here .tU"C takeru from the
pmn?hlel, 1111 Major B<Cl()nonnk~ Indicators :1957 -1967"n, pub-
Hshed by the E:conomuc Phnm.ling Board or the Korean
Gove."mnenl. (Inconsistencies are caused by the fact
Umt sOlne figures are bank seUlement statistics and others
aTe cilustom house clearance st:2'~jsttics. These inconsis-
tencies do not afffect nlle !purpose of presenting them here
as indications of patterns and trends. )
Table :2.
(In $ t.hou.usall1lds•
ANNUAL JE;XPORTS
Page 74 of ""Indi:ators"')
1958
1959
1960
]l.96J1.
1962
Jl.963
.$Ui.780
20.436
32. 385)
42,90l
56, 702:
84, 368
11964
Jl.965
]966
1967
1968
$]20, 85]
HJO,450
255, 75]
320, 229
500,000
(Estimated)
\Vhile \~:e have been aln.able to locate statistics Oill
IItt added value II " earnings. infornled economic opimon is that
approxinllately 60 percent of manufac1tured goods exports
are net earnings. and that on all other produc1l:s, it is
ahnost 100 percent.
~.
Table 1. SHIFTS IN NATURE OF EXPORTED PRODUCTS
Nmnbe r of C ountrie s
Numher of products
Value elf exports (millions of
dollars)
Manufactured goods as % of exports
Agricultural! marine and mining
products as % of exports
Export as % of GNP (excluding
invi:sibles)
1956
=-=--=
18
42
1958
~
16. 7
14. 8
85. 2
3
1960
~
20
65
32. 4
18. 2
81. B
4
1966
--
76
6 f}'...1
255. 7
62.4
~7. 6
11. 4
1967
320.3
69.0
31. 0
14
I
..-
..-
I
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The United Slales has: become Korea" s chief market
laki ng approxhnate1y 4:3: percent (] 967) of its total
expol'ts, with Japan in second place t.aJdng approximately
26 percent (H}67),
Table 3. EXPOHTS BY MAJOR COUNTRIES
Un $ thousands. Page 70)
COCNTHY Hl59 H)63 1967
_...--..-~~~..
-
--
ASIA
Taiwan l~~ 127 $: 722 $3, U04t'",'
Japan 12.680 2-1 l' H41 84,723
Hong Kong U.032 ~i. U20 15, 215
Philippines 2. 596 565
Others 937 16, 451 25, 536
Sub-Total 14, 776 53, 736 129, 143
EUROPE
United Kingdoln 858 I, 581 7.883
France 26 538 2, 116
Italy 10 1,810 J.087
Gernlany 49 tl 1. 275 5. 233
Others 865 2.698 16. 866
Sub-Total 2.253 7 908 33. 184
AMERICAS
U. S. A. 2. 133 24. 287 137. 431
Canada 249 7, 914
Others 16 749
Sub-Total 2, 133 24, 551 146,094
AFRICA 142 8, 762
OCEANIA 240 3.038
NOT CLASSIFIABLE 650 225 8
GRANO TOTAL 19; 812 86 1 802 320, 229
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Table 4. EXPORT STRUCTURE
(In $ Thousands. Page 66)
Item 1959 1963 1967
.t\gricultural Products $ 3, 480 $ 11, 222 $ 16, 971
Marine Products 3, 649 13, 090 52, 834
Mining Products 9, 821 16, 446 40, 603
Manufactured Goods 3,486 4~~, 610 248, 184
Total 20, 436 84, 368 358, 592
Table 5. -EXPORTS BY COMMODITY GROUP
(In $ Thcusands. Page 67)
Item 1959 1963 1967
Food & Live Animals $ 4, 118
Beverages & Tobacco 106
Crude Materials
Inedible except Fuels II, 713
Mineral Fuels Lubricants
& Related Materials 657
Animal & Vegetable Oils
& Fats 177
Chemicals 11 6
Manufactured Goods
Class. by lVIaterial 2, 139
Machinery & Transport
Equipment 48
Miscellaneous 86
Not Classifiable 653
$17',841
250
26,405
2" 579
92
904
28, 115
4,067
6,401
146
$37, 928
7,017
58,002
I, 770
119
2, 360
101, 384
14, 188
97, 242
219
Total 19,812 86,802 320, 229
Item
Table 6. EXPORTS BY COMMODITIES
(In $ thousands. Page 68)
.... .-
1959 1963 1967
-
Swine $ 134 $ 3.676
Fresh fish 602 :3. 20n
Cuttel fish & its products 516 1. 915
Shrimp & its products B6 1,656
Dried laver 1, 191 1, 504
Raw silk 744 4, 292
Agar agar 717 1. 739
Human hair - - 239
Animal wool 630 2
Tobacco & its products 89 204
Ginseng 72 430
Kaolin 110 271
Natural graphi t.e 626 863
Fluorite 389 777
Iron ores 2, 178 5,912
Lead orElS 171 518
$ 52
12. 461
2, 299
4, 240
6, 498
14,872
4, 671
11
653
6,668
,922
419
994
991
6,059
1,775
I
.....
~
I
Table 6. CONTINUED
Item 1959 1963 1967
Zinc ores -- 90 1, 168
Tungsten ores 3, 397 3,075 11,027
:\nthracite coal 657 2,578 1,750
Cotton fabrics woven 1, 425 4, 289 12, 592 I
.....
Woolen fabric woven -- 10 3. 963 CJlI
Other fabrics woven -- 471 9,853
Outer garments - - 3, 259 8,001
Undergarments -- 1,076 15. 339
Iron and Steel -- 3, 317 684
Bars, Angles of iron
& steel -- 105 228
Plates & sheets of iron
& steel - - 8,290 972
Rubber tires & tubes -- 511 1,638
Plywood 11 5, 833 36, 418
Radios -- 146 1,932
Bamboo handworks 1 98 284
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In sum, how can we explain the renlarkable growth
of Korea's output and exports in recent years? As
mentioned earlier, growth patterns are determined in
any given country or area by many factors such as
history, resources and cultural patterns. While influ-
enced by these factors, the remarkable growth rate
development in Korea was neither t:1eir inevitable result
nor an accident. It was due to planned and organized
activities by the government, with some assistance from
A. L D. a:ld othe!'s, and to the industry and intelligence
of its people and business community.
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CHAPTEH .1 V
SUMMAHY OIij~ BASiC PRiNCIPL&S
AND THEIH APPLICATION IN KOREJ\
The experience lin KOr'l~:i:1l H'u:BIS evollved Ib;ru:s:h.: U'»1I"unc'lip]es
that have appHcabliUny ell:s;e~'.vhett"e~ Th:e'se ~lItt"eun<cBiilC'~~tted
briefLy below.
The fllullll tt"eporll Umlt follllow:s; ;;dleu" Ch;aJH.lltteu·' V dlcsc'Jdbes
the succ:esses and f~liiilluuu"<t~:S lOlf each ;ilc'fiih;Hy.. guves; C'ase
histo!~uCS of vatt"uoll.US U»U"<OXC.huctts. ~Hlldl tthc dlCttii'll ii II s of the
sohaUons lOW llaclk of ~«()llll\uttu({)JJJlIS fouml,fJ) fin} SPCC'HUlC' pJl"obllcuns.
We sug'geslt Uuat IUl'uoSlC ~l',;r~M» wush to \luse tthus neU)JOif'tt as; a
guide Ito SBun uhu" acltii vHne's u"eadl h1l U1111 fllU lln. OttlhJcr:s: w lhJOJ
may be nnteu"ested un ;ru shllglle ll.lJu"oll)!~eJr.ll em'll tt"llll1ldl., llll1l tlhJe
table of cOU"lltents. the dU:illplleu" dle'l;.~ottedl tto ttH1ieUu" p;;n'tk'lLlIllaJl"
inteu"est.
In Hunch over-siimpllH'nelCft fierms. HlJett"c lhJavc bee1f1l two
methods of lCftevellopung; e::-i:poJl"tts. The fi"llJr"st has beelllJ by
those countries whose pruJl']llary objlecHve 'I.~'as:tto e:rU"bli a1f1ldl
save fou"eign exch:amge att allnuost anll}" <cost. They embarked
upon a progran1l1l of iiJl1Illport sn~bstiihuttnom:; 'I.,..Hh ihliigh ttarHf
protection and ~arge dllirect and ihludldle1f1l exporfi s1lUbsiidl.iies to
offset the cost of ove n~- va~\llled curn~e1f1lci~s. These dle\'iices
created inefficientnndllustriles and high-cost pro<l!tLucts for
the domestic COnSllmller. and eventUJlaHy sHowed dOWn] ex-
ports. They may have saved or earnedl foreiig1f1l excl!llange
teJl1I"lporarily but this was done at tl!lle cosit of dlette'riioraHon
of their eCOnOJl1I1Y and ii1ts future poite1f1lHa] for expansiion of
output and trade.
The nnethod upon which Korea based iits lPoHciies lllla((ll
the objec1tD.ve of creating a rational, sustaiinable am.ll eX1Poll~ll-
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oriented industrial growth which would minimize the
necessity for long-term government subsidies, pro\'ide
lower cost products for domestic use, and assist in the
process of ra.isi'lg the standard of living. This was
accomplished by establishing a realisti.c exchange rate,
reducing itnport restrictions and making export growth
a primary objective in government investment and lend-
ing program s - including both short-term across-the-
board (i. e., applicable to all exports) subsidies - and
by establishing a Inassivc program of support activities
including technical assistance programs designed to
prOlnote efficient production that could stand up to inter-
national competition.
While it is possible for a country to engage in ex-
port activHies even under conditions of economic insta-
bility and inflation, it is extremely difficult to do this
and at the SaIne tinle obtain the ger-cral benefits from
export development described above. In an inflationary
economy the possi.bility of earning profits through dom-
estic activities is lTIuch greater than through exporting.
Ilnporting commodities, stockpiling inventories" and
construction activities present greater opportunities
for large profits, while the time lag involved in export-
ing discourages this activity. Rising material costs
and export prices do the same. Therefore, the stabili-
zation measures adopted by the Korean Government
provided an essential backdrop for the eY."port program,
including the provision of the necessary domestic sav-
ings for investment in export expansion. The freeing
of import restrictions, plus the other stabilization
measures forced Korean producers to be competitive,
increased the supply and variety of production m,.l arials,
", ... ,.1 hol..,.orl "n~+~nl ..,. ....;"oC'
u.""-I.. .....'-..Lp"'...... "-"'............. '-J".L .P"'" .L""",-o.
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I n countries where the pre-conditions of stable
economic growth and rates of exchange already exist.,
less attention to them will be required than of Korea.
B. Essential Conditions for Success
Five essential conditions must exist, or be created,
to achieve a major acceJleration of exports in the typical
envirorunent of the less developed countries.
-- An awareness by both the private and public
sector of the necessity for export development.
anl' a willingness to do something about it.
-- An entrepreneurial community interested in
and capable of developing the necessary manu-
facturing and agro-industries. If such a
cOlumunity is weak, there must be evidence that
it can be strengthened or if it is non-existent,
that it can be created.
-- Products available or products that can be
developed for export which can compete in
price, qua1ity, volume and time of delivery
in the international markets. In addition,
markets for these products must exist.
- - A broad program, developed by the direct
participation of both the private and pub:.ic
sector, to create the necessary structure and
the profit incentives that will J.nduce the
private sector tv involve itself in export develop-
ment in preference to doing something else.
- - An organizational structure that will mobilize
and activate all of the related private, public, and
quasi -public sectors of the economy, including
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the economic ministries, support institutions
banks, educational institutions, trading and
business community, and both naU'Ie and
foreign entrepreneurs.
Each of these five points and the Inanner in
which it was developed in Korea after 1963 is elab-
orated belmv.
1. The Des h~e to Export
Becaus~ of the unfav'Jlrable balance-of-paymer.lts
situation, declining foreign aid and the cognizance of
the need for an externa~ sUnluhls to industrial growth,
the governnlent recognized the necessH} for a large
increase in exports.
Those sectors of t.he business conlmunity that
had Inade large profits frona the high rate of inflation,
while adlllitting the need for export development,
resisted nlany of the stabillization measures. To their
credit, however, they understood with a mininlum of
education and explanation, that in the long run it was
to their interest to accept stabilization. The few export-
ers as wen as the smaller business~n.enhad been initially
inclined to support the stabilization program. Thus, in
a short thne the entire business community recognized
the necessity and desirability of increased earnings in
foreign exchange and becanle eager to proceed.
The business cOlnmunity. having more or less
accepted stabilization in principle. had to be educated
to an entirely new philosophy of business.
Competition between products. particularly on
the inte~~nationalmarket, is based on quality. price. and
tin1.ing. therefore. busir:es:s must emphasize efficiency.
cost control. quality. speed. and larger scale production.
-21-
The expanded production and sales \\' ill offset the
slnaller unit profits whichmillst be taken to compete.
While this philosophy needed developrnent, both
government and business showed a demonstrable dcsire
to enter into an export prograrn. \\7 Hhout such a desirc
no p~agrarn can succeed.
2. 8xistence of an Entrepreneur ial Class
and a Trading Comnlunity
An entrepreneurial class should exist, and if it
does not exist there should be evidence that individuals
in the cornmunity can be developed into entrepreneurs.
These individuals might include those now engaged in
manufacturing for doolestic use, or r>ersons "}.iho have the
ability and imagination to engage in new and expanding
activities.
An im.portant group eonsists of those businessmen
who are now traders. These Blight be importers who
could fairly easily direct their activiEes toward exporting.
They might be traders engaged in cOIT_estic trade \vho are
both collectors and distributors of products. In countries
where primary products in agriculture and the extractive
industries play an inl.portant role, existing traders \vith
initiative can develop into entrepreneurs.
Korea had some manufacturers and many traders
for the domestic market. Both groups provided a basis
for developing an exporting entrepreneurial group.
3. Exportable Products.
A prelilninary though cursory survey indicated that
T(orea had existing and potential products that could be
developed for export. It was evident that most of these
I 'oducts could not Ineet international requirenlents as to
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price, volurne, quality, design, packaging, deHve.~y
lime, elc. Howeve~", sufficient products and. potentials
could be developed to meet "'-'lo.'lld nun'ket requirements.
In making this survey, major ntrnpo.'tance was given to
availability of the products selle...:-tedl.
4. Developing the Program
Since the pre-conditions existed (:al Aeast to nile
extent lhat pernliUed sh"engthening them whDe direct
export developlnenl effo.'ts were proceeding). it was
possible fOl" the government and the business commt. .1l.iity
with the assistance of A .. I.. D.. to undertake a planned
prograln of export expansion.. The program iin Korea
consisted of a number of incentives and of other support
measures which together formed a systematic and com-
prehensive approach. SimBar activHies nla.! \'leU be
applicable in whole or in part to other developing coun-
tric:-s. These win be ontUned in Section C below.
5. Organization for E~~port Development
Pr( grams developed on paper can sound good.
But they remain rhetoric urness there is an organization
capable of putting into action the measures and ideas
which the programs set forth.
In the compJLex organization of governments.
there is a tendency to confuse words with action. Elab-
orate programs are worked out by well intentioned
cmnmittees and authorities. Action is then assigned to
some agency. which reviews the words, and then proceeds
to continue to carryon its activities as lit did previously,
paying scant attention to organization necessary to imple-
ment the new program. The Korean export effort set ')ut
to counteract these usual tendencies. The method is
described in Section D below.
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A hasic philosophy conccrulling nile umburc ryh" Hue
incentives evolved as foR.h:»'l.t.,s:
a. Obviously. aU nnccnth!es are :at fOU'U1J1J (n,r
subsidy Un~t as much :at:Ai [)lossfible d1h~ec\t su.uijn;;ucd!ues:
for parUcular prl,,("\lucUon ['acuHUes shrrhllijRdl Ulot
be utilized. Such sllubsfidfi~~s teuud h:» cl"t"aleiull-
efficient industries and! .,lIre dUficlLuU to> U'Clf"flJOIVe
later.
lb. As mudl as possible.inccntive bel'1lll:d'Hs
should be hnllited to new exports or export
development indus1tdes. "flllcll.Ir' pll.urpose: is to
exp:uhd exp«n-ts arnd not to be siu1l1lply an extra
Hbonusu foll." already exnsUullg; exports.
c. Ilf aU tax incentives are given ouuy tlo pll'ofHs
fronn new or exparndled e~q.l)((n..ts.they do 1l110t ded1l.Uclt
frOlU exi3Un,g goverm1l1lenlt,inconnes. !l1l.Utl only from
addi.tional revenues created as a rcs1ll.llt of tille 1l1lew
growth and new exports.
d. Policy should also preclude tariff protection
as much as possible. E~lPorUng invob. es Jinter-
national cOlL1ll.petition and requ.uires eflfiic iit~llt pro-
duction. Protection tends to develop hnefllicien1t
and high-cost industries.
e. Import substitution. is" in th.eory, a proper
way to reduce th.e drawdo1~wn of foreign exchange
earnings. If it can be done without eJrubarkhllg
on a progran"l of high tariff protection~ it Jig
effective. Regretfu]l1.y, in practice it allnllos1t.
universally results in. over-protected, ineftricient
and high-cost industries tthat not only
c ~"eale cxpcnsu v(~ pu"o'CtiiUlcls fott" domesftuc
ILUSC. but act as a bralke OUll expou"t expans-
ion. in gencu"all. umpou"l subslHlLuUon jjm3!l
docsn" U, 'l.'itwlk.
f. In tthc iniiUall pu"ogu"aU'1I] stt:aJges hll
pau"Ucllullar, the banlkuu~g ~lmd ffinanc:ung ClOiU1Ill-
ponenls of the pu"ogn"mn SHulllJUUlld not d1ulU1JlIUrmtte
the eHott',t 1\ practuca~ W:LllY to avoid thus ]s
to !keep Um expou"t d1eve~opuneJ1llorg;;:ulI.uzaHons
ftt"oun blldng dh"el(~lllly ;fussod;cdcd! \},~dUll b:,ulIlkhog
nnsUhutt.llons. Hattheu"" tthe nUll;;;llttllcua~un:s;ftlltttLutt](ms
SiH~IlUlldl onlly be OUllC (OJ( U1C :S;1(~\N~U"",llll O!ll"g:i.HlillZa-
«nons 'l.'I:'UUllllUll Hue cXijlm"t (ClleVCllOpUlllJCntt h"ame"~·Ott·lk.
g. A 'l.'Judie v:awnely of uJllIccnth?e:s sHllotLulld be
devcllopedl I\,vhkh :are applHcablle ttOU11lJ:r.HlIY
snhuaUons. Thus allso lleaves a fllexublle sHu-
alion whiL'Te oUuen" pU"(()Jpos~ds can be adopted
iiJ :t1lllll on tthe ou"ighllall nll1lcell1JUves proposed are
not cOn1lllpllett.eJly accepted.
~-.. AU iincenUves sB-1!olluJldl be nllade .at'l,la.Halble
Ilo boUl! nalta ve and rron~engUll connp" .ies, all1Jd to
,10D nll venhuu"es.
2. P n"ofiitt. Incenttii. ves
The governnnent re1cognnzed Uu:at iin a priivate
en1ltt.erprise sysJtenlll productnon foll" exporting is done prj -
nnariJly by the lu-livate sectoll", and tthat the government
InItUStt. create profitt iincenUves Ito iindlUlce the blUlsiness com-
Hnmliitt.y to engage lin exportt. developmen1t.~ As recommended
by the Joint Export COtt1uuiission (EPSC~ described beJl ow,
the Korean Govel"nment relied largeRy on free market
forces and inaugurated an extensive series of credit, tax,
fiinance and support incentives for this purpose. It aRso
took steps to eRhninate restrictions and restrictii ye pr2c-
Hces that interfered witH'n this development.
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3. Credit Incentives
These were designed to make credit a vailab!e
to companies wishing to expand and develop new exports
and to gi ve these companies credit beyond t.heir present
credit structure:
a. Short-term, low-interest ~oans against firm
letters of credit. LI C loans were rnade at a
6-1/20/0 per annum rate, contrasted with bank
loan rates that ranged downward fr0l1l1 a rate of
28%, and with the average on aU loans of approx-
imately 170/0. A co-signature system on LI C
loans was instituted by which the tr'ader and the
producer could share in this loan in proportion
to their portion of the value of the export Hem
involved.
b. Loans for purchasing indigenous or import-
ed raw materials.
c. Low-interest loans to permit credit sales
to foreign customers aga.inst bins of lading.
d. Special low-interest crop loans on agri-
cultural products designated for export.
e. Same for seafood products.
f. Top priority to capital development and
nlachinery loans for new or expanded export
industries.
4. Tax incentives
a. No income tax or a reduced in~ome tax
on profits from new or expanded exports
during developluent period.
b. Accelerated depreciation allm'lances on
new plants, machinery, or improveme nts on
agricultural lands used for export products.
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c. Tax dedu(;tion allowance on travel and
overseas promotional expenses.
d. Reduction of local taxes (sales, trans-
action, real estate, etc.) on indigell10us
and irnported raw materials tlsed for
export products.
e. Reduction of or a Ihnited tin-he E~xemption
on aU taxes on new or expanded plant facili-
ties or agricuUuralland developed to expand
exports.
f. Tax deduction for research and technical
assistance expenses connected with new exports.
g. Elimination of aU export taxes.
5. Other Financial In~entives
a. On coal exports - uniform freight rates
to any export port froun any internal location.
b. Free entry of machinery used for export
development.
c. Free ~r~h'y through an indhrh:hual plant
IIbonded warehouse"" system, of rmv materials
used in products for :re-export.
d. Free entry of supplies, not for re-export, bu:
necess<:JIry for production, e. g. lubricating
oils, dies, processing chemicals, etc.
6. Other Support Measures
In addition to the diretCt fi~ancia1 incentblp.s, a
series of other support nleasures including the strengthen-
ing or creation of institutions related to e:Allorting, were
provided or planned. These measures included:
a. International trade pronl0tion and market
research (Korean Trade Promotion Corporation -
a governnlent agency)
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b. Productivity (Korean Productivity Center)
c. Massive input of technical assistance
d. Simplification of paper work procedures
e. Quality development and control
f. Export inspection
g. Design
h. Packaging
i. Export insurance
J. International arbitration of disputes
k. Business ethics education
1. Expedition and complaint centers
m. Standardization
n. Market research training
o. In-and-out travel missions
p. Industrial parks and free trade zones
q. Engineering, technical and vocational
training programs.
The pros and cons of these incentive and support
measures are discussed in subsequent chapters. While
all of these incentives are not applicable to every devel-
oping country: the important fact is that incentives are
an essential ingredient to this development process.
V/ithout these incentives i~ would have been impossible
to develop the program in Korea.
D. Joint Expc.rt Development Committee (EPSC)
1. Need for An OrganizatiOl:
A massive eAllort developnlent program involves
almost every part vi the economy, including most of
both the private and public sectors. A method had to be
found that would mobilize and activate all these forces
in the community. A mechanism had to be developed
that would actively involve every economic Ministry.
quasi-government agency and university, the banking
community, and all sections of the business community
in a single organization that could plan, coordinate,
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activate and direct the entir4~ program.
In many countries~ the writer has observed the
establishment of a top level export committee, com-
posed exclusively of goverrunent andlor banking officials.
While these committees may achieve sOJne li.miter:l suc-
cesses~ they are not wholly successful because they de
not actively enlist the entire economic COlnTJlUnily of
their country. Even when th4:: membership of such a com-
mittee includes important off ~cia1s of public and private
organi zations~ it does not rkt1Cessarily serve its intended
purpose. What is essential is a consciom:; and continuing
effort: to get the active parUeipation of' all related sec-
tions of the govermnent and the business-economic com-
munity and of individuals.
2. Establishment of the EPSC
In Korea~ the various agencies and ministries
did communicate and meet \lJ'ith each otheJr~ but these
were unorganized and unstructured contacts which did
not, at first~ result in unified action. In 1963, a joint
export developnlent committee that should have accom-
pUshed this objective was established on paper. In
practice~ the cOlnmittee was non-existent. A. I. D. began
late in 1964 to probe the feelings of the Illany interested
persons regarding the formation and activation of this
cOlumittee. \Vhile there \'1as general agreement as to its
usefulness, much of the acceptance was mere lip service.
l\rlinisterial prerogatives, distrust between the business
community and government agencies, and general inertia
nliligated against its activation. A continuous campaign
of explanation and education was required to gain com-
plete acceptance of this concept.
In March~ 1965~ as part of the export develop-
lllent program~ the Joint Export Development Committee was
officialy established as a sub-committee of the Economic
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Cooperation Council (ECC)p which was the top level
coordinating organization olr the Korean Government
and A. I.. D. The Joint Export Development Committee
was usually called the Export Promotion Subcommittee.
By agreement between the Deputy Prime Minister, who
was also the head of the Economic Planniing Board, and
the Director of the U. S. A. I. D. Mission. representa-
Uves of the lVlission were made part of tne EPSC.
3. Organization and Acti vaHon of EPSC.
EPSC consisted of: (a) the Vice Ministers of
Commerce and Industry. Agriculture and! Forestry,
Finance, Economic PJlanning, Transportation, and
Foreign Affairs; (b) the Directors of other govern-
mental and quasi-goverrun.ent agencies such as
Customs, Monopoly, Korean Export Promotion Corp-
oration, Bureau of Standards, agricultural and indus-
trial research centers; (c) the governors and officials
of the Bank of Korea and of private banks; and finally
but very important. (d) the Presidents of the Korean
Chamber of Comnlerce, Korean Businessmen Associ-
ation, Korean Traders Association, Small and Medium
Business Cooperatives Association, and other trade
associations. Thus was combined the private and
public sector.
The Vice Minister of Commerce and Industry
and the Deputy Director of A. L D. were co-chairmen
of the EPSC. The EPSC relied on a steering committee
to do the detailed planning aLnd coordinating of the over-
aU ~xport drive. This steering committee consisted of
two people, the Assistant Minister of Commerce and
Industry and the A. I. D. Export Advisor.
At the working level, a series of cross-sectional
private and public sector working task forces were
responsible for activibes in the following areas: Finance
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and Taxation: Agriculture, Fishing, Mining, Heavy
Industry, Light Industry, l\IIarketing, Information,
Quality Improvement and Technical Assistance, Simpli-
fication of procedures, and Exporter-Importer Relations.
An A. 1. D. technician was attached to each task force as
an advisor. The A. I. D. technical advisors attached to
e very task force were able to contribute their experi-
e nce and knowledge.
The activation of these Working Task Forces
required considerable effort on the part of the steering
COlUlnittee. At first, members of the working groups
were inclined to think that they existed merely to obtain
financial assistance from A. 1. D. As their work pro-
gressed, they gradually began to function as o"erall
policy-nlaking committees forluulating plans and recom-
mendations to implement the basic export program estab-
lIshed by the government.
The central staff of EPSC consisted of a small
Secretariat whose only job was to expedite meetings,
gather nlinutes and prepare resumes for central com-
mjttee meetings. The work of developing programs was
left to the working committees or task forces who in
turn would call upon the constituent organizations for
advice, progranls, ideas and activities. In this manner
the pri vate and public sectors were mobilized into an
institution which involved them in all aspects of the de-
velopment process.
Since a commodity-by-commodity approach was
necessary, the "Ministries of Commerce and Industry
and of Agricu.!.ture and Forestry assigned a total of 35
comnl0dity chiefs, each responsible for a single com-
modity. vVhile reporting directly to the llninistries in-
volved, they also coordinated their activities with and
subnlitted reports to the appropriate EPSC working
groups. EPSC suggested that each commodity chief
should work with representatives of the industry to set
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up an advisory conul1IiUec. "fhHS imdu"aucltiou'o "i';'1!~ iC'~H"u"ilcd
out in sorne areas, but \'Jas not fILuUn.\llled lin ott.hcU"s.
4. Korean Take-Over of Function
ParaHel lto the EPSCwas 'al Sfin1lbH~llU" ,goveu"umllC'Ublt
comlniUee, winch consisted conlly of govcrullBlrbcUllt olfflieialls
with the business r('~presentath'esacUubg Htt'll ~ltUll advisory
capacity and without A.1. D. ulIllcu1l1lbeu"s. MmllY of'the mett1J1l-
bel'S of the governIDllclI1lt COmU'DllHUCe I;,q,,"crC' alls()J memH»crs of
Uae joint committee. As the comuniUce uncmH))cu"s gahllcd
mq>ericnce and kUlowlledge. the 1I.q,,1 orlk of tt.he joint CIiJJ»1J1lU1JlIHUeC
was gradually talken over eUlltt:fitt"cly by tthe 1;.7au''.iollus agencies
and sub-conuu1l1littces of UlIC g;ovCrUllraH~nbtt.. 'The govcrullu1I1Itmtt
connmittee in tt:urro toolk into Us ranlks u1J1lorc'rcp:u"cscntta-
lives of the Korean bll.USHUllCSS COnH1l1llLUU1l.lltt.y. By It.!hJc end! on~
1966 the ~~oint cmnuniUce U~PSC> rc:easc<cU lfum~:tt.ioU1Liullg and
its entire worlk was Hllandllledl by ttbe lKorC':am Govcnm1lC'nft
and private business sector connunnUees.
5. Acconnplii.shnf'Oents of gPSC.
Since EPSCI\,'(\ras UllOlt a govermnenlt agenc'y,nt had
no power other \Loan to U1l'1lalke recoulIu1l1lendatkms. Howeve:lJ",
the record for the hvo years sholl.'Ils thalt a:Umost aU of its
recolrnn1lendatiLons were adopted by 'IlarnOIl.Us goveru1lll1f1l<ent
agencies.
One reason forftJnis record is ttlnatt the Koreallll
Co-Chairnlan of this counu1l1liUee, froll1I1l itsnH1l<ceptnon, ]' e-
ported once a ulonth directtly tofthe President of Korea OUlI
the cOlnnlittee ft s work and the ensuing progll"aLlI1I1l implell1lllen-
tation by the Korean Govermnenlt:. The P l!.-esident took a
personal interest and issll.ued instrll.ucftioB'1ls on lfnajjor poliicy
Jlnatters frO!n tinne to thne. The \9leight of his olfIJicc gave
continuous support to the activitnes of the J oimlLE).l))ort
Development COffilnittee, i. e. EPSC. Statistics of acltiiO.llllS
taken are sho'i.'/U in th,e following tables. :FuU data on the
nature of proposals and resu.ults are in the append] xes.
Tabl~ i
SUtrlftHlry of ActioM taken Oh Proposals 1965 (Jfin = Sept>
E?SC Pnmo15al§ 1965 Export PromotIon Pollev Pl<bOOgah~
f<'1der Under
Proposals Com'iid= No Pr0t:H.1sa13 COfl!5ider= No I Gl<and
Accepted ex11tion ~eHon Total Accepted action ActIon Total ~
Finance & 'r:~xation 0 :; :2 i lO 2 1 13 :W
Agricultur(~ :2 7 4 13 0 1 0 0 13
Fisheries 0 2 3 :) 0 1 0 0 :;
Mining 5 :2 ., 10 0 0 0 0 10.,
Light InrJustry 1 2 1 4 2 0 0 2 I 6Heavy Industry :3 1 1 5 0 0 0 0 a
Simplification
of Procedures :~ 0 2 5 I '? 0 0 :~ I B :N.. NInformn'Lon 0 4 2 G 1 0 0 1 I 7
Exporter 'Importer
Relatio,.s 1 0 0 1 I 3 1 0 4 I 5
Marketing Analysif'
& Research 1 .; 2 i I ;) 1 0 6 I 13
Quality Improvement
& Tech Asst. 4 3 4 11 I 10 0 0 10 I '~ 1Export to Vietnam 3 3 2 8 0 0 Q 0 8
Steering Committee
and n. e. C. 1 1 0 2 I ;) OJ 0 i I !}..
-
TOTAL 24 34 26 84 39 6 1 46 130
A. Most
Report - Oct 1965
USOM/K ED/FE
Table 8
Summary of Actions taken on Proposals 1nB6 (Jan - Sept)
EPSC Proposal s la6S export Prornotion Policy Proposals
Under Under
Propoals Consid- No Proposals Ct):1sid- No Grand
Accepted ation Action Total Accepted eration Action Total Total
Stcerin,:r .5 0 0 5 j 10 0 2 12 I 17I"
Committee
Finance &
Taxation 4 0 1 !) 1i 2 :~ 22 2i
Ag r'icul ture 1 ~ 2 :) - - - None f)
'.'
-I I 2 :..:Fishery 0 2 0 2 - - - None
M.inlng 2 ~) 0 7 I - - - \\;0110 I ii
Industl'y 2 () (l 2 I :~ 0 0 .) I ;).-
Quality Inspection
& Tech Asst. B 2 0 10 f) U 1 6 I 16
Marketing 10 CJ 0 10 14 0 i 21 I '} 1\ ') ~
f .-
TOTAL n 11 :3 46 4fJ 2 1 :3 64 I : 0
,-\ • .7\lust
Hep0l't - ()C~ 1~166
{'SOl\I E· ED I'E
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The reconlmendations form ulated each year
becanle to a large extent, the export program for the
following year. As the overall program developed,
gove rnment institutions and privaLe organizations them-
se1ves more and luore took on the functions required for
its implementation. The cOlnmittee's \'lork changed to
one of fOrll1ulating broad policies. During the second
year the number of working groups were reduced, and the
number of meetings declined, as did the number of peo-
ple required to attend.
Toward the end of 1965, and again in 1966, a
cOluplete report was prepared and presented by the
Steering Comnlittee to the Economic Cooperation Council.
The presentation of the report was attended by the Deputy
Prinle :Minister and the A. I. D. Director who served as
chairnlen, and by the :Ministers and other important offi-
cials of the Inajor econonlic Iuinistries and government
organizations concerned. The full reports were circu-
lated in advance, and point-by-point summaries were
read to the Council. These reports were given serious
attention, and their recommendations assisted in formu-
lating goverrunent policy and acti )ns. The fact that all
these busy official~ devoted a half day to attending the
presentation and disclission of this report is evidence of
the iruportance that was given to export activities.
In conclusion, the system was effective (1) be-
cause the Joint Committee succeeded in mobiliztag,
uniting, and activating all areas of the private and public
economic structure related to exporting, and (2) because
the Joint Committee gave the govermuent committees,
which functioned separately, usable advice and ideas. In
the short period of two years the government structure
had become so institutionalized and operative that it
required no more outside assistance.
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CHAPTEH V
EXPORT DEVELOPl\iIENT PROGRA1\"I
The form ulaHon of the first overaU prograln began
in early 1965. The job of putting this p~"ograI11 into a
single docmnenl was given to the Assistant ~lin:ister for
Export Development of the l\iIinistry of Commerce and
Industry. A. 1. D. furnished technical assistance.
The program as finaHy fannulated was a mixture
of broad policies, staterr1lents of purpose in certain
fields, specific and detailed irnplementatiion measures
in others, and a series of predictions. Some of it was
noorly defined and over-general. It included financial
and taxation measures, a series of studies, technical
instructions, research proposals, marketing measures,
references to specific industries. and plans for the
establishment of some new institutions and the strength-
ening of others. Despite the 111ixed nature of the con-
tents, it brought together all the elements and measures
required to achieve the high priority given to export
develooment. Included in the program was the establish-
ment of the Joint Export COInnliUee (EPSC) previously
described.
A. EconOlnic Study to Determine Program
Size and Shape
Following the deterrnination of the general com-
ponents of the program Cllnd its institutional framework,
the next step was an economic study to deternline
realistic levels of proposed export increases. The
Economic Planning Board - - the senior economic
Ministry - - was gi ven this task. Its IVIinister was also
the Deputy Prinle l\Hnister and the Chairluan of the
Cabinet Sub-Conunittee of Economic M:inisters. In
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:uddHion ttn its phumnng ~bcUvHues. Ul had t("o1rDh"oll oveu"
the baudget (dlnd foreign :Dl udl) and! Um ~5: had gU"e':td ll(~itt8'U":tug.C'
ov('r" .aUll tiue oUilet" li\HlI1In:s;tt~"h~:s. Tluc MUUlltisttdes of
Commeu"ce ami Indm;;h")\ and AgrnctluHll.uu"c x...'ere ciiuHcd
'lupon to deve~op tau"gels fif)!U" each pU"OiChuctt b~sed flJr1! an
alllah'5us of irucu"cascs ~'JUllndll "oveu"e aU:tbuUlla:bllc.
"
I':':pou"t dcvehJJpnll(~Ult u"cqll.uuu"e~ capHall nnpll.Utt. nnto m:nmy
J ndHsttr·na~. ag,Th.':Q~HIlUtt":tllU" U11lUnUUllg iillm:B se:tllroo([1! deve]opmcTutt
;;1" t II "...'U tt U{' s. C U"i(~d i l n ttll:ill m:" i Ub;g ~'." :..15 m:eded ro U" tthe pJ"oposed
mr('ntt hies pn'ogy:tuU1:ll :<11:5 1;\y,'eU ~ :as fou" U";;,1I\1,i1 nll~btteU"liahs :fllnd
\~." (',dd !lJ1-2. c:tupu tat hu :a«:llrr.Wt.tioUll. ftimuncuUllgtN:fllS nec'essau"y ttl()
d('~"~'JOp Uh." physu'C':aU ~H1)«,H nUll:s;tlitt.\lUntiomll~nU1lh"ash"l\.llchH·e.
In addnttdOnll tto :seUDrr'ug expou"tt. ttau"gett goalls and esUma-
tHUg the fUuu:,:ullcn:.:ull u"eS(()ll.llu"C'es ~'.i'hJicllll they u"eqlLuiired. H was
aL~o neces:s:.:u"y do COn1lsu(Uen" hO'l,...• Hue ft"UtrIl:fllIl1lC'UUllg mnglntt /be
ull!ht:1Jnned. The phUUllll1lllnig, of expou"t ([~~\"e]olPu11llenttwas omy
a p:,:~u"tt. of Hue oveu"allll p~armllUllg roU" ttlhle d1evellopnllenlltt on the
ent" .' CCOU1l'OJHUY. SUnlIec expol1~tt devcllopmentt ]had been g:hren
111}'(" luughcsl pu"llorHy. lln s;oune Knllstt~1lnllCeS reSOtlu'ces: were
"',,, Hludrawn fu"oun otther ~»n"o,g,lr'''H1r1ls. J:\Hostt on the ttlln8lnding
C:tHllllC fu"on1l KOI1"ea" s: ow ttl! !"eso~_uu~ces" pllUbHc :amd prhratte•
.....,.. Hh son~e heHp [U"OUll1l A. 1. D. and other fi nternatnomllll assist-
:Uilce p."og·U'arns.
Since achilcveullllelutt of Hue stt2ll»iiHzahon program de-
pended heavily upon anttknpatted expop"t ealt"mngs. there
"...,,"'as real pressuu"e t.O meet Uue targets of Hue p];alll1med
export. prograull1l. NeverUllelless. there was a dynanll:DC
appu"oach, \,,-,u.Uu constant reviews and shHls in prJioriHes
and allocations.
The l\1hnislry of Con1lllUllerCe and Ind1Lllstry assigned
export targets to every organization in the cOllmttry. Eadll
,ub-district. e:::lch cH.y. each industry and each iindustriiaH
organizatnon received speoLilfic targets. Targets "","ere evall
-37-
established for individuall cornpannes .'dlleu"~~veu" possubli(,'
Ov rseas. the Ambassadou's and the KOTRi\ cenleu"s
(Korean Trade PromoUon Coq)or~~UoU1l) we-u'e given the
responsibility of seeing that cOlluutry s,~h~s taqgc~.s w'eu"c
fulfiHed. The iu'ocess of eslabllishung the tiuU",g'ets W',Hi
noll always sc uenllHic, :and U'llcy WC'U"C ofrteull edtlDC;;hh.:cti
guesses. \VlhUe Hue oveu";;liU go;al ",,'.as Uuo~, cUlI:HlIged .. the
:sepal"al.e nnUlnviduau lan"gels weu"e s~lluHed as expeu"LI~:m,"
or fUI'theu' analysis stLuggested, To Hue ;;HnlJaZeU1lwnt orr
~hose not dUlrecUy ;;Usso«"uatteiCll" tthil." uu~~ttfo~lI~lit. ;uuHll'rd"
oven'aU Ilargell was n"if~:i.H:.hed yce:LU" ~unett" ye;';1iT.
H is probably esseullttU:rlll tt,'Q> :i.HlIY ptt"ogr"aun ;;uuuywheu"C'
in Ilhe wou'jjd that, while lift unay not m:~cess:Llin"nlly foHol.'l,
Hlle exact Kou'e::,ull patt.ttett"n. ut estt~llhH;sha\'s gO::'tlis" anud
provides fnnancial ll~eS((j)lJ.utt"ces whuch meet the lI"eil.J!lLlilll~e­
ments.
B. F'iinanchng the Ptt"colgtt"ann
The ecoruottUu iic shudnes had «:lett.€' nn lined trJhle SQUO-
sltanUaR annountts required for this extenslive development
progranu. The dh'eclL and nn-lldlnrect slLubsjidiie~" tax rebates
and support iinllstitullions. as 'i.'.{eB <:liS the rllel.·; capH<:1lR
investnnent. iinvolved a sii.gnHiicantt porttDoUll of the ll1latiion1l<:llll
incon'le and of the na1tUonaR lln1l'l/estll1l11cnt iirnplLuL
The Korean ecomnny l\.'iaS reCeiiVRrllg assnstance from
the UnHed States and othell~ Jforeiign donors, and foneiign
investments fronl Japan alll~ SOJl1flle European COlLHllttu"ues.
Questiol1E' have been raised as to \'ihether it wOlLuRd have
been possible to mOllUllt this export program w iiUl101Ult
such a nnassive input of assistance. U. S. aid <:lISSiistt~HllCe
had been lLUuch greater during the' ten years prior to the
beginning of the export drive. FroHll Hlll53 on H began
tapering off and whi1Le substantial. it \\'as cOll1lsiiderab1Ly
less than previio1lllsly. Deve1Lopnlent loans \'..'ere rep1Laciiullg:
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gleant assistance. 'T'ornl nell l/)olTo\vings nm.dl net trans-
fers fr'om the rest of the '-'Jodd (rottn aU SOlLurces con-
stituted approxhnaLelly 10 percent of the Gross Nationan
Product for each year 195'7 to HHJZ. In each of the rOnO\\~­
ing three years 1964, n~6S and 1966 foreign l"esourccs
constihntcd about 7 percent of GNP and in H)i61 about
H-l/ 2 percent.
Knowledgeable ecoulottl!llists eomneclcdl """uth the
PIl'Otw:<un have stated Uuntt tim:eslunett1l1 needed for' the
export dcvelopmcunt pll"ogtt"am co~ulid hav<t:'c bceulimadc
availlable even uf UllCtt·c had &:H:en U1l0 outsude cconollnnc
assistance. T'eduucall helip can be' bOlLught,iif not pro-
vided olherll.'J nsc. EXpHOJI."t. ullll,crease would ILmdoubtedly
have llnoved at a rnuch snowl(~r rate, but could have been
developed through the locan !'esolLu"ces ava.HabJle in Korea,
if the right poHcies had been "3lbHshed.
The funds lI.·cquired canw froB1I1I BHHlIY sources. Part
of thenll Calne fronn the go'verrlurnent budget, part from
capital growth~ and part fronn the rapid expansion of
private savings that follOWed governmllcnllt stabilization
rneasures - Il.vhich inclll.~ded raising the rate of interest
for savings paid by banlks froull 1L6 percent to 30 percent.
This increase in the sa\I,'ings interest rate attracted
large surns into the bank:s,which could channel the use
of the funds in an orderly and planned manner. Priority
was given to export financing, \'lhich was given subsidized
interest rates.
The cost of giving the low interest rate to exporters
for various purposes (includling the important incentive
of 6-1/2 percent loans against letters of credit) was borne
by the Central Banik rediscounting the loans by the com-
mercia! banks. The :rediscounting was covered partially
out of other profits of the Central Bank, and partially
froln govermnent subsidies to it.
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As exports increased. nnore and more credit was
available from foreign sources as weB as frmn the
lal~ge increase in foreign exchange reserves. In Jl965
these resen'ves amou.mted to $Jl38 fniHion. By 1961 they
had reached $ 34'7 un an BOUi.
n was possible to fUnance expolt't devellopnnent. needs.
despite necessary mone(att'y and budget restr:fltinls.
because of the can"crull aUenUon given tt.o tthe SOlB'Ce and
distn'jbuUon of financing.
c. SeUing the Progn'arru to the Cou.mtry
The next step \'Jas to seU HIe ptt'og.r'c:1lm to the pubHc.
and partBcuhu'ny to t.he busiiness community. The initial
drive was begun by President Park o~· Korea at a wen
publicized ItneeUng to \'.1hh~h unen from the top levels of
govermnent, fn'orn supp<c>!'t nnsUhuUons. banks. and a
wide sector on the ~nnsines:s comnHmHy had been invited.
President Parlk ;LUliUliOu.unced that export development
would becorne t.ne m.nnllber one prnorHy in the economic
developuaent plL"ogn"au'Ull. He pRaced such emphasis on the
export progr~H1lll that hns :iUmOIlUllCenllent ",,'as headline news.
(See The Korean Ren:mbliic. SeouR, Jan. 10, li965, p. L )
SubsequenUy. l'nany other nH::eitiings were held in cities
throughout the naHon and Dl/1l1lJlch publicity was gi ven to the
various aspects of the program.
The Joint Export Development Com.n:nilttet.. reported
in a body, once a llUOllllth to the President of Korea, who
took a personal interest in the proble.n:ns presented.
r:ach Cabinet Minister had regular Ineetings about
the export prograltn Wi1ll11 his staff. The Presidents of the
varicus business organizations caned nleetings of their
lneUl bel'S to proul0te. explain and discuss the problems
involved.
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The A. L D. Mission Director and Ull(~ Senior Export
Advisor rnet with hundreds of businessmen y and dozens
of business organizations. A regular serh.~s of weekly
hmcheom::: with the heads of various orgaru:zatfions w~s held.
This massive promotional canrupaign created ~nah1Ultiii­
a5m throughout the coumtry. J\hllllosl e,/ery sector of the
b\IUsincss community from Ulle largest to the smaUest be-
ca.nllC interested, an":~ began to give thought, to ho\...~ they
cO"Did hecome nnvol ved. SuciC:ess slories were pubHciz.ed
and exporting became om.~ of till; prime obJt~dtives of every
bllUsHlcssm.Hll and business organization. P:dzes tNCre given
at cCll"emoniall occasi0ttl!s fOll" stLUccessh.lill perfo.nnance.
D. Inp~t of Technical Assistance
Because of lhe nabure of the develloplmental process,
the ex;:.ort p~~ogranll reqlluired a :massi ve input of technical
assistance_ It inchuded specialized tedull.liciians assisting
nn specific projects at the marnagement and factory levels
as weU as generaHsts advising; at the highest levels. It
nnchaded sending trainees overseas both as individuals and
lealns as weB as developing traipjng and educational pro-
grrons in the country.
In Korea Inuch of this technical input was requested
by the Korean Govermnent from A. I. D. The 1\Hssion ob-
tained new advisors and Jrallade liibera,l use of experts al-
ready in the country for other purposes. The A. L D. Export
Developllnent ConuniUee and 1the Senior Export Advisor co-
ordinated the whole progranll. Other assistance came from
international organizations and from private business. The
source of technical help can be varied, but the desire by
both govermnent and the private sector to be guided by its
advice is Inost essential.
E. \Vhat Not To Do
Certain export activities in many parts of the world
have been observed to bring little or no results. Some of
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these activities are included here as a note of caution.
1. P remature Propaganda
Internal propaganda is a part of export develop-
ment. However, no campaign should be prematurely
started. The programs, incentives and organizational
structure should be planned before launching the campaign.
A premature campaign could invol ve business in activities
which might not be successflllLll, and thuswnuld actuaUy set
back the program. Propaganda exhortations in the name of
patriotism are insufficient. Concrete plans and incentives
must be presented.
2. Over- emphasis on SeUing
Often a so-caned export development pl"ogram
consists only of export prOl1r1lotion -- the selling process.
This is important. but it is orilLy one part of an export
program. Export development includes the entire range
of activities outlined previously. Before promoting there
must be pror!ucts to promote.
3. No Panacea
Unplanned, haphazard and unrelated incentives
or activities may help, but \'lill not succeed in bringing
large scale results. For eXaTIlple, in the Philippines the
major governn1ent eATort origanization was established
to tackle one problem, that of export procedures. In one
Latin American country t.he major emphasis of the pro-
gram evolved was to develop Uindustrial parks. U In other
countries a single incentive or a single production devel-
opment program was established. At best, haphazard
activities can only bring limited success and may dampen
the enthusiasm and initiative of the export community.
The problem must be surrounded.
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Al though irnportant. fim.llUllCing and uHveslunent
F'" ould not be given pn'iunal"y plt'Onll)] m:DblCiC'" "VhUe ~ [ ns
sometimes unavoidable, fit is 'Miseu' H the e:o;;porl organ.u'Z.1l-
tions are not part of :at. banlking insUhuUon. »lalher the liJanlk-
ing institution should be one olf the counponeulil parts o~· the
export organi zaUons.
5 Exclusive Ou'ganuzalUoUlls
In many couullb'ucs. snnaU export eommjUees.
have been estabUshed. Soune consi st ou'l.lly <of goveu'ulunenl
officnals. other's mosUy OJf U>mulkhug oU-rucnals. mud! slnl oiHli-
ers only of inusiness oq~anu:zaUoU1lofficials. \VhHe these
can ~io IlUseful \9Jou'Ik, the)' do m)t accompHsh Hue basue pur'-
pose of involving the wholie or'Une govermneub1!.. and Uue plr"i!-
vale sectoc together. Theynuay also develop into bmream:~r­
acies which perpetuate Uneunsel ves. In each comlltry the
type of organizatnon nlIll1l.Dst be deterll1l1dined by .local political
and econmnic factors. However. the best organ.llZationll is
that lin wh.ich the centn~all counmiiUee has a small.l staff all1ld
the \\7ork is done by the lPan'tncnpating organuzatnoulls.
6. Over-optirn:sUc ScHers
In developing a programl one cannot always wait
for logical step-by-step development. If an individual
product Ineets internatllon:r...l standards and can find a mar-
ket, it should be !Jushed \llithout ~Naitii.ng for the whole pro-
gram. Success stories are hll1lportant. However, it is
essential that products actually be ready for the interna-
tionallnarket. Often the sainple may be acceptall-Jlle, but
the producing unit is not quite ready to fmfnl the orders
it has accepted either as to quality, quantity or time of
delivery. Prenllature selling without an organization to
back it up can often do more harm than if no selling had
been done in the Jfirst instance.
CHAPTEH VI
A. 1. D. MISSIONlS HOLE
A. O.~ganizaUon ro." AssiblLance
Even prior to the cOtt1l1lpllete reaHzaUon by the Korean
Govel"mnent that a llarge uncrease lof expor'ts was impor··
tant to thei I" econon, UC devellopnllent progr'arn, the A. 1. D.
]\thssuon had l"ecognized the necessity for' thus activity.
Both in pl"eparatllon for and subseqluenUy as a result of
the request for assistance h"om the Ko.·ean Government.
the A. l. D. Mussion DirecttoU" nllade the de1t.ernllination to
esttablish the machinel"y ,,'Hhin the 1\Hssion to assist in
HUllS actiivHy. It \vas agtt"ced that expon't development
requiil'cd a coordinated oven"aU approach within the A. L D•
.H'ganiizaUon, The progn";(url ,,,"olLund involi ve every aspect
of A~ l. D. acU viUes - - pn"ogranllnlliing. econonlllc analysis,
financing. technican assisttance, industry, agriculture,
l"nining. seafood. educaholll, investnll1ent promotion and
inforl1l1ation activities.
Because aU acUviUes ''\"ere involved and exporting
is everybodyl s business, lit would be nobodv~s business
unless there was a focal point for these activities. The
A. 1. O. l1VIissJion therefore established an Office of Export
Developnnent and Private Enterprise designed to serve
both the Jl\;li.ssion and the Korean Govermnent. The Senior
Export Advisor was to act as a focal point of ideas, to
co~rdinate and give iltupetus to the activities of the JMission,
and to assist the Koreans in the sanle process" His
staff consisted of two assistants (one Anlerican), bNO
secretaries (one AnDerican). and one interpreter.
The Director set up an A. I. D. ccmnlittee of repre-
sentatives fronl each of the dJi vision£ indicated above '.vith
the Senior Export Advisor achng as Chairnuan, to deal
with export developltuent. Closely relat~d to export
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development was the foreign investment promotion
program. An A. L D. committee for foreign investment
development was also established with the Chief of the
Finance Division as Chairlnan and the Senior Export
Advisbr as a member. A third committee concerned
with small and medium industry was chaired by the
Chief of the Industry Division. There were still
other committees in other areas of activity of the Mission.
When programs had been formulated by the A.. L D.
Export Committee, implementation was turned over to
the appropriate division. The lines were sometimes
blurred and there was inevitable overlapping of pro-
gramming and activity, but as much as possible this
method was carried out.
Through the regular Director's meeting with the
senior staff, plus ad hoc meetings on specific problems
with the various Chairmen, the work of all these conl. '7
mittees was coordinated. The Senior Export Advisor
and the A. L D. Export Committee were the contact point
between the Korean Gov ~rnment and the A. L D. Mission.
Within the Mission these committees reflected the
philosophy of the "overall" approach. For example, a
proposal regarding the exports of fresh fish would be
assigned to the seafood member of the EXport Committee,
who would not only use staff of the Rural Development
Diyision. but also get technical advice from the Industry,
I
Finance, and Program Divisions concerning such ques-
tions as financing for fishing ports, or transportation
from the ports to the market, processing and freezing
of fish, or the search for a market. He might either set
up an ad hoc committee or seek advice from the various
departments involved. In this manner all sections which
were involved in a problem took a part in the decision-
making process.
As has been previomsHy described, lluc Jount Expom"t
Oevelopmncnt CommiUee (ESPC) slLJlbseq\1.ucnUy estabHshed
by the Korean Govcrmnerllt had a U1Iumber ott" \'.Iiolt"kfing eom-
miUces. A staff member of i\", J. D. was aUachcd to each
workfing comurdUee fin an adhlrusO!t"Y cifllp:fllcH,y.
In addition to U'lle nljleUllllI)J~~rs of thc~nu:s:s:iiolll, the
CommercBal AUache of l&lC [~unb uSS)! \~t.lifII~ ;;bHsQ') :rJiU1Jll1eunbeu"
Ie)!' \the A. J. D. Export COUlrHlJlliiUee. ~'HlId otheu" Ett1lllbassy
,,,ffUcbHs 1\.t,;1()J\lu~d p:!UrUIl":up:rdc nu)) fits itbcUvlitties tt"U"OU1l1I Hrnc tt(i)
ttilme. Sll.uh:F~qQUctt1lU'y, a SI/))({;IC::ii:i.uU MfiHlltt"u"y P'ro<C'tLlIlt"cuncntt COU1JlI-
~ll]fiUee, ;(·~)1I1l:sn:sUng of u"cp.u"esculltaUves of ahe U. S. J\Jrmed
Fon'ce~, the Erruhassy ;[lind Hue Sennou" Expou"tt Advisor, was
esllab,Hshed Ilo 3ssB,sll Uue Kon'eaulls llrll seHling thelir' prod!1l.llcls
Ilo It S. Anned F'olt"ces stt.aUonedun Korea and Ilo Vietnam.
Then'c was allso a joinll Korean (;oVelt"Uillllent-U. S. I1\'liHtary
P rocllDremcnll CmnuniUee.
In ordel.' Ila give the progr:aurJ1l the hll1lpeh.ns it u-eq1Ldlred
as -.'JeB as to indicate to tt.he Korean Governull1lent the impor-
tance that the Directoll' aUached to iit, Hue Senior Export
Advisor needed access tt.o tt.he highest llevel of goverID1!1lent
and business. and Hlle conUn1LUoll.~s support of the Director.
Ahnost hnnnediately after his arrival. he "'las perbonaHy
introduced by the Director to the approprliate Gcve~nrrItent
lVIinisters, and to the heads of the major business organ-
zations. The Senior Exportt. Advisor at aU times had direct,
easy access to the JMission Director and Dep1l.llty Director.
Their guidance and assistanee as \'leU as the quiick decisions
that could be rnade at this level, were of inestinlable help in
developing the whole prograull.
This writer had the good fortune to have lt1l1lany years of
experience as a production engineer, construction engineer
and businesslnan in a wide variety of enterprises, and also
served as Industry Chief of the ~IarshallPlan in Italy and
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special assist<lnt in It'rance and Germany for three years
starting in 19f,O. This combined government. business.
production and engineering e~q)erience. and previous de-
velopment work in Europe stood hiIn in good stead in
developing the progra~-H. Similar broad engineering and
business expel'ience would be a useful asset to anyone
who 111ight be chosen as organizer of and principal advis-
01' to an expol't prograrn.
B. Learning tI.!e Problenn
Since there had been no eonlparable export develop-
ment progranl in the past, the Senior Export Advisor
began his work gathering ideas and opinions from all
possible sources. induding an intensive reading program
and discussions with every A. 1. D~ division chief. The
l\tlinisters of the Korean Miili:stries involved arranged for
hiln also to meet. their Division Chiefs. FurthEr discus-
sions were carrie-j on with leading members uf the bank-
ing cOlnnlunity, of KOTRA allld the various supporting
agencies then in existence. He also talked with engineer-
iJ~g and business school officials, and with economists.
The Advisor undertook a sel'ies of trips throughout
the country. lneeting nlenlbers of the business community,
the Chalnber of Comnlerce. local city and provincial gov-
ernors. lnayors and officials in every locality. He visited
nlore than one hundred factories, shipyardls. mines, food
and seafood processing and freezing plants, etc. In this
nlanner he became familiar with the productive capacity
of the country, and also obtained some concept of the
technical needs of these production units.
An important part of these studies included learning
the general history and culture of the country -- its reli-
gions, manners and philosophy. He visited many of the
universities, attended lectures of the Royal Asia Society
and visited monuments, temples and shrines. This general
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education on the culture and history of the country
helped him to understand whieh forces would influence
change to a modern culture based on technology and
business.
C. Contacts with the Business Community
Exports are created primarily by the llnanufacturers,
traders, and general business comlnunity. Government
can only formulate policies and administer incentives
that stimulate the businessmen in this effort. \Vhile the
l\tlission had over the years developed many contacts with
specific industries, and with eompanies to which it had
granted loans or assistance, there was no point in the
l\tIission on which these contacts could focus. It was im-
portant that the business community, through its collec-
tive leadership. have a single avenue for exchanging
opinions with the l\iIission. This avenue had to be one that
afforded intimate contact, and also a sense of the interest
with which opinions were received.
The Advisor spent a large part of the first several
months meeting with the executive conllllittees of all the
lnajor, and lnany of the lllinor business associations in
Seoul and in other cities of the country. Out of this de-
veloped a regular series of small luncheon meetings with
the key organizations. These were conducted \vithout fan-
fare or publicity. The 010st inlportant of these was a bi-
monthly :<neeting with the Presidents of the "Big Three r ,.
the Korean Businesslnen's Association, the Korea Traders
Association and the Korean Chamber of COlnmerce. At
these luncheons, the Senior Export Advisor \vas often
accompanied by the Anlbassador, the :Mission Director,
or by other senior members of A. L D. and the Embassy.
From time to time inlp:>rtant visiting businessmen were
also invited.
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These Ineetings, in the course of the two years,
proved eXlrenlely valuable and the businessmen repeat-
edly stated th2t they found in them a new and fruitful
nleans of cornmunication and a method of cooperation.
In addition, to the j~int meeting with the Presidents of
the "Big Three", separate monthly luncheons were held
with top staff of each of these organizations.
There was also a weekly luncheon with the President
of the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation, and occasion-
ally with other staff Inembers. \Vhen the Korean Market-
ing Association was later established, it was included in
the regular hi-monthly luncheons.
Of great importance, although it had !Considerably
less power, was the 1\rledimll Industry Cooperatives
Federation. This organi.zation represented 65 Trade
Associations with a total nlelnbershjp of approxinlately
7. 500 sInal] businesses.
The Senior Export Advisor also attended meetings
of the Aluerican Chaluber of Commerce in Seoul, and met
with Comlnercial Attaches of other countries represented
in Korea. In addition, he had numerous unplanned meet-
ings and luncheons with Korean busi: ssmen, and with
visiting American and foreign businessmen, and he became
a Inember of the Seoul Rotary Club.
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CHAPTER VII
GENERAL PRODUCT ANALYSIS
A. Product Selection
A rather conlplete survey of the products that were
exportable was Inade. The Korean economic expansion
program was being pursued on a long-range basis. In
1964 Korea was already half way through its First Five-
Year Plan and was preparing the Second Five-Year Plan.
The EconOlnic Planning Board had the assis lance of a
first-rate A. I. D. staff, plus a consulting team frorn
Robert Nathan Associates, and special con.sul tants who
were brought in from time to time.
The export progranl \vas divided into three sections:
short-range, Iniddle-range and long-range. The middle
and long-range sections were influenced by and would in
turn influence the capital investment program, which
included incentives to attract foreign capitaL Different
sets of criterh-l were evolved for each of the three sec-
tions of export developlnent. Both for the psychological
and the eccfionlic gains that it would bring, the sho1"t-
range prc6ranl was given first im~ortance.
Si'lce Korea lacked the resources to promote every
available product even in the short-range categories, a
list of priorities was determined. A first priority was
for the few natural resources available for immediate
export - - tungsten, coal, clay, seafood and agricultural
products - - since these were Uinstant'l and 100% earners of
foreign exchange. The major thrust, hmvever, was in the
direction of new products in the areas of processed foods
:lnd particularly manufactured goods, because significant
increases in ea.....nings could come only from the develop-
ment of new activities.
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The criteria for sc[ec:tilng vH'oducls fOB" tthe sh~u"t­
range program inchuded: (a) high-llalbor conlent, (I»)
products fOt' \'Jhich llabott· cOlLuId be qufcUdy lltt":aJpned. (c)
utilization of any eXllsUng' Jidlle capacity, (d) llo~'.." capHall
investments, (e) uUHzaU'on of ulI:DIUve tt"a\'.." m:flltterialls,
(f) a vaHa3]liHty of inlett~naUoU1lall U1lHllIL"kells.
The last point \\':BlS considered the mostnunportt:fllVlIt.
Many cou.antt:ries have lended to expand d1evellopmentt of
a vaillable products W II UllOllull :~HnrnCllenl aUeu~UoJ1l lotthellll"
rnarketabHHy. In sonne llU'll:51ances mm'lkels were tthe
determining factor fOtt~ KOirea even'll tthough an the other
criteria Hsted above 'l.,,"ere UllOt satisfactolty.For example,
Korea has developed a U1l1l:aJu"lkett fOD" pllyv.vood, despite the
fact that the cOllmtry has no ll..imbett". that pllYwood manU1l-
facturing is a capitallua1lll..-:ilsnve indus,ttTy, and! Uuall.. its
quality dennands slkiUhull tlu"anulliullg of engiineers and of labor'.
In R967. she exported a toltall of approximately $36 minion
of plY\'l1ood~ uuosUy to the United States.. AUllotther example
is swealtel·s. Korea has d1evellopedl a market in Sweden for
approxinlateiy $8 unillHon iller all1.1l1l1LUUlll or knit "Near. WHh
the Swedish trade as an .incentllve and the knowledge and
technical e:q)erience galirDedl, the s:weatermarket has no':..,."
greaey expanded to anan)" other countries. The iniHal
development of the nn']rlket in S~l,.7eden was: almostt an acci-
defit and could not have been foreseen in the early stages
of planning export develloplIll1lent.
There is a \videspread misconception that 1m,., price,
cheap articles represent t.he best possibilUy for export
development from less-d.eveloped comrbtt.riies. \V'h:ile there
are some possibilities in the initial stages, this is a poor
area for competitive grmvth. Cheap :items are often pro-
duced in developed countries by highly sophisticated, aUlto-
nlatic, big scale nlachinery, so that their labor content
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is slnaU. Thus the c:ollnpatt~:i.llUVe advalllllage of [01;"" -cost
labor is lost in the direct 'connpeHUon. Siince Hems
which cannot be produced in develloped comlJlries wHlhioll.ut
a substantial labor content orfel~ a cOllnpeUHve ad',;antage
to low-cost labor, Korea decided to deveUoHlI nts high-
labor input, night hlldl1lJjsh~ies.,
Consun~eJr goods in the medilllLU'lllJ H»rliceceti fueliedls were
promoted. This inv0lived slJt"ellmoaus efron"lls to cu"cede
the quality specifications demam.lled. un nhis pu"ice neve].
Such arn~Ues as we:arhllg appatt~en and accessoJl"ues. tiires,
batteries, musucall llttll:sh~tluUnell1lls, te:dunes. Y:JiI"lflJ (ill1ldlLudiing,
silk and synU'oeUcs), If(()Jotwe:au'~ ]eatheu" goods, g,rass wallll-
paS)ler, human haliJt" pieces :fllU'udl wigs, eyegllass lfraJr1l1lcs,
bicycl.es, u."adios, and ol1.her sillllluliar unallll1!.ulfachured. arftX-
cleb were develloped. Now:Ell 1I1l1lamulf:aLfchun"u II1Ig ill1ldustryns
developing in durablle and! semn -durablie H~Jr1lllS slluch as
s\Lllb-aSSelnb~:9~electroll1ncs, an nnurpose unachhlle tools,
dieseii engines, purnps, ellecl1.tt"icall eqlUlin:mllen~ and cablle
and auto assenllbly. Allll olf the above are in ad.dHioD"ll to
the inc l"eased developll1lllenl1. ((lllf nclI...? agricuHutt' aU crops,
and the processing of priiunary B:llrodlLUcts of tlhe extractive
industries and of: agrncuUuJl"e and fishing.
It is interesting Ito nol1.e that iii'll those Asiatic countries
with shlliilar labor supply siihuaHons s\lUIch as Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Singapore, lt1l1lany off the salue pro'dlLllcils are being
developed for the sallue .reasons and for the same nnarlkets.
In countries where prill1tllary products, e. g. rm"" unatteria,lls,
are avaii.JLable, exports of these products Hllave in some
instances nearly reached 1Il1laXinnmll possibHiitiies. Such
countries include Iran, ~lalaysia, Thaiila1l'1l.d, Indonesia, and.
the Philippines. These countries also find :iiit. necessary to
develop non-traditional exports of nllamd'achured prod\\.1!cts
or processed agricnl.tll.u-:al p:roducts.
In SOlne instances, political pressures were exer-
cised to give priority to some itenlls not properly ben~ll1lg­
ing on the priority list. Unfortunately, as is tJr'll.UC in 1l1I1lost
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remmh'ues j Ullett"e was a gencrall lcndcl!lIcy t,,~i'Hlhihll the
govermnenl a.o gi ve ptt"ef'erence to ]argc sC:lfJJJe huhush'y
:arod llatt"ge h"aders "6'ho couUdl e~ett'cise pollfilllcall UU1lnm:~lllce.
\\ hHe Hm snnaH and middlle iindustn'y sechn"s coulld
exert some pl"essIlUl'c lhtt"Ollugh Ulleh" own ott"gmlluz.ahons
amJl the Channbc.· of C~nHnett"ceJ they W<e:n"~~ not .L1lS unfllu-
cnUall as lhe hlirgCtt" &nush'ucSSIl1l1l(?J'1l tt'eprescnled by such
oq~:c.HtftzaUoros :JJS Hue powed'llull KOtt"C:iHll BtL~:snu1ie:5'smel!lIfts
;\ssod.til,D(>n.. Neve 1·a.helless'J on the \1..d]l()Jne~ UUiC: ijJiriof'utt ues
W(~Il'e :<:u"n':anged un llog:neall ott"den" mlld ullHl)~tt s;eh:"<r'tlU0uuS. w'e~'e
hase'lll '.em Uw C' U"U k U"UJ1l esl;;'ll&.lIllnshcd.
Duu"ung the cOllun"se of tthe ['itt"sa. ylt~att"" ~11 UllI!.Dmber of
changes \\''.I1Ctt''t" mJ;<;ll.de nUll UlJe Usa. of pr'nou"Hiires as; "(fcllll :aJS
nlll Ital"geLs fOI" pwo.chuca.s Ott" unm"lkea.s. M;[H~keliiUllg coru-
diltllol!1s OI~ SOU1llle mmsll.U;all suhuaUoUlls cOl!.ullduUllftl\l.uell1:ce
these changes. Squd~ fllextibiliHy was possnblle because
of the Lype of ol·g:,uuuzaHolf1l tthatt. hard been esttalbHshedi.
Trade organizations and e\geUll pr.iivate &:mSiilf1leSSUlllleUll had!
a l"cady forllunn nn EPSC Ito whuch they cOl!.ulld present
thein' n·equeslts for chaUllges.. They c01Ullld appealltthro\\.llgh
theiil' o\'Jn Itrade m"ganuzaUon1ls, to the 'iI',.7oddng ]eve] com-
nnJiUees~ Uu"ou.gh the conlllJnnodliiity chief's. or ttlhJro1Ulgill
thenr geullerall business organiizatioUlls. The oUnces of the
slteering cOllnnnn::ttee of EPSC 'l.'lere ah","ays 0relf1l to them.
where they soon leal"ltlled ttlhJatt a.hey coulld receive a sym-
pathetic apd confidentiall hearing.
L The Case of Hu.unan Hair and \Viigs.
An exannple of the above is a siltuation that arose
.iin the hmuan hair \vig bu.llsiness. Prior to HHi4, Korea
had been seUitug approxiinnate]y $] mUlion of human hair
per year to the Aunerican JI1IHu"lket. Then, nB'l styles in
a.he United States created a substantial inClt"easc in the
demand for hair and wigs. }\t about the same Hme, lin
1965, the U. S. Government detp.rmined that no mOI~e
wigs could be impol~ted through Hong Kong, v,.'lhich had
h~aditionallybeen a la.'ge suppHer. j\ goodl deal on"
Hong Kong!s supply of hail~ originated nn C01lnnl!'~;:uist
China, and UlIC complete ban was imposed because it
'vas difficult or iBnpossible to delernnine lhe source of
the hait~. Thus, a large market for Kon"eauli human
hail' and for wigs of both Hue handmade andl 1l'1HllChine-
made varieties suddenl.y opened up.
The dynamic progu"am made a Bexible policy
possible. The industry u"eqtluired new plant.s, nC'I',,'.,;' equip-
ment, technical training, lechnncal assistance, and
quaHty-control guidance, as wen as a shiH hll the target
goals. The Light Industry \\forking Task Force (a sub-
committee of EPSC), together with the representatives
or. the industry tackled this problell'u and were able to
provide the necessary resources. The A. 1. D. "Mission,
working with the U. S.. Commercial Attache, was able
to steer a nmnber of inte~'estedAnnerican iCOl!1I1lpanies into
working closely with Korean lentrepreneurs. Sonte of
the An1.erican conlpanies supplied technical guidance and
others entered i.nto joint venture arrangements.
Within one year Korf"an wig exports jumped from
$1 minion to $13 miUion in HHHt In 1967 they rose to
$20 million.. In 1967 the United States Govermnent rescind-
ed its total ban on Hong Kong products, es1tablishing instead
clear rules that required Hong Kong exporters to certify
the source of human hair. By this time, however, the
Korean exporters! ma!~ket had been so weU established
that it was not much affected by the relaxation of hnports
from Hong Kong.
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On the recommendation of the working task force
cOInmittee for the hair goods industry, and becmlse of
the g.'eat increase in the dernand for human hair nor loc-
al production, the Korean Government forbade further
export of unprocessed hair ~.lthough this E~ntaned some
risk of losing their former (~U'5tomers for the raw mate-
rial. In fact, Korean manufacturers had to search for
other' sources for human hair. They sent buyers to
the Philippines and to IndonE~sia for this purpose.
2. Check (Minnnnum Legan) Prices
ConclLH'Tently wHh the wig nnarket, there also
developed a nn3rket rOlt~ wnglets and eyelashes. The
tecbniques of nnalldng eyelashes were coo]paratively
easy to learn. They \'orcn'e produced in back-alley
factories and in honnes. The competition to sen this
item becan-ne very great. Some companies were under-
selHng the n''"narket at prnces substantiaUy below world
rLarket prices. In order to protect Korean industry
against such situations, the government had given
authority to the 1l\ii:inistry of Cmnmerce and: Industry to
estabHsh a Rllcheck price.. 1111 a minimum at which any arti-
cle could be exported. Thlis was done for eyelashes.
Pressun'es to create check prices by the larger
units within an industry were always strong. This would
tend to dimir;.ish competition\'litilin the iI1ldu'stry. But
whether or not the concept of check prices had validity,
in practice it becanne largely ineffective. The major
probleul was the difficulty of enforcement. It was com-
paratively easy for an exporter to make arrangements
'Lo give his foreign "":.ustomer rebates on the documented
price, provided the foreign customer was wining to accept
local currency hu Korea.\VIhUe it was impossible to knmw
to what extent this practice took place, the writer had
enough evidence to beHeve that it was fairly widespread.
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This suggests a general proposition. Regula-
tory measures of any kind should not be established
unless it is clear that enforcement is feasible and \vill
not do substantial harn1, aUld unless adequate preparation
has been made for enforcement.
3. Monopoly Privileges
Another step to protect new industries was an
e.uthorization to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
to grant a short- term monopoly to the seller of a new
export. The I\!ICI had the power to grant a six-month
exclusive monopoly to such cOJnpanies, and the right
to extend this for an additional six months. It exercised
this power with great discretion and only very rarely.
Because the enforcement of this power was very silnple,
it presented no great diffic:ulty.
In the case of wigs, a monopoly position was
given to the Seoul Trading Company. The developing of
the techniques and training of the unskilled workmen ne-
cessitated some protection in this case. The protection
was not only in the interest of the conlpany, but even more
important, in the interest of protecting the reputation of
a New Korean e:AlJort product. If the first wigs leaving
the country had not met the high standards required of
this product, the whole reputation of Korean hair goods
would have been destroyed and this could have been fatal
to further expansion. Therefore, this protection was
also useful to th~ future competitor of the Seoul Trading
Company. Despite some complaints of favoritism, which
mayor may not have been justified, the history of the
development of this industry testifies that this decision was
justified. After the first year the monopoly was lifted.
By that time other companies were capable of competing
and the industry progressed. The power to create a
monopoly is fraught with danger, but if exercised \vith
discretion, it Inay prove helpful to e)o..-port developlnent.
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CHAPTER VIII
PRODUCT DEVELOP1MENT
.. -~
To eumprcher.d the great variety or problems and
activities required in order to develop products ror the
international market, it wiB be JUseful at this point to
examine some specific products, their problems and
the solutions that were adopted.
A. Some P roblern Industries
1. iVIining
lVlining and mining products had been developed
early, both for donlestic use and for export. In 1963,
exports reached the sunl of $16 million, consisting
Inostly of coal, tungsten. iron ore, lead ore, zinc ore,
1110lybdenunl. talc and clays. For several years A. I. D.
had financed a tealn of coal mining experts who had
helped to build up and lnodernize the industry as well
as assist in locating new coal beds. There also were
new developments in zinc, and further development in
copper. lead and tin~
Except in tungsten and coal, possibilities for
increasing expansion were limited. It was necessary
to ilnprove productivity and to develop the second and
third stage processing of ores. Processing could take
advantage of Korea's low cost labor and give added value
to the item exported. The technicians in the field rec-
ommended to the working committee an extensive, long-
range program which required heavy capital input.
Nevertheless, the Economic Planning Board decided to
include most of this activity in the Second Five-Year
Plan.
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'rl"ansportation to the ports presented prohnerrl:s.
The \vorking cmnmiUee recommended a single freight
rate fronl the mines to the ports for aU coaH transpm"ta-
lion. This was adopted by UH~ governllllcalL. However',
projects for building highways from th~ mnnes to the
ports, and for improving r':lBroad transportation of rnine
pl'oduets were considered ImM priority in the ~enerall
econOlnie picture.
The ."esuU of these efforts to ittnprove processing
and transportation becaune evident in an increase o~" min-
ing exports to $40 mHHon !by 1961 -- a r'elaUvely disap-
pointing growth, ho\\'ever, fronl! the $lllB rni.llHon figure of
1963. The percent:age of uninerals in total exports dropped
fronl 19. 5~1~ to H% in the SClnH~ period.
Cerannics
For 11lIClny centuries Korea had a \\'oddwide repu-
tation for fine pottery. SURa" Korean Cehlldon and PorcE:Jaiin
are coUectors R HeIns. Celadon became a ,lost art .in the
16th Century because luost of the potters \\"ere taken to Japan
where they were parHaUy responsible for the developJroent
of the fine JapaneSE ceranI1tics. Ceramic production required
almost no iOlported materials and seemed at natural and prof-
itable itenl for export. A wide range of tHes, irol1lstoneware,
procelain insulators, dishes, sanitarY'vare, and refractories
were being produ.ced for domestic use. AHhou.gh Korea was
exporting fine .kaoline (a cl.ay) in substantial quantities, her
exports of tableware were minimal. in 1964. Her own finish-
(' d products were of poor quality and design.
The goverlunent established an ambitiou.s export
target, but to everybody" s chagrin, only a SOlan percentage
of the target was achieved. The reasons for this failure
were:
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a. Because the ceramics: industry ,-,-'as an
old one, the majOl' plants had old r.1dchinery
and equipment, and used inefficient and out-
dated techniques. Very fc\v changes had been
made in the methods oi manufacturing for
many ycal's. A ..lapanese technician was assign-
ed by the United Nations Techni~al Assistance
program to the largest plant. 1\ second plant
had a Korean enginecl' ~Nho had been h"ained in
the United States. They ass.isted, but were
hampered by inertia, poor nnanageuncnt and
l~ck of funds for equipr.rilcnt.
b. The rise of the stand~H'd af H ving "",; itthin
Korea increased dmnesUc demand fon' ceraLlmics
enough to absorb the increased production nnade
possii)le by A. I. D. Jfinancing of 501111e new ovens~
Jl\:rloreover. quality and design requireunents of
the domestic rnarket were Bluch mOJl:e easHy
fulfilled than those of the inte.l natinnaJ rnarket.
Despite oft repeated expressions oft' interest by
luanageluent, it was quite oaH~ious that they were
not really eager to export. Indeed, one order
which had been obtained by the largest cmnpany
to export approxilnate]y $1 nliHion of table\':are
to the United States \vas never fined.
c. Because of pressure by th.e goverm:nent. a
s;mall arnount of exporting was done to the
neighboring countries: t.he quality requiremlents
of these neighboring countries nlade Korean.
tableware acceptable. However, none went to
the nl~SS~ aCfilllent nlarkets of the United States,
Europe or Japan.
d. \Vhile on the surface it would appear that the
availability of QOlnestic 1'3.\\" rnaterial "."ould add
to the attractiveness oj[ developing eXl1lorts. H.
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in fact, :(~cted as a detriment. One of the
incentives given to HJJ;fU1IIlufachurel's ~)r e:qHH'ls
was that they could hnpol't duty fl'ee I'aw
materials necessary for processing for l'(~­
expol'C \Vilh P- eo aHowances for so-caIned
waste and sp(,~L]ge ~~Illd hy other' devk(;.~ senne
of the irraported I'm'.' IlHatcl'ian could be sol"! on
the domestic rrilat'~~eL This created an extra
attractive profit Where no impor'ted raw
materials \'Jere requiired. this added incentive
was non-e::dstcnL
A fte r :analy'zi ng Hlle:£(!' !'e:asons. the gOlfe }'runenl
decided on :a prograr1l1 fOh' cOh'reetive I11liea:s:ures. The
pos~ibiliUes for large scale huc"ease un exports justi-
fied an investment in ~]loth n11llQrllc"" an(rj effort.
It was decided to establish .ll ~ec:hnic2J center in
the 1\>lasan region (the area of clay JeposHs) \dllllch could
develop the techniiques of ull1Ianufachurnng and dc:sig'·. The
center \'J:>uld also estahH:s:ll1l a :s:maH pUot prl\')duetion ph.llllit.
\Vorldv;ide search ron' the latest equni.»rnen1t \1,.'a5 un"Jertaken
and the nevI center \vas cons:trueted.
Thjs pr~'6ranl was crHjcuzed c_s inefficient and as a
long-range cind exp~nsjj\"e anJproach. Opinions ",';ere ex-
pressed that the hnpehns fOJr'this approach resuHed frmn
political pressures to cr'eab~ rIle\\,' bureauC'l'aHc institutions
and jobs. AlttrnaUve pn'ogTanls "'lere offered whnll, hi in-
vol ved supplying technnc~31l assis~anc.e. and providing caplita!
for ne\\' equipnupnt diTccU}" to existing pti31BttS. It was sug-
gested that the only centralL .e"...:hnical acthrity should be a
SlUM design ins~ituUon under llie guida:hce of forlt"ign l1lIHlI.r-
ket experts. Fnna]]y» it was proposed Hl1att. a series of
financial and tax incen~tnes be de ..reloped \~,(hic:ll \vou]d induce
llnanufacturers to give p!'eference to export acUvii.bcs.
In the opiinion of H:ns wriiter, the best pk~ograun would
have been a conlhination of !both apr: oad:es. A snnaB
pilot plant and technical training center in an exnsiting
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institution or a plant should have been established. In
addition a vocational and en~!ineering training program
should have been de'/eloped and expanded in exislin g
t.echnical sc{~001s. universities, and through on-the-job
training.
As of t.his writing, iL is dif.~ieuHy to state categorically
that the approach adopted by th~ governnUE~ntw~s incorrect.
Only the future wiB make H possible to assess this activity.
3. Silk
The mamafacturjng and export of sHk cloth was
another example of disaj>poinUng results. SericuUure had
been developed fot' rnany ye:81rs during the Japanese occu-
pation. The qualJity of Korean sDk yarn is as good as any
manufactured an}7\vhere in the "/orld. A first-rate quality
testing laboratory grades every bolt of sHk yarn that
leaves the country, and is very strict in its requirements.
In 1967 Korea exported almost $15 mHHon of silk yarn,
nlostly to the United States and Japan.
During the Japanese occupation there had been
little developnlent in Korea of the weaving industry. In
J.·ecent years, howe vel', risi ng labor costs in Japan were
gradually reducing that nationl s silk cloth manufacturing
so that although a large im'oad into the market had been
n"ade because of the trennendous growth of synthetics, a
~~;bstantial world market for pure silk as well as for Hllix-
ed silk and synthetic cloths stin existed.
It appeared logical that a Korean silk weaving
industry should be able to export laJ:'ge quantities of silk
cloth. For example, the fan1l0U5 Thai sillk is woven with
a good percentage of Korean made yarns. In 1965 Korea"1l
exports in silk textiles only amonllted to $370, 000, while
silk yarn exports amounted to nearly $7 IniUion. The
\\lorking task force and the Korean Trade Association \vere
asked ::0 nlake an analysis and prepare recommendations
for innprovennent.
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Despite the favor'able circumstances. the effc,,~t
to create textiles for export was not a success. T~w
reasons for the failure can be explained by the foHo'\.'., [ng
a. Befor~ 1964, under the then ~xisUng Hnkage
system, exports earnilng the nargest arnount of
foreign exchange were given aI priority on the
use of this fOI'eign exchange fOI' purchasing im-
ports. They were Ums either albIc to sen iimpor'll-
ed articles fOI' extT'a profHs. or to seH these
priority doHars at. ;[II prernh:nll prke. Conse-
quently, the donnesUe sane of sUi< yarns to the
textile industry was inhibited.. After the stabiU-
zaUon progrann "Jas effected, this extra bonus
was eHnllinated, but m~ve:rUlleless, ~mail1lY loan
and credit facHiUes for exporte~'s agalin made
exporting of yarn rnor'e aUracti ve th~Hll by sale
to the donnestic market even though domesUc
prices were higher' than export prices.
b. Because the silk yarn exporters had been
involved in this business for Hnany years, they
had a ~'~?dy Inarket and existing customers
which they were reluctant to lose, and which,
in ITIallY respects, ,l,lere preferable to the
domestic ClistoHllers.
c. The jurisdiction over the industry '1.... as split
benJleen the l\iIinistry of Agriculture and Forestry,
and the l\ilinistry of ComHllerce and Industry. The
gr(~wing stage to the fii.nished yarn stage was in
the realm~ of the a:Hnis:try of Agriculture, while
weaving cloth and finished products \vere in the
reahn of theI\rlinister of Conlmerce and Industry.
Each ]NUn: stry wished to create a go<::0 record for
exports so there ,vas a tendency by the 1\Iinistry
of Agriculture to push exports of silk yarn. This
split jurisdiction also created probleJns of poUcy
and com:.rc>l that harnpered the developnnen1t in the
weaving end of the industry.
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d. Most of the eqIlJLipm(~nl and factories: in ~he
silk textile weaving industry \\'CI'e old and!
inefficient. A great many of the Joouns were
36 inches in width, nal"rOWer than the ttJ'ade
requirements. The industry needed a C'OU1llipne~c
overhauling.
(~. Brocao~s ancl oUuen' silk designs and colors:
were made to suH the Korean laste \\'hich was
dHfcl'cnt than the taste of Hue overseas nll~u.dwt.
New designs and nc'l.!';! qll.wHHes had to be created.
]Most of th<: factol'ies 'l.'I.'CI"e sunan units operated
by old Inanag(::1JH~nL
ParentheticaHy, H is nnter'esUng to note that the
vd)rld taste which was develloped since HHrl has increased
the demand for the bright colors so popu1arllru Korea, so
that KUI'can c RoUli. has been we llconlled on theinttC'u'natiionall
rnarket.
Because of the cmnpeUng interests of the ll\v.."O sectors
of the industry it was oHeen diiJffk:lLiH to nnake the necessary
changes. Nevertheless, Hne go\rerruncnt decided to aHo-
cale funds for investment in Illel'.... loo.ms and new equipment.
Japanese technicians were brought nnto Korea to assist by
gi ving technicaA advice. and sOlIne of the .:-\mer.ican chain
;:o.ttore buyers assisted inll creaUng ne\\" designs and collors
sl~itable for the Arnerican lt1l11arket. For eXanliple, the
repreSeb"d.ti ve of lVlacyl s helped one of the factories create
a new type of silk called ~!iari., which was siimHar to the
fam ous Thai silk.
The silk industry dennonstratif"s that ii.t is rnore diffi-
cult to convert old industry to J!TIojern techniques, than tc-
create ne\\' industries. Opinion s \vere widely expressed
that had there been less politieal pressure applied by the
silk yarn alanufacturers. the ;goverrunent could have taken
the necessary steps to guarantee the now of yarn to the
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weaver at prices equal or 10'I'Ier than the export priee~
The,Y could also have taken other steps \'-"hneh ..'..'ould
!~3.ve given more rapid acceleration to the weaving
industry. It is difficult to assess the vaHd.Hy of these
opinions.
4. Furniture
High-priced ftu'nihu'e should have been an Hern
of export. Korea cannot compete \'"Hh the rllll<liSS pu'odtUlc-
lion factories abroad. It cO\1Jlld, ho\\"cvcr, enter the
market of specially designed, ellston] styled Herms which
constitute a high-Iabou' input §H'oducL Kou'e:an cabinet-
makers are extremely skillful and do beauUf'ull work.
The United States has a growing nnarkf"t fOil' rll1lodern
furniture with an oriental look.
On the othe.' han(~, the designs of Korean furm-
ture made for the donnesltic IInarket are not Hkelly to be
accepted overseas. In addiiUon, hunber n.eeded se.:Jison-
ing to prevent cracking and ~H,..'eHing ..,,,hen p~aced in
heated 1'0001S. ][vIost foreigners were leary of buying
Korean furniture for this reason. ReconnHnendatJions
were Inade that proper techmques be studied, that HIilodecn
kilns be built to sol ve this probleJrn, and that designers
fronl abroad be brought to Korea and Korean designers
be sent to foreign countries. These suggestions had not
been cal rieo out ,..,hen the writer departed. Recently,
a Taiwanese co.-npany opened a sJrnaU furniture factory
in Korea which has been e~l)anding rapidly.
5. Canned and Processed Foods
The agricultural and fishery sector has not been
neglected. An extensive p1'ogran1 of diversified agri-
culture was being developed. New crops such as ffiush.-
l'OOll1.8, asparagus, grapes and other shniilar food prod-
ucts as ·;.. ell a~ the traditional crops of pears, ginseng,
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apples and tonllaHj~B a:h"cscnled good opporl,lLmHues for'
deve~oping an export busines~) un ['reslhi fruils, vege-
tabUes and in frozen and canned foods.
The cost of g~"owntt1l.g l,he crops "'\"as too high)
despite I~ehutivd'y 1m'" labol" rc:(»sls. T;Luxes. spoHaJge)
pOOl' yield, and ineffieicnl p~tic:lknng ulIbeUuxls; ali! COrll-
lda.mlcd lo these high co:sls~ .t\cbmnlly, it W~'lIS quuesUon-
.ahUe whethe .. prodlucers l"caH,Y Ikn"~'l.\,1 Ulle» I" eosls OD'D a
single Heln. Asinlel"cstl un ~'''~'':''I'Ung deveHoped, B'arm-
ers I"educed theUn" pI"kes to u1rucetlnllllett"ull:OllUonaH com-
petition i\ III nntens i ve pll"og.ll"liHllI of u"esea I"eh, edtLDc:adLllon
and gQuidlanc~ was ptt"O.cJQUCBUllg, fi)leUer yieHds and more
varied ctt"Ops, and :31tt Howes" cosfi.s~ Ripe appllef::~ were
expfH"ted to T ahvam aurud! 1\,9,;1~.II"e beginmng to penetrate
oUlIiC"r mal~lketls. KOI"ea llm:s had! a Hong esfi:adbllislhIed
nn:,u"[l{et fott" the export of $ll«JJ U1JbuHiott'll fio $H5 mfilHoJ1l of
seaweed a year t.O .J :Bqpall1l.
Will He canned foods should have had 3 large
pote~lltii.al for deveHopnnent. the problems ~~nco1Lllntered
,,-,'ere so difficuH that qllBiclk :soHuUons were ii.flupossible..
One oj[ the Seri01L1l:S prolblenlls 1\,'-'3S the food habits
of the Korean people. Call1ueld fooos \'I,felre :101 used
ftocaHy because theiir cost was too high for the average
Korean. Besides. their traditional pickled! foods such as.
kiunchi suppHed the needs for on-season green vege-
llablles.
Another prr,blenll was hi.gh-·cost of lnlllanufacturing
tin cans. Unfof)rb,mately. the one can nJl3nufacturing
plant was old! and inefficiient, and coa:ld not produce at
reasonable prices. JI\Iioreover, Korea manufactlUred no
tth'~ p~ate) and inllpo.r1ted the basic black sheet fron~ Japan.
Only one company was equi?ped to plate these ~tteel
sheets. Connicts Jinvol \'ling price, \llork and priorities
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arnong Um plaLing COfUllP:D1Xlty, the can unamllfa~hueu" ~~U1iICt
thll? canners prevenled the d(~ve[opIt1l1Jreu1Ift-of a can liw:h~s­
try \vhich cou[d prodllitce at 1t"e~HH:mab[e (H"kes. As: ~l:
meUlod of forcing action, ILhe goverltUDlIcnt rh]u:1J~ ~J oven'--
came poHUca[ preSSlln"es and perJllfllUUed ,iHnenu1I1Ipou"l of
lin cans from Japan unUll s~ItIC::h Un-ue as lhe tU'll<Chltsftry
could straighllen HseH O~bt F'nnr~~lly, Uu~ ~r(()J\1«.~u"m]llenutt
fDnarcerJ new pllants fOIt" U'll[S nnwpose..
The Korean Govenullllenll sll,~....eeded UU'II ge-UUn1lg Uw'
U. S. Govcrmllllent to agu"tCe l«) uHc·,.,udre DJne c:~Hllulled u111le~llll
pelt" day of KOU"eaull food (Kfirnc'hi) fou" ~,oJl"emll sohllfiers:
un. Vnetnatt1l11.. 'T'hfis agreement pu"ovtided tt"lfJiU' a g,lLmu"a:llfteed
but temporary ul1l:allrlkeft" bllUlt 1l.1~las :5lluftt'uC'ueJI1lttttolluudh.luce :ru
Rar,ge unvestU"."llnlt fin carm.ling aU1Kll proce'ssllng, n'oll" fthns
parUclldau" man"lkett.
5~ AnUgucs
Because Korea had! net JI))eettll a c:en~((;.It" of tt«)lIl.~.dsrr'lJ1i
and had bvceD1l sealled on froml Hue ':>.'{or~d!, Hs aJ1llt~qlUle Hen1l1iS
were llan'gely m..known lo ttlue ':>.'lorlld! l!llllatt"ke~, ;fJlll1ld 'i.'{e're not
always consn.de iI."ed olf g'U"eat .uJ11l1lportall1lc~ by the KoreaJrlls
Ulleun~;ell\les. HeIns olf ralt"e be;al.1l,~ty and hustorncal valllUle
were "leU preserved and weB appreciated. Itn~1l onJiiJrllau~'y
old but beauUlfu.nl cabinets, poUery,llacq1Lller-.,,"are, panrllk-
illlgs, screens and other Helfns \'lhich ",,'.tere to be fOlLUnd tJrll
great n,urnbers, were given HUle or no aUenttllon.
Japan has earned su.~bstanHal aJl1JlIOUll1ltts of fore:iign
excha.nge thro1Ulgh the exports of her antiiqll.ues. She has
carefuUy preserved the right to keep the iuulPorttant cull-
lurall Henus in Japan, Hnut has perlniHed Henns of which
there are nnany copies to be exported in controBed!
alInounts ",lith. a systenn in which seUel's obtain certtifiicates
of exportabiHty in advance oJf sales.
[ncr(!'ased ttt":mdle Ibtt"mught nrllorc vii:s;Hs by !oreiign-
ersjI and forellg'fIl relaU shll"es \'Jl2re :s;&1l(())\~'llrDg inlerest .urn
KOI"can :DlU1UQI1LUeS. As lhe e~,pOtt"t:B rron~ Kou"ea Ibegml Ito
uncrease, a rlll.urnber or Uallcii«:llcnts: or Be-iizlures by Clllls!t,om
offiicii::ds crcatbclCU aJll llmpllea:s)anil reaction If)"Ollll rlO>re.uglll
B:nuyel"s u"cpresenltiing U»ug depaJrltmenlt sl(()ll"es~ HeguUa-
Hons (j)~"l expott"l or aUllUltUIlUeS '~·.i'ere nol cllear Ullott" \',Hl!re !the
enfou"ceuncnl ullllelhoos Plf."(()I~)ru!Jl"lly o>rg:amizedJ..
Becau.J1se lhus ~n"iQ)1blUem has arisen .un other
coumltrnes, iit us wou"ffh menlnon.ung the d1iiSCllIlSSll0J1lS Umt
look PUace un U{owea.. Hull lUurP.! ,t,n"Heu""sU:rust reu»orl tto tthe
KlOwean Govel"mnettul <0>[' U!DJ66" he staled the ff'oUll()il',.~dng:
''''The p.·o1b>ll.em or lhe e:qJlo.rlt or :runlUqlUles and!
CIlU
'
)bUtt"all I()bjjecls hasU"elC~ell1ltt.lly cOJU1J1le tto !the
rou"er."oulll.. 'lI"huSD'Gi a d~~llucalte probUem jin-
'loll VUr1l~' n:atHonall pJU"ude, aUlld du ff'rllclluH :atnally-
:sus. U us reasolmblle, lLulldlcerstam:llablle and
necessary lhat Kou"ea Ikeep wHhuUll :its: bord-
eu"s lI.~are objjects of gtt"e~al hnsto!~:licall :and
cuUurall vahue~ Korea has a pro1l1ld tradJitnoUll,
and Hs aUllcienl CllUUIlUre sholluld be preserved
Ifou~ lthe cducaHon and! edfiJnc:ation of its 1Qi'1..""ll1l
peop~e as weU as vllsiitors.. Korea has good
rea....on Ito be prollDd ott" the many lbea1l1lHf1l1l],
arliisltic all.-r.d H'nand-Jl1J1Jade~ objjec#.s ii1t has de-
ve~ oped lthrougholiDt tth~ celtlltur:fies. Objects
ltha*. are unique and! rare sh.ould not be per-
nniUed to leave 1t:lhle country.
'"1 However.. it is equaUy important to the
world !knowledge of Korean history.. Cll11UUre
and tradition that Korean objects be exhi-
bUed throughout the world. 1\luseurrn.s every-
\vhere should have Kortean art .lin their
displays. Visitors to Korea bring.in:g to
their hon:nes old and artli3tic Korean objects
win enhance the lknu',dE~dge of Korea" and
-67-
create the desD re by foreigners to
(lllu'chase and prolludhy display new
Korean products. F'or exmnpne, Un]
a r'ecent display fin a Jlarge AmerDc~Jm
deparbnenl store. old Korean chests
were used as the background for
olodern Korean texttB~~s. SHlla. Cehuion
and Yi dynasty r ~Uery cOllulld be used as
the backgromuB for display of modern
KOJ"ean ceramfics.
"The probllem is, therefore. one of
selectivity. " "Gu"cat quantities of
exampJLes of nesseu"iuJDportanc~of
poUery. statues, chests. books and
painUngs a~"e availlable lltt'n Kox'ea. " .
. . Thousands or such iterns ca.~ b€~
e"'llol:-led -- still leaving tholLusands for
dOlnestic use. It should be made
possible to export these Hems easHy.
UTile present rll.ules and. regulations are
cmnbersOllJ1le, place responsiibHHy upon
the buyer rather than the seHer, and. to
a great extent leave decisions as to the
historical value of antiques to the
individual judgern-ncnt of the adminllshator
of the rules and. regulations. The pro-
cedures require lengthy time for process·"
ing of documents.
""Obviouslv, such an arlrnlLim,,;trator
will not wish Lo take the risk. ...."'If granting
permission for export which TIllight
result in criticism of his decisions. A
policy should be established which
will permit e~"port of objects of lesser
importance. . . . . The defintions
and rules must be clearly outlined ....
"" It us :ili USO UUl1lpC 1"~liUVe [hal a sunglle lI))uu"e'~'Hu
ott" 'fYJffU!(:c ft'lle cs[abU ushled where ;a dc·;rulleu"un
~lid~Uqm~:s or :LUUU huilBli viicdlllmll wlishhlg [<OJ selll ott"
1!»I\UY :<Jlu1Jllliqm:!s C;L~U] ob[;runn advance certlu fiic,aUott1l
(lA' ("HgubunUy ['<Oil!" expoll"U. In lhal w:cuy the UOIlU."-
u:st oU" (o!rpugn I/))Iluyer 'l.t,dllll have no h(~sHaUon
'l.\rhcau ij.1>lluI"ch:tJlsurog.. In ;addutiouu, UII.lis 'l.'.i'iiU !be a
U!r]c[hod! of pU"cvil!ullUng .Da1J1lH:Cll.!lliouliS :allnd fa.Use
!Copue:s b~~\)fin.A', olffeu"cdl ;f)lS gen'uune :anU,uGlQues.. 1'1'
Lest llhe W'Ott"cglQlUUll[g guwc U.he llU1lllpU"eSltlUOIU1l UhaUUhe
rWiOhh~>n1J:S wel"c OVCI"'l.t..?hellu-BlIuuug, H WOtl.ddl be \tlelllltlo
de:S(~Ir"llbc a nmunbcl" or SIlUC«'.:cSS sto.Jr~iies. n lI1l1l1l.llsl !be
cmph:Llisu.r.,cd l1Ju:c.ul tlhe owcl";aU prograrull tN~:IlS .uU1l Hselft"
Hue siluccess story.. The few exannpJles below willn
dCUlI1l0Ullstratle tlhe type off' :fllc:Uv,uUe:b on iim:.ll.fi vud!1l.lIa.ll pro-
d.ItU(ctls tlh~ul made the 'l.',dllolle story so slI.ucc:essEluill.
The 3pparell irodlI.us1try had! 1t.H1le greatest oppor1t.ll.lInn-
\ty fon" l1~apnd nncrease. n q~overed! the wlhio]e range 0['
nncu" sand woulen" S cll.olthung :amd accesso.ry :ii1lenus. The
suppny of \tcxtHes and slkillledllabor~'lerE~aJrnlp]e. Inveslt.-
nnent capitan reqll.unrell1llleJllll:s; were small]. H.iigh labor .iinplllr1t
brought nllOJ'e foreign exchange earnings from apparel
than lfronll the export olf It.eKHlles and! yarn. Appare] can
be nnade by both narge :r:1lll1Jd sJrnaU enlltreprenell.llrs. KO:ll"ean
exports of kmt goods had 4~Jlready begun to shaN s1l.llbs1tam-
Hall. increases. Korea was exporting' approximately $3
nllHUon per year to Sweden in this itt:eJrn ;aJone.
The working comnlliUee for the apparel industry,
the jI\JHnistry of Cornmerce~ and Industry.. and the inuhllstl.ry
itself were given the task of presenting a plan for devel-
opmenL A. L D. financed the cost of bringing in. an ex-
pert in the n1l.en" s garment industry. He made a caref1l.ll.ll
-69-
sludy and rnany recommendations. A. L 0.. also sent
a team of Korean technicians to study the industry in
Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong. lIong Kong, "t,:Uh a
population of III nlliUion, has developed a clothing indus-
try of large proportions. In A961 about haH her total
exports of $l, 250, 000, 000 \'.:'ere un Umns of .ttipparet
A major errort was nunde (,0 interest for'eig,n
lbuyel~s in cDoU-uhllg. 'The pr'mhucls ....'ere prom-noled .in
ann Hue center's nn the worDcK, and! btl.uy~;ors w!~re »iwited!
to cOtt'ne to obscl"ve the p>tt."oxd!llucts be.iing, ttlliade iin Korea.
These buyett"s anso p>tt"ovi\CUed maudhJ ledllUllllca] g,uidance.
OUllC of the Ul1Jost sctt"liOlluS pu"oti}Jlleul11Is Umtt arose
concerned dellivery llime which is verylimpoJI"tt.anU in
this itt1ldu:sh~y. Styles cdll:aru!ge frequ.uenUy and Dead times
are sluaU. Obtai.ning; Jl"a..'.I' JlTllaterialls ft'oun .Japan when
needed was diJflicullt because govermneD1lfi .JI"cgu.ullatlif''1s
pl:"ohibnled n:mrchase or tt"a'l.'J ttl1la1ter.na.lls priiott" tto ob~aum.iing
a ll.eUer of credH for exporhU1lg the fUmshed pl'oouct.
The worlkhug comU1llitltee recoJl1lllmended and the
govel~mnen1ltHnaHy pernniUed stt.ocJkpiling .null advance of'
purchase on:-ders, uu"o",.didled that 30 percent of the vahue
of innported goods was deposited.. \VB1liille Ull:ns method
was not cOU1lllpll.etely s3l.tBsfaeltory to appare] JI1l11alkers, it
was helpful. The rLaSOJlll. for the deposit, ':.',i'as to <lis-
c01lJlrag;e .nlInpOl"ts ami to eJl1lcollnlI"age the IUIse of donllest]c
textiles.
It was recognized early that very 10\'': priced
items cotuld not be prrnhuced corrnpeUUv-e1y. \Vhere
labor input was stt'DllaH the advantages of lO\'l-cost labor
",ere negligible. Therefore" the general poUcy was
to ennphasize nniddle-priced items. This entailed
attention to quaHty, design and packagil11g.
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The United State5 Arrned Forces assisted in the
developlnent of this industry by agreeing to permit
Korea to manufacture large orders of fatigue uniforms
for the Vietnamese Army. This agreeollcnt was based
on a cOInmHment by the Koreans to nlleel international
price competition. The Korean Army also Inaintained
its ow n raclol~y for the rrnanufachure of \luni forms for Us
own soldiers. Soon Um training and knowledge gained
in this mannel' helped ~ead to successru~ eXPJorts or
dress shil~ts, sUacks, raincoats and accessories..
Korean apparel nO'll; appear:s in fnost of Hue l1lU1ITkets of
the world and particlldal~lly in the afflllLuent countries..
Rubber andUeather foohveatt'. and other leather
products presented anottlller fieUd.nn 'Io""hricB'b there was an
exceUent potenUal for hn~ther growth. Two employees
of an American conl1lpany assisted severa] KOllean com-
panies in developing the techniiqlL1les" styHng and pro-
ducUve capaciity to nllalke possible large u:mrchases by
theh~ connpany. \\I'e have been informed that Hlle Ameri-
can connpany is now u:mrchasing three nlliHion donars
of leather" canvas al1ld rlLDbbelt~ footwear amnuany. The
industry has aRso benenUed from substantial orders
for junglle boots for the Vieftnamese .i\llmy.
3. Hamiiicraftts
\VhUe Henns nuade in hand:iicrajfl shops by
artisans or craftsJluen on an individUJi~basis can never
be exported in such quanities as lI1fuass-prodlUced goods"
they are siigmficant in creatiill1lg a favo:rall.ile iimage" and
an abnosphere for acceptance of other goods from the
exporting country. They can also generat~ sizeable
foreign exchange earnings., Exports oj[ these tripled
behveen 1964 and 1967.
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Handicrafts are also important to the economy
because they can assist in developing erV1lployrnent row
workers who \vould not otherwise be dra\'nll inlo exporl-
oriented industries. J\ great many are part-ttime
workers, including women and yOQ]th, who cam "lorlk Dr'll
their homes or in nearby small factorie:s: on a part-Ume
01" seasonal basis. Handicrafts can provide suppRernenta]
earnings during U~e winter season jn the fa1"11:l1 areas. In
a country such as Kore:a ~'J'here inlelligent ,,,'orkers have
gl~eat rnam.ml skiHs and apUhndes. and are qo.nick to learn.
thig industry is parUcullady \I.usefQuH. It g.~neJr·any r'e-
quires BtUe capUall h'IlWcsttnllcnll., ra'..• tt1l1laterjaRs or fjimJJnc-
ing·.
Tu~adiUonan h:Dnrndicu"aU ptt"o\Chucls were enco1!.lllr'aged
linchu(Hng; such litmus as beads. erU1lbu"ofidclrjf, sh"aw pro-
ducts, lacqueu' pu'ochuc1ts. sttnaU wooden jewellr'" prec:h:ms
and! semi.-precnous stones and! JlllOlher-of-pearll, and I!nany
oth.er SnttnHal· iteul1ls.
The NaUonall Assocnatiorn of Farm CooperaHves.
a subsidiary of the Ministry 0]' Agrlicu_nllit.ure devotee to
assisting sn.naU faruners. had a handicraft d:hisio.n. This
association acted as a guide~ and a ttnarketD "f!" orgam zaHon
for CarIn handicraft IProolLucts. In the same manner. the
Handicralft Industry Association acted as a cooperative
for non-·farm prodn.Dced handicrafts. The Um1ted Stab's
Arauyft s PX system, :ala-lld tourists provided a local market
and testftng ground for these products.
An example of a developttnent procesd 1!.llnde!~1taken
by a community W3.S that of a small to'lNn hll central Korea
which set up a school for maruufacturing small glass beads
and products ilT~ade with beads. Unfortunately. the to\"~·n
was not aware of the type of products that might be market··
able overseas and devoted a good deal of attention to pro-··
d1Ulcing items that could only be acceptable to the Korean
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:rnadwl. AfhH' a vb.sH by thle i\. I. D. ham:Biicran experl.
it be~:Hl producing beaded b;ags and olher ilerns for' ex-
port., Evenhm~~'y. iH"odlucHonincrcased rllany Hmes.
Another examplie 'I,,\':IllS :at project of tth~ Fosler
Parenls OrgmdzaUon. 'Through a srnaH gHl of $500
they wel~c abn€: to I"cnt a lion. vnlh ~nre C'()HoperaUofll of a
~,m'ean company they tt,:Dmghtt, lOO \':ndo\,,~ed nnolhers how' to
ptt"(}ChD(:e hand-made fishing netts ,,,hich "'.H.:re Uwn pItUU"-
chased by U'llis cornpall1ly for if.BOrnCf'Uc use .t:Hld for eXPJort.
Thett~e 'l.vere ltnany otthen" such e):aunplies of seH-hella>
organizatlions Hml \'i,"cn"c en"catted DIll lids fieh:lI. QnJioUnllg
fu"orn Hue \'l.'u"Heu""s J"epott"l of October", n9l661:
"~Ther'e ;,ue Uunee (:II:B1sses of g00d!S hllvo]ved
nn Huns Dtt'udll.ll:Alh"yw They .unchude :BItt the f[l'st
~even. linexpensi ve :solluveniir iitettlllS: at the
second nevel, ull1l())(Reu":BI1telly priced, popll.bllar
gift nlenus sold hu Uue better department
sllores; and fiinaHy. :BIll a very ~liigrr. level au"e
Hue au'hsUc goods sr,))ldnIl1lHrn:i~edquall1ltities
hu qualHy stou"es and! alrit gaHel"iies carTyh~g
Ilhe U1l1lost expensive Hen-bs. T.te sou veD1lh
Henls can be Sertrlll·- Ulll.81SS produced, provid-
hug the designs are aeceptable. This, plus
the llllllJidrcUe lleveJl.. presents the test oppor-
tll.mity for real gro'lj,\~ll:h.
1!"The basic problenn nul this field is one of
desiign. Korea has unany unique and lbeauU-
. fuJI. products. Unfortunately, many of them
are not acceptable to th.e tastes of the for-
eign buyers. There is a tendency among
Korean llnanuJf'acltul"ers to hdlHate hancHcraft
of other countries. \"1ilhUe itt is possible to
accompl~_sh this, olbvii.ousXy the COlLulfltries in
which the designs ori;ghllate can do a better
job. It is necess.<i':"Y to produce articles \~dth
th.e Korean imprint, yet lNi th desi~s t.lhlat
vlliB sen abroad. His, therefor"c.
I'ecommcndcd Hnal c:onsuHants 01" :JllCR\:isor"s
in the various all"cas: be b,"oaught her'e. They
should be those who mnBe"stand the rn~H'kel
and win wodt with !~';:ou"e::'Hll U'UHHlIu.ufachu,"ers.
ca"JlUsmen alr~d :f\ltt"UstS' "'9~'ho theunsenves waH
cn"eatc Uw ne",'1i' desu,fgn:s:. To hnport (Des-
i.gn~,"s \'Jouundl not devellop n,ott'cmll tdlesug,ners.
1"'01' !<ou'eans to 1l''':Lllvell to otheu" ce:omdru€':s
win onlly ctt"eale umll1ta.. ions. Thell"c have
been r(~cent suuggesUc'ms tt,hat Kott"e::<UlI tei8lJlYli S
go aba'oad fOI" Uous pauI"pose. This shoulld
be dliscou I"aged. "n
A SUllaH ~J>UulL untlCTe:stllng stOtt·,j" regruU'dhllg
the developmeJllt of a ij:lltt'OOILUCt 'I.I'lJ1 ll1th ver'j" hugh llabor corn-
tent, and nn'l.'Jhuch Une ltUn1l.U«:JlIl.Ue hand skins oft" KOJrean
WOJllH":l coulld be utidzed us tthe foHo'l.9dng:
Foa' Ullany C'il"Ullhull"ies Soochow (Ch:iiJr1la) has
been known as a center ['or a spece:nfllC' ttype oft" nne enll-
bl"oiLdell"y. \VHh. thE closllng of expoll'as froun China to
the United States, the ~alle of these Hems in the Umted
States had ahl1l0st disaBJ>pear~d. These Hems consisted
of gift Heltns such as handkerchiefs, tabllech}tths, and
accessories.
An Anlerncan company specializing in hand-
kerchiefs \vas eager to obtain a new source of these
iteans. This connpany had a salles volume of approxi-
mately $8 anHHon in standard handkerchief products.
The gift line \vas supplementary to their regular product,
but represented a h.igh proCH potentia].
The representative of this cOJlnpany had
found in Hong Kong, a nmnber of fOrLter resideDllts of
China who were skiHed in this type of \\101d< and \vere
willing to come to Korea as trainers. Ten teacher's
fl~mn Hong Kong trained loo Korean women.. The women
h'ainees were each taught one type of e.lllllbroidery~ n
l~equired several wOl~kel's to complete an item. Each
woman upon cornpletling her trairdng "'lUS sent back to
he.' village to train ten othel~ ,,,7011l1len.. Thtlus9 the plan was
designed to huUd up :approxilnately 1, 000 skUlled workers.
The producer inh'oolluced a ~ompnetely new
concept into on-the-job tr"aining progranu;; iin Korea. In
the nrst place, he suppl ned corn fortabh~, wen-lighted
and healed space in whfich the trahllccs could "'lork. SecC'nd,
he paid thellll :a Salal"y cehu"nng UlleRearruing periiod. And
third, he invested the mmlle~f necessary for thfis whole
development ru-ocess, galublfing on fits future sUlccess.
It was estllll1Jllatecell that the tT:adniing process
would take approxhnateRy one year. The American pro-
ducer was fearful that the products of improperly trahled
amateurs wound begiin to be exported and wOlluRd then create
a poor Jl"eputatiion for Ullfis product The dlesigns and qual-
ity w ~re keyed to the succes:sfud marlkeUDllg of this product.
He. therefore, asked the Korean GoverD1lnllenit to give him
a monopoly position for one year during which he would
export nothing. Because he was a foreigner there was
some difficulty in obtaining this priviilege. However, the
governnlllent finally establlisR1led this monopoly in his favor.
There were many trials and tTiUnulaHons, and
the volume of production never became as great as the
producer originaHy planned. Nevertheless, at the end of
the year, he was begimling to e~"P0rt fine embroidered
handkerchiefs and was planning to produce other simBal'
items.
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;). For~:ign Investment in SlLlb'-"'\=:':?.:?:.~hnj·
Indush'ies
DtH'ing Hue early stages of Uw' export ddve
the ernphasis \'Jas on industrnes developed by KOI'cans
with their own funds. ",\s h'ade expanC(h~d, the KOI"emli
GovcI1 nrnent also made a detel'rnnned effor[ to aUract
fOJ'engn i nvestrnentts into the expol'l i nrhu:5tt des. .."\ n
aUJ'3clive fOI'cign nnvestra1lcntt nnchuccrnclflIt bn,,- v,..;as passed.
;:Jrad .t1I (h'ive to aUI'act fOI"<i'~!ig,n nnves[u1I1Ieulitt ",...:~n:B, hegun.
Spc<c:ia~ eH'owtt.s. nnehntiing ~m indm:itrnall
p~rlk. \~veil"e rnade to at tn-act successful K();n~an residents
(~f .J 3p:ara to opera factou"ieshn Korea. 1\ l1!lULUnbcl' of
An"Jerkan htnyers llulltett"estlednn cn::atfing a new SOlLU"ee of
suppUy ",~.'e r'~' Rtt'nvoll \led i'-Ii jjORn-utt, venhnr-cs or l,i:llJoH y ow ned
iU1lVeSln1Ji(~tt1ltS in ny~on" ph~u-unacelLlltica~s, handlkerchiefs,
5\',,'(;:;::l.1C 1"s, hunll ~lln ha i U" t,,'I;.'! ig factoriies. ar.d clioHu:iin~; l!1!1lanu-
. -
u:/.-)c(urnng.
In ll96'1, the dln-iive fou" these iinvestors began
to produce hnpD~..1taU1ltl ..eSIlILU:s~ A unumber of :\merican
electronic nnanufachn~ersestablished stub-assembly fac-
tories in Korea. These hllchuded such ]uajor companies
as SiigneUcs, JMotorola. Oak Electronetics, Fairchild,
and Haytheon. all oj[ \vhonn invested substantial funds~
These new industries were particllullarly il!1lllportant and
effective to the devellop]uen1t of both l!1Illall1lufacturing and
ex)on.-ts. Seeking' llOt"t;.r'-cost production, they brought in
valuable tlechniques, personne-l training and their OIl,.Vllll
built-in expolt't nllar!keL
Recent stati.:.;,tics indicate that. exports of
electronic conllponents and finished product.s are increas-
ing rapidly.. The eAlloriL program of Korea \'laS not devel-
oped nniUaUy through foreign investments and could prob-
ably conthuue growing without them. Nevertheless, the
contim.D'ed input of foreign capital in this area can be signa-
fie ant.
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CHf\PTEH IX
lipHonl)CTiu~ PHOBLE1\US
U'(H·.-"~W Duu(hush+a.~ UUlJ:ana.genllcoulIl. ,,'..'as gCUlllC'Jr"au],Y nUllex-
rrH~ deuwed nn the uruter'ulI~uU(())nm~ competHn ve' requu] relflllJClfllts
I,.i' '~"', ')1 " :; rt ~ r cd .." <.;: ijnillJ IT""I, ,r"~' "" ',I; li"u ~~ :SIT)I!> (l''' ~ n,r" "11 Ii ii ~'·ns, ;t nd ~,' U'!' (" ii D1i',t
·--U'il.f. ...... ·,,';') ,-"->',.~,l.i.j_.,it\l UJll!lI"--"'L.~II:r~,l!l 1Lu--_··.. ",'L·,IL-Il··--,'tt to.. --lu" ..... ,.~~ ..
\LlJ)I(Ju' ~H"()la])~em:s UB h::(U~1Jnlll(~:all deV1eliopunett1l~. eqmpt"i:cui:tt.
,:l,,"nuvlltt>l, ;uulId I("O:;-·,tt :;U((c'fllJllIiUlItthu'f.'! rel,t!lclj,m:d to) be solived
Qlu!qgL ,:, J')il'I,~u!d ~lluq;~dk til)'\.' ijjytO,UlJ g,~III.'~;:ll';~liCD~'1i1It JW~ nndu,:t,i[cy on
" ",o~m!1Jodlltty-hy-<counUll1if()idlltty b;;J1su:;;. \nuHe r'1!1J;;:uny tr)Jf tlir,';::..;~;
l'll"ob1ems I\.",'(;'U"I/," llu1Jb~n'u"«~"L"tt(ed" 'l.....'c ~,,'.... UllTI deseu"ube be[(),w' nneas-
III tt'e:s UIl~llt ",?eu"c talkculJ to :S(())~ve sounC' of tthe hlldn V'udmllll prob-
n(: nns.
A., Cost
Inexperience and llaelk of IkU'JJoN,dedge made \C'ost
accounUng of very dOILUlhttlfull acclUI Jr'·;(ljcy. gven some of the
L;:u'ger connpaniies:. '\7hirch u1l1Iay have lkll1lm~tn their overan
cmnpany CtlJlslts. onen had! no accll.urate Heun -by -HeJr1l]
::; ilaUstiics. In some of the better Jr1l1l allllaged phil!1!tS iit was
sonnetiinnes diiflficuH to esUrnate the cost oK' nllew Hems
ace Ul''3lte lly.
\VUh lI.itUe experiiel/lllee nUb mam.nfach.lld.ng nel.'/ HeJf1llls,
and ahnost no experience in volmne plf"odll.JLcUon, Korean
connpan.iies ,,\7ere infhu~lfllced by other factors than actuall
cost in setting prices. In pracUce, the 111l1lajor factor was
inten'national cOlupeUUorn.
Because of Ulle incenU. ,:e:s and the propaganda
impehu£. Korean conllpanies ''''ere eager to begin export
business. In the early stages. they often based. estinnattes
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on the pI-ices eslablished by .Japanese compenHllou~. Itt
was generaUy understood that Korean goods ({':OfiVtd onby
be acceptable if prices were appu·o~dDnafte~.vW tto E»
percenl iower than the Japane~e ptt"k(~s. The ~ijdl{~hh«m~ull
cost of transpol"taUon. phus Hue uur,lKnO\VUll olr~ poor u"epu:-
tation of Korean quanUy made thus mau"gfiro c~e'CfC':;;:5'H"Y.
As lhe quallity ami repll.ut~1tluon of Kou"e~un ,goods linr1Jpu~oved"
a smaUett~ pu"ice dHr(~tt"enllU~ull ~1~1,(H;; :tllccepttublle.
An inten-"esting c11llllhuu"~llll note us tthfl:tt desplitte;;~ llolJ1l/l!,'
period of anumosity, the ~<ou·e~Hll:S !lused fthe ;U,fijpmlle:s:e
producUorD ll.U1lut or cost 1lllrrlllltt :as UlIeuu' st;;lIuuJl;;llu"d. n was:
almost 1l.mhearil'~ ott to !ln~:lC .11 !lUU'uH of uneaslLuremeUlJtt f'tt"(f)U1nl
Ameri,can, Euu"ope;;,ull on~ oUlIelt" ;;u."c:as. even though tthese
might be all"eas of specu[k cmnpeHtt,fiouli.
In addHfion to the <llbove pr:acUccs. p>rfiee (~'oll.lilld oftten
be detcrnllined by the custtoU1l1lcu". The ""bau"gallu1J htmftll:u"s'"
and the irr ~sponsublle "" oulle tillne"" buyer \1'J'olLulld somettrmes
talk prices down bellow Une lle\7ell tha~ \'."olLulld coven" reasoUlJ-
able costs and quality. Thus was OUlle of the reasons foll"
attempting to interest unternationall b n1.yers ft"roun the liatt"ge
responsible chain stores and\}.~dnllHesalle hOllQses. Such
buyers seek a contimuhug SOlLllr e of slLnpply and 1r'€'coglnLb:e
that bargain hunting n1l1lalkes tJhiis impossiible beeause em111l-
panies must rneet costs~ and \"7]H CUE qualiitty to do so H
prices are driven dm'.Hll.
The actual sale price often bore HtHe or no re-
lationsh';'p to the actual cost. Despite pOOl" accou.mhng
methods~ hm'lever. COnUlIllOn sense bookkeeping and ex-
perience event1lllaUy gave the producers SOHne ILmdeu"sttand-
ing as to whether or no~ they \vel"e making a prom t frOD1I1l
the item sold. Consequently,. there was a tendency to
increase prices after the first orders \'.'ere cornplleted.
This would irritate larg;er and lluore responsible cu.ustonn-
ers who expected lower prices as larger orders \"7eh~e
given.
As in many cOllunt:rnes of Huc wlo."lld~ ~hc.·e "'las
also a Ilcndency to fb: pdces through ciCu"h:!!ll :aw."ange-
rD1lI(mls, ,eheclk pr'kes, and olher de'vlices:. 'The gove ."U1LU1fllCUbt
uh;;eH ~Nas, desplile llip se.·vnc:e lo Hlle contr~b.·Y~ encollwag-
ung these pu"acUcc:s. Nc\v or sun:uH srcale pu"oilthuceu's w'oulid
sou1I1lcUrnes llullde.'mlinc tthe market hy selllling, fau' benc[lItth
\vorlld rn:Cllrlkel prices, mnU orten slluhsl;anftn:<blllly belm",' ttheli ..
'(~osil:s. Thus ptt"acUcl(~ cOllulld «1I(~stu"oy ou' seu'u((\ilitslly llUbjuu"e
those pwoduJI(~lill1lg llunUts \9,7hu,du ~,t'!eu"e sellllliuug ;Clitt :e~;Hhn8itte
~:wke:s. On the olheu" h:<lIUlld, ("~u'n(ell <OJU" fti:-;:I(:d'ptl"lic'e att'Tm1Jg~:­
~rnen~s lLendedo U1J1J;;JllD1l1:<1lliu'1l llUlICtt''tl''llfcUeUlltt pu"O!(huceu"s un R:Husuncss"
~Ull!f.U dele u"!"cl(1 flluu-UH'~ u' uuutt u"o«.]llucU «,lJU1l of UlllJOU"C' eft'fuc nent oper-
;a U ems by tthese :411h'eady pn"oftittahlle pU"Ol(filIJIC'!C"Jl'·S.
De;t;pllttll~ the rr.llfillemU1JHll descu"libed ab«»ve. uV.;()l!"'C
effk:ncna ptt~l()tHiLu<C'Hon Il'UllettUH),KcUS ;;mtdl bt1u:suncs;s fi)1.l!";)(:ttllces gained
headway in nue hmg n"IlUllll.
The adV~'l!ll1lttag<es ott" expou-UUllg weu"e suHic.nenHy
great to <C'n~eate an nnlen"cst llU'U beUcr CO[~tt ;(llccolUlUllttiing m:etth-
ods. Thus interest gave a ll))oost ~o ;run actthrH:" which had!
started sonne years before the export d.-live. I',.v,dllcn a natiion-
aJ accountants organizaUoull had been fO.nnedl "","lltth A. I. D.
encoQnu~:ageunenlt.and ad,rn{c'e. .i\lf1lllong oUll\\'::Jr ach viiHes lit hrelid
a series of Syll1lllpOS!.(R a m:ll , 'i.'liiUll the assistance off o1l.llttsiidle
helip. c~H'ried on shudnes ctllesiigned ffo educatte Hs menllbeTs.
The business schools ott" the lLuruvers:iiUes. wHh the hiP.'llp oj['
Koreans \'dllo ~lIad studied abll"f[JJad. es1Lablished advanced
courses in accOlI,mHng [.l>ll'acUce.
A. I. D. olffered assistance throtLug,h Us CO~ll­
troHer" s office. and a nuunber of local eUll1lployees who lhlad
worked for A. I. D. ~Hllo,t\P,d into the pr:iivate sector in Korean
account:iing and business Ifirn]s. ...¥\. I.. D.. also slL:ggestedl
that llnternat:iional C1I_~<colLlllt1lt:iing lfirms open offices in Korea
and tha1L the Korean Govell"mnent grant Ullettn Hcenses ItO
op(~n'~nte UlIC n'e. 1\:5 of the 'I.',n"He 1t"":S depoH"hlwe U'u"«)lun 1!«(\U"«}':b.
Uuns ~md not yet been diCme. h1i H»66 the HOllte nll:;lttll\fm::d!
.~Qusti n(~:ss 1\huchtimes COIt"jpICW;;UU1ouu 0 B1\U) ""'..' ~lIS ij)J~:81 umn ~1I~ tl{}
"JJij})Il?fR lUll offke hll ;(olt"c,a ;;UltlJ<cti [II:,)) nmh"ilwtillucc bllv:F~~nrL;':f;S un:;w U1:uuw-
, y :~lJ*~'(~ tt1r1wchult1Je aCiCOllmUUlJg 1t1l1l(~fih(1X[~s hU«0 tthe (f"(!.Jllilil'lIttu"y.
As was descrnbed un the plt··eC:ll.~duu1i~ CC'h:;lIli)lh~It... (,TId
r;;ll(~hn'tie:s nrn deve~opu U1ig C«nllnttll"ulf~S; ~ U"{;' ~llhll1J(t)Jstt ti U1ieVll tt:;lIb1y
the :fdf(»west to adopt. UllC'l.'J ttllJett&1J((Jids ~~Ulid h:C'hntii[nm:~:s:. N:((;~",':
factolt'nes alrc eqllunppcd 'l.',i'fiUu ij"'1ltte-u1JlJodell ItYll~H;'htin:ell"Y and
u'npcwteli: techull.uqllues and meUwds h"ou1J1l tthe unou"1!.:' :lld'i/:8Ineed
cOllmff.des. A mumllJJCl" oW' ttlJuese u'UlJl!J\lfienu PU:;:ll~1Jtts obltt~lltill1led
lthe uU" ltedumca~ gllludc n 1t1it(~s '>y emph»yu uug r<l))U''4:~t~~Ul! h:'chulJDcu:rtlullS
by sendIng Kou"e:':1JHS ~UbnOl~U((U ff{("l, stt.ll.u<clly ou· by jin'hut vconhunes
w nth fowengn cm1llJpanuc:5.
JwRone and uuare KOU'(C':<UUll:S; ttu":ruviC'llllfJng ;i.lJhu"oad. alndl U1!1I0Jr"C
and mou'e cllastmncrs conll h1lg' tto Kou"ea. phvsUw dernandls
of connpeUUve hllten'naU(())ulla~ ll:»llusllness" hl8'g,mll to ;fliIPPU"f:Cll-
d1bThy linJfhuence the deslln"c jf'tolH" fiU1J(~T'e:rL:sed p>tt"odlllicr:tthrHy.
Fad:ory enTncucnlcy ob[auull("lCll fllll"slt pu"lloriity. OlfHce enffi-
cnency and uuarkeUng were U1l0~ cOlI1lslldel!"e'~~ equuaHy h1l1lpo.u·-
tant, and nrnproveunen1tsn n tlhJese came llatte-u".
Personal work haD:JJiLts auuJl atLttHm:Bes favolr'ed prolf.hucttih:-
Uy efforts in Korea. KOI1"eaU1ls have a Il"emau"kablle aHenttiioll1l
span, good work sysb:nns. «3md munch ~ngenuiitty. They re-
gard hai"d \"lark as 1th~ U1l011"U1I1l. Thm:l:. wiill.ll1l rea3mllablly good
r1l1lanageuneun. the labor force tte1l1lds to be h~ghThy p:tt"odlLuc1!.:iive.
The fD.rst phase of increased prod1Luctth~[ty '1N«3lS ttOlllI1l-
crease the iimli\,riid1LUall e!ffUcllenc:,Y of tt1llle \~rOH"Lf;'.er. ..\"iitth some
notable exceptiions. the \'lenn-being o( Hue Il.t"or!kells was
giiven BtUe alb"ninon as a factor in efrncient prod1LucHon.
despite its reltevance. Safeit)" and heaUh 1l1llleaS1Lures. and!
worker c01lufort were neglected. CentllUll"Tes olld Itradn-
1tDOUllS _iLnd the exis1l:ence of a hngHu peu"cellll1l::8I)'~e of lLurder-
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ernployrnent made it easy to give safety Citti(r: comfort less
attention Clan they deserved. Progress her.~e win probably
a)c difficult to achieve.
l. Kor~ean P roducU vity Center
..;...----.;...._.. .. --
Several yeal~s prior to 1964, 1I1E~ Korean
Pt'oducUvity Center had been organized with government
famds and with financial and technical assistance from
A. l. D~ It had to develop its own staff as weI! as to con-
vince ind'~~stJ~y to rnake use or Us services. At first, most
of Hs services were 'l:onated ~',dthout cost. Us original
cffol·ts were properly directed tm.'lard management. It
conducted sernLlars, rnanagenllent tra.ining courses and
other related a~UvUies. In 1963 the Center obtained. a
team of seven technh..::Jians rrorn the International Labor
Or"ganizaUon (ILO). It was also affiliated with the Asian
ProchncUvity Center headq1l.mrtered in Japan.
By Ji96~ its sel'vices \....ere beginning to be more
widely utilized, and it begarn to charg'e fees which partially
covered the costs of its ac1tivi1ties. The eluphasis on
managernent training continued, although the need was: now
for lnore factory, job level efficiency training.. Unfortu-
nately, both in the factories and on its own staff, there
were too few experts in specific phases of production line
"lork. As ithe ILO assistance was phased out, A. I. D.
undertook to supply technicians who were equipped to give
assistance in factory and nllariceting techniques. Their
help was one of nlany factors \vhich led to an appreciable
increase in the general productivity of Korea" s industry.
2. Taegu Regional Development Activity
One developnle:lt in the field of industrial
productivity work deserves special attention. The city
of Taegu is the fourth largest iindustrial center in Korea,
containing sixteen factories which are large by Korean
-81-
stand'lrds. In addition to these are many small plants
Inanufacturing items such as aluminum ware, hardware,
textiles, chemicals, and foundry products. The city is
also the center of an agricultural area that grows large
quantities of tomatoes and apples.
The leading factory is a textile \veaving plant,
C!le-il \Veaving Company, which is part of a great variety
of enterprises owned by one of the wealthiest men in
Korea. American experts who have seen the plant rate
it as one of the finest in the worli. In 1965, it employed
approximately 3, 000 workers~ produced top quality
woolen cloth, and exported large quantities including
approximately three million dollars' worth annually to
the United States. Us manager was a first-rate textile
engineer and executive, who also had a social conscience.
Its women workers were well housed in warm and clean
dormitories, and worked under good conditions.
Under the leadership of Che-il \Veaving Com-
pany, an industrial association was organized which in-
cluded in its Inembership the 16 large plants, plus the
Chan1.ber of COlnmerce and the local, provincial c..nd muni-
cipal authorities. The association established a small,
independent productivity center and asked A. I. D. for
assistance, indicating its own willingness to provide self-
finance and self-help. A. I. D. agreed to supplement their
program by furnishing six ractory technicians - - a foundry
expert, sheet-metal expert, chernical production expert,
cost accountant, quality control engineer, and a tool and
die engineer. Unfortunately, A. L D. I\Vashington was
never able to recruit all of the six technicians promised,
but did furnish four technicians who worked in the area for
over a year. The local committee supplied seven Korean
assistants and technicians as staff for the productivity
center. In addition, staff members of A. I. D., including
the Senior Export Advisor, assisted with seminars,
leC"tures, etc.
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At A. I. D. I S urging, the local cOlumittee
included a representative of the engineering college
and vocational training schools of the community. In
this Inanner it was hoped that the formal training in the
Taegu area would be geared to the needs of the local
factories. Unfortunately, the local industrial commun-
ity had no real understanding of the necessity for the
educattal phases of the program.
A. 1. D. had urged the use of the quality con-
trol division of Che-il \Veaving Company as a training
school for quality control engineers. \,'hile Che-il per-
Initted visits and organized occasional seminars, they
did not agree to full-time training on their premises.
The city, with some assistance from the national e-overn-
ment built a first-rate testing laboratory which was made
available to local industry, and A. I. D. furnished some
of the equipment.
Achievements of the Taegu Regional Develop-
ment Activity were quickly visible in improved production
n"lethods, and training of local engineers. The business
con"lmunity was enthusiastic and pleaded for continuation
of the program. The spirit of self- help soon spread to
other areas of Korea, which started to form similar
programs.
C. Quality
Meet ing international competitive requirements for
quality was and in some aspects still is one of the major
problems of export development. It is generally so
important in any of the less developed countries, that its
treatment in Korea will be spelled out more fully than
that of some of the other production problems.
Since Korea's major export advantc>_ge is low-cost
labor, she could not compete in items for which tech-
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niques of large scale mass production had been develop-
ed in the advanced countries. Items with conlparatively
high labor content are predominantly in the middle and
high priced range. Quality specifications for these are
more stringent, and are particularly important to their
acceptance. Inexperience, poor techniques, poor equip-
ment and lack of knowledge all nlilitated against good
quality. \Vithout good quality, Korea could not compete,
and therefore, could not export at all.
The achievement of quality was tackled from two
angles. One was to attenlpt to prevent the export of
itelns that did not meet general quality standards, and
also those that did not lneet their contract specifications.
This is basically a policing and preventative operation.
Quality cannot, however, be inspected into a product;
it nll... st be built into it. Hence, the second angle was to
develop techniques at the factory level which would ensure
quality goods. Scientific quality control is a comparc..tive-
1y rec~nt engineerj.ng science. In mass production it
is based on a lnethod of statistical samplings. Since t~<ss
production demands complete interchange of identica_
parts, and pieces are not adjusted in order to fit together,
the old methods of iudividual inspections of both parts and
assemblies serve no purpose. Sampling can ?"eveal wheth-
er parts are identical. Such quality control depended on
the adoption and use of i!1ternational standardization pro-
cedures that would not o!1ly create domestic standards,
but would also raise Korean products to meet international
requirements.
Four institutions, plus a number of private industry
cooperative organizations, ",-ere involved in the process
of creating quality. First was the Korean Productivity
Center described above. Others were the Korean Stand-
ards Association (KSA), the National Industrial Research
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Institute (NIH!), and the Quality Improvement and
Technical Assistance (QITA) division of NIHI, which
was the governlnent-established export inspection
system. The first three of the above named institutions
had been in existence prior to the beginning of the
export drive, but the Joint Export Development Corn-
Inittee (EPSC) made many recommendations for improv-
ing their work. The QITA inspection division of NIHI
was established upon the recommendation of the EPSC.
Below are descriptions of activities of the three
organizations not previously discussed, and of the private
industry cooperative associations.
L Korean StandarJs Association (KSA)
The Quality COl.trol and Technical Assistance
Working Task Force of the EPSC recOlnmended to the
Govermnent that funds be provided to translate inter-
national specification guidebooks into the Korean language
for use by Korean industries. The United States Armed
Forces made available the standard specification require-
m.ents, and the American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTlVI) and the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)
standard books of reference. KSA also used specifications
of Japanese standards, and the American Fire Under-
writers inspection requirements.
This work of translation and distribution was
expensive and laborious. KSA was subsidized by the govern-
ment. Its budget and staff were inadequate for the great
task it faced. Nevertheless, a great deal was accomplish-
ed, and its services were increasingly used by Korean
industries which were authorized to use a KSA stamp if
they met the requirements of KSA.
2. National Industrial Research Institute (NIRI)
This institute was the major materials testing
laboratory for the country. It was established in one of
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the engineering buildings of the Seoul Na~ional UniversHy
(the leading university in Korea), Clnd \"las supr>1ied with
new equipnlent through A. I. D. financing. It was staffed
by Korean engineers and laboratory technicians, many of
whom were trained in the United States.
Despite its first-rate equipment and staff ti'aining,
NIRI was not as efficient as it should have been. A. I. D.
had as.:;igned a staff engineer as a part-time advisor to
NlRL His advice helped bring continuous ilnpro\'ement
of its services. The United Nations also supplied tech-
nical assistance in the forln of a full-time advisor to the
electrical division.
A constant prograln of education, propaganda and
information was necessary to convince industry that it
needed this valuable testing laboratory as a part of its
own production equipnlent. NIRI charged fees, out these
fees only represented a snlall percentage of the cost of
the services rendered. How~;ver, it was felt that if a
charge was made for the work, producers would be more
likely to learn an appreciation of it.
Other laboratories served individual industries in
other parts of the country. The MLlistry of Agriculture
maintained an agricultural inspection laboratory. There
was a ::eafood inspection service in Pusan. As described
previously, the city of Taegu had its own inspection lab-
oratory. A number of the newer factories were equipped
with laboratory testing instruments. Some of ~he more
advanced manageinent made good use of their own testing
laboratories, but many of these were only showplaces,
used insufiiciently or not at all in daily practice.
As tinJ.e passed and technical knowledge and trained
personnel became Inore available, the U3e of national,
local and private testing laboratories was nluch increased,
and these came to play an inlportant role in quality de-
velopment.
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3. Quality hnprovement and Technical
Assistance Division (QITA)
Early in the export campaign, a review was
made of the entire quality inspection systenl for exports,
by Dr. Neil Beck, the A.!. D. quality control engineer.
He reported a weak system operating in seven separate
divisions, SOlne under the government and others under
pri vate trade associations. Divisions varied frOln ex-
cellent to very poor, with most cJ assified as inadequate.
Upon the recommendation Of ~he Joint Export
Development Comnlittee (EPSC), the Ministry of Com-
merce and Industry required a government inspection
stamp on all exports. A special division within the
Ministry was made responsible for enforcing this regu-
lation, and at the same time a division (QITA) in NIHI
was established as the authorized export inspection
deparbnent of the Korean Government. At the request
of the Ministry, A. 1. D. assigned Dr. Neil Beck to be
advisor to this a.~tivity. In many instances the inspec-
tion requirement had been established before the in-
spection facilities and organization were adequately
equipped to carry out their duties. In some instances,
these hasty designations deterred the program rather
than advanced it. Gradually the regulations became a
reality, and more and more items were required to
obtain inspection and approval before they could be ex-
ported.
A. 1. D. also brought in a full-time quality
control advisor, Mr. John Jacobsen, who visited hun-
dreds oi companies to advise them on methods. He was
instrumental in organizing a quality control association,
which sponsored a major public showing of quality con-
trol methods that was partially financed by A. L D. He
also organized seminars and study groups throughout the
country.
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Very important to the program ":,ere the
activities of both the temporary and permanent repre-
sentatives of foreign buyers. Some buyers assigned
full-time technicians to assist producers in quality
control. Such activities were promoted by A. I. D.
A. 1. D. also financed two trips by teams of
Korean technicians under the guidance of Dr. Beck, to
study the methods used in Hong Kong, Japan and Taiwan.
A summary of the recommendations made by those teams
and by the EPSC working group on quality control is
giyen below under Item 5 in this section.
4. Private Industry Inspection Associations
Some inspection services were organized
by private industry associations. In principle, this
method should be very effective. People who are in-
volved in the industry are the ones who should best know
its problems and requirements. Unfortunately, self-
policing does not always work. In some instances the
--lirector of the inspection services was himself a pro-
u..lcer and was in effect directing the inspection of his
own and his competitors' products. It became evident
that where a cooperative inspection organization ex-
isted, the inspection services had to be completely
independent frOln the centrol of the industry, and under
the regulation and guidance of the government. It was
also essential that the staff be adequately paid and not
on the payroll of any of the companies involved. The
ten1.ptations for corrupt practices had to be completely
eliminated.
The :Ministry of Conlmc!'~e and Industry had
determined at one point to permit first-rate factories
with good inspection services and records to export
without government inspection. While it is undoubtedly
true that the best type of quality control is by self-
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discipline and by the customcl' s acceptanee of the pro-
duct, nevertheless self-inspection sornetiInes leads to
carelessness and a lowering of standards. It was sug-
gested that in cases of this nature the govermnent may
not )~equire a full inspection, but should ma!<e spot checks
at frequent intervals to make sure that the standaros are
maintained and specifications cOlnplied with.
The best n.ethod is where an industry has well-
establishe(~ standards, a history of understanding and
acceptance, and an organization of self-discipline. For
exanlple, the silk yarn industry was an old indusiry that
was established by the Japanese during the occupation of
Korea. The industry 11laintained an inspection laboratory
and every pound of silk yarn was graded and marked be-
fore it left the country. The laboratory had a well-train-
ed, efficient sf-aff, and was very strict and independent in
its enforcement.
Korean silk yarn was in competition with
Japanese yarn and the gi ade nlarks !lad to meet inter-
national standards. The laboratory was partially sup-
ported by federal subsidies and partially by fees paid by
the producers. This was a profitable and well estab-
lished industry, and the quality inspection and grading
was essential to continued international acceptance and
the prosperity cf the industry. Actually, there was no
reason why it should have been subsidized by the govern-
ment except that without government subsidies the lab-
oratory would be completely beholden to the ind'lstry it-
self and thereby might lower its standards.
:J. RecC'lumendations of QITA Study Teams and
EPSC Quality Control Working Group
- Branches of present textile inspection and
testing cooperatives in different cities)
shotlld be brought under centralized control.
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(This is the recommendation that has been
least implemented. )
Inspection and testing fees should be
standardized.
A plant classification system should rate
plants according to their effort and success
in establishing quality cont:col and inspection
procedures. Plants which ma:ntain top-level
inspection systems should be granted auto-
matic approval of their products, but this must
be carefully controlled in order to prevent dete-
rioration.
NIHI, however, must still be the central
control organization and should take over
entirely the weaker cooperative inspectioa
services. Eleven commodities have been
placed in this category through August, 1966,
but more should follow.
No cooperative service should be certified
until there -is adequate financing, staff and
facilities, as well as C"61nplete legal and
administrative freedom from the product
manufacturers. In most cases, continued
ROKG subsidies will be required until com-
plete financial independence can be achieved
by an individual cooperative inspection services.
A single centralized, complete authority and
approval agency for ~xport inspection must
be established. At the present time the
Ministries of Industry & Commerce,
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and of Agriculture. the Office of
~'",1onopoly and 0thers have this
rcspo!'lsibility fpr different pro-
ducts. This creates confusion and
varying standards.
No waivers of i"1:.:'pe~tion of products
whi~h are on the Ministry of COlnmerce
obligatory test Ust shx)uld be allowed
for any rea.son whatsoBver.
The combinatior~ c" t,E.chnical assistance,
p)~oductivit"yand t.::c t'1icc:"llaboratories
has begun to functicll. The Taegu Plan
should be repeated in other. cities.
On -the-job training programs in the
better factories should be organized
in cooperation witl~ techiaical high
schools, unjversities nd colleges.
The Korean Stal"!dards Association
(K8A) Bhould be gi veri suffIcient staff
to handle frequent review of specifi-
cations in or'der tc establish a more
effective basis for KSA certification.
Personnel specially trained in their
posts should not be shifted to other
jobs. Since February 1966, there
have been transfers on two occasions
fronl. the job of chief of the Export
Inspection Section of the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry. Both men
had been specially trained in export
inspection and had participated in
A. 1 D. -fronded tearn visits overseas.
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No industry should be .cequired to
obtain export inspection q,pproval
until the inspection facilities a.nel
staffing in their area are adequate
for this purpose. Hasty designa-
tions without prope r facilities to
carry then. out can only harm the
program rather than advance it.
During the writer's trip throughout the world, the
question of quality of Korean products ,vas continuously
called to his attention b:/r hnporters of Korean goods. In
too many instances even the label of the Korean Govern-
ment's inspection services was not a gua.rantee of qual-
ity. The overseas trad.::! missions and elnbassies con-
tinuously alerted Korean Government officials regarding
this situation. As a result, great improvements were
made. Even in the short period of the hvo years the
improvelnent in quality of Korean goocis was noticeable.
The cOlnbination of tightened government inspection, self-
discipline, and educatioH and customer demands were
obviously having their eif€cts. The best proof of this
was in the increasing volunie of Korean exports. I .. is
quite obvious that, deRpite some complaints, the Koreans
could not have increased their overseas sales unless the
quality requirements were continuously improving and
the products were Ineeting their customers' demands.
D. Product Desi~n and Packaging
In a country which had had little or no contact \vith
the outside world the design of prorluctswas determined
by tradition, habits and dornestic taste. The export de-
velopment effort dealt with three types of problems con-
cerning design:
Adaptation of some products whlC:h were
unique and origi:ml to Korea, and which
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she wished to sen on the int.er-
national In~.rkets as npw Hems for
those nlar'kets.
Consumer gooJswhich were bfnng
manufaclured fOl' domestic use but
w'crc \Vcstern in their origin did
not meet the late!~t style and design
requirclnents ('f Uw jnternaUoll1lal
mar'kels.
Packaging, which plays such ~Hl
irnportant role in consuuner goods
markets. was cornpletely foreign
to Korean. r ~odu.ucers
1 Adaptation of Indigenous Korean Designs
Articies of orJig.D.!hal Korean des.ign prest::llted
a unique and difficult s~tllUatiion. Old crafts ac"eloped
by native. back-alley 'C:1I.~aItsrnenwere prod;.uced in small
factories and sold to touris1ts and American GIs. These
sales led to the Geli~f that local designs '.vere acceptable
internationaHy. Jl\IIany of tBuese i.tems were of exquisite
and unique beauty an~ fine \lIrorkmanship. but did not have
widespread acceptan~e on the iuternatiunal markets.
Some enterprising traders b.:~ought in samples frorn
Jai.~-n and other countries ,'.dl]ch Korean craftsmen imi-
tated for sale overseas. In most cases. the customer
could obtain better quality from the orig:i~al source.
Wh2.t was required was to :nodify the basic Korean de-
signs to make them acceptable to the \Vestern market.
From 1960 to 1961 A. L D. had financed a handi-
craft design center, whiclra did good work in creating n~w
designs in sonle i~~ms. The design center did not. hmv-
ever, create a sufficiently large number of Korean des-
ngners who could develop thenr own desJ1gntSi. Korean
craftsmen and artJlsts "Jere E~X ceedJ1ngly skUU"u]. :atutd
given the proper trannnng~ c<cm.lld um:Boubtedlly c:re~d(;,
new and acceptable items.
The Light Industry \VCOl"'lkbllg Task !i('ou-ce of EPSC
stabHshed a sub-comrniUce oro ~tyJle and coUagetin<hus;-
n k .. ' which recommended to the govermne!U1It fthat a des-
ign expert be brought to Kor«~:a to assDstnn Iltt"anning
Korean craftsmen and desllg'm:.~rs.. Jt"\. J.. D. S;ll.llpplU2d slUIch
an expett"t who was marlket-mhuied. In addH.non" the com-
mittee tt"ecomme;'Udedme eshll.blfishmenl or a a::'oUage .iln-
.. "sh"y and sltyle desig·n cente'tt" which the g,lD>v<e':tt"rnll1Ielflt sett
). A roumbelt" of \miversfities also estalbHshed design
and resealt'ch centt:ers. p:au''!tuc'.ll.ullarlyulfll tt.he jfjjelld oj" ceram-
Des. ffrhe UJ .. S. Armed Forces IPX system ru.urniished both
a Itnal~kett; arlld a tesUng gU"OIlUlflld for Kore:cul COlfllsumer pro-
du~ts designed for expom"tL
The history of the de,,1e~OpJlllentoftHlle famous Than
silk is an ou1t:s1t::andfing e:xall'bllple or :ariap1t:atfiolfll of the product
of an old 1t:radiUonal llndllus1t:ry.. An AnllerllC<in officer who
had been s1t:aUonediin Thaiil:amd dlLuriing \\-7orldWar II recog-
nized the beauty and qu.mlity o[ this sink» and ]its export
potential. Howe vel'» he :also reaHzedtthat Une colors and
designs were no1t: inlernaUomllUy acceptaJMe .. Using native
skills» he assisted the 'Thain s in redesigning their sHlky
and offered to the 'l.'forldlwhat has since belcome an inter-
nationally ramo us prod\Uct.
In Korea» A I. v. brought in an expert in merchan-
dising to prepare plans for a shopping cenlter for cottage
industry and handicrafts similar to one set ILIlP by the
Indian Govermnent in New Delhi. Unfortmraate:ry» hlls pro-
po~~ls ',',fer!: ileV€~ put into practice. The basic {»\urpose
of this center w"as to {;:jG.coUJtJl age tourism which we wHll
describe in a later section.
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2. Designing \Vc.slern Goods for \\!'csteJl"Jl
IiUarkets
The second set of problenns concerned with
Ineeti ng the design I"CqllU nD"emenls of standard. !nass-
produced consumer ptt'oducts for the \Vestern markets.
".'Jere InOI."e important than the handicrafts problems.
Such Heins as shirts, cloUlling accessories.
shoes aad other weaD"ling apparel floor C'o\'erings. waH-
papers. cycg;llass ftt"mll1Jes. attni c,:en such manufactured
ntems as basebaU gloves, bi1cycJcs. ("le. were involved.
In nnany instances KOU"Cc'Ull Hlu'oducers were unaware of
the necessity of inveslin,gin highly skiUed. designers.
All! Alneriican u1l1laH ordeu" cat8lllogue W""'.S oilen used as
the source of theli I" desiLgn1Js for \VesterJ1l goods. The
designer ",'as usuaHy a. factory IneChal1l.llc one step above
a Hne wodkttuan.
The overseas of!f'li('es of the Korean Trade
Pron1\>tion Association pllayed an important role in
gathering sannples and sen1Jdnu1Jg iLhenll to Korean producers.
Frequent trips by individuals. and t€ams of Koreans to
overseas nnarkets gave it&11e][n further knowledge of design
requiren1en.ts.
As with quality controll. consumer goods buyers
could often be persuaded to help. Representa1t:ii yes of the
large scale consmneJt's and world tradersll.vere often so-
phisticated and k:10\vledgeablle regarding the problenlls of
developing countries and were prepared to assist develop-
ing industries to rneet their l"eqUJl:ren1ents if they foresa\v
a ne\'; inexpensive source. and they observed a product
which approached the necessary requirements. They
would furnish sannples and ask the producers to im.:tate
t&11eI11. In rnany instances they \\7ould spend tD..lme and ef-
lfort in the lfactories to instrHct ithen1 in designs. as well
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as the quality desired. In some instances they were
willing to supply full-tinle technical assistance.
A third approach was for Korean industries to
produce sanlples that could be sold. either by travel-
ing representatives or displayed in Korean trade
centers.
The writer made a survey of th~ lunerican Inar··
kets c:fter which he proposed a special approach to the
problern of selling designs - - namely the establish-
ment in New York of a cl.othing style center, which could
create L,d present original designs in a Ulanner similar
to that of nnany Anlerican clothing rnanufacturers. This
idea required eonsiderable further study to determine
whether it would indeed, serve to increase the nlarket
for Korean-designed clothing. Such a study was never
done. Israel and other countries ha ve used this nlethod.
Hong Kong, on th.e other hand, has had a phenmnenal
success in exporting apparel items ~or which it relied
chiefly on designs created by its customers.
3. ?ackaging
The third phase of design is packaging. Recause
packaging is so noticeable. it is alnlost invariably
Inentioned in discussions on export development. It is
an ilnportant problenl.. but should not be given nlore
attention than it deserves, since it is only one of Inany
involved in export developlnent. Packaging serves hvo
purposes. One is to nlake the product more attractive
and saleable when placed on the store shelf. The other
is to protect the product frorn injury during transport-
ation. and until it is c..elivered to the ultimate conswner.
Nlc3i packaging knO\\fledge crone as a result of
IDl.itation by Korean producers of \Vesterll pack:lging
lrnethods and designs. The Korean Trade Promotion Corpor-
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ation (KOTRA) devoted considerable attention to this
subject. In addition to pubJ.i.shing articles and pam-
phlets it ran an annual Packaging Fair, to which the
Korean manufacturers and producers were invited to
study and ooserve displays of packaging gathered from
throughout the world. The A. 1 D. Mission was fortunate
in having on its staff a man well qualified in this al'i'a.
He assisted KOTRA in this program, and offered sume
direct technical guidance to firms.
The introductlon of foreign goods to the Korean
domestic markets began to create a dema.nd by Koreans
themselves for certain packaged items. This helped to
stinlulate a knowledge of the design of and an improve-
ment in the quality of packaging. Other education about
packaging ca.me through visits abroad acd from customer
suggestions, including the impact of the large number of
American soldiers and civilii.ans living in Korea.
The problern of packaging for protection did not
receive quite as much attention, particularly in the area
of food products. For example, Korea exported quanti-
ties of apples to Taiwan. Inlproper packaging caused
approximately 30 percent of the apples to be bruised or
frozen. They were packed on or near the farms, where
adequate knowledge about such a simple technique as
placing the apples in layers in the boxes was lacking.
There were similar problems with other products.
E. General Conclusion on Problems of Cost, Quality,
Design and Packaging.
As can be seen from all the above, improvement in
figuring cost and setting prices, together with concrete
problems of quality, design, and packaging cannot be
solved by one simple program. Essentially, and in its
broadest ternls, it is an educational process. The impact
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of cust0111er requirements is the major factor in creating
improvements in these areas. The process can be speed-
e·j :..tp by introduction of technic~ll assistance through
government efforts and by the pri vate sector. Korea still
has a long way to go in solving her quality problems, but
she has made great strides in the last several years.
-98-
CHAPTER X
OTHER PROBLEMS
Many of the problems that arose in the course of
the Korean Export Development Program were inter-
related. In the interest of those readers who may wish
to concentrate on only one of several given problems,
we will attempt to cover each separately.
A. Red Tape
In addition to creating positive incentives, it is
also necessary to attempt to e!ilninate road blocks.
Among the most universal of these are the time-con-
sEn-Ling and costly paper work and procedures required
by banks and goverlunents. The steps involved in cus-
tOlns procedures and in obtaining import and export
licenses, financing, passports and visas, permits to
travel, inspection certificates and numerous other li-
censes and pernlits add to overhead expenses without
adding any real value to the product being exported.
They also create delays which make it difficult for the
exporter to 111eet his delivery dates. l\!Ioreover, the
greater the nU111ber of steps that are required and the
nUluber of offices that have to be reached, the more
likely is the possibility of corruption.
The paperwork problem is not a simple one. It is
precisely because exporting involves so many of the
private and government sectors, that some controls are
unavoidable. The very nature of large scale business
and government creates bureaucracies which are not
always as efficient as one might hope for. In the devel-
oping countries, where there is little experience and
activities are constantly expanding, there is a tendency
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for a great deal of unnecessary paper work. It is, indeed,
rare to find efficient and speedy processing in any country,
developed or developing.
Within the range of essential controls. the best me-
thod of reducing paper 'Nork is to create as few adminis-
trative steps as possible. and to simplify regulations to
eliminate duplicate and unnecessary steps that require
mt~ch bookkeeping and traveling from office to office.
The red tape problem is so serious that it is almost
inevitably amongst the first itenlS that are discussed and
surveyed in any country that is interested in developing
its exports. In Korea this was the first problem on which
the Minister of Commerce and Industry requested assist-
ance. In order to gain a perspective and to dramatize the
magnitude of the problem, the writer undertook a case
study. The introduction to this study, nlade on December
31, 1964 stated:
"Attached is a case study indicating procedural
steps, documentation and iJrocessing time re-
quired by a single Korean exporter of cotton
goods in order to export his product. The se-
quence starts with the first offer and goes
through his final shipment and receipt of draft
of foreign exchange from the bank. Of the 37
steps listed, 12 are involved in his own business
negotiations and procedures. The other 25 steps
require him to fill out 94 different types of forms
with a total of 148 copies. Not including his own
time required to gather the infornlation necessary
or to fill out the forms, it takes from 84 to 121
days to process the documents.
!fIt is hopeci that this prelinlinary single analysis
prepared illustratively, may be useful to the con-
sideration of ways and means to enhance export
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"trade. Obviously, such questions as the
general validity of the processing sequence
will need to be expl.ored, taking into con-
sideration that a large number of the steps
w ill be necessary under any circumstances,
and that time is inevitably required to
translate export orders into export products
:]rtually exported and paid for. "
Chart I (page 101) illustrates the steps required.
Subsequently, a second study was made which
exalnined procedural steps, documentation and pro-
cessing time ~·~quired by a. Korean businessman to
travel abroad for business purposes. Nine steps
were involved in this procedure during which the
businessmm fined out a lninimum 0: 31 types of
forms with a total of 48 copies. Excluding the busi-
nessnlan's personal time required to gather the nec-
essary information to fill out the forms, to submit
thein, and perhaps to travel to Seoul, the processing
tiIne t:mk approximately 40 to 55 days.
Chart II (page 1021 and Table 9 (page 103) demon:..
strate this process.
A similar study was made of the steps necessary
for inlporting goods.
The findings of these studies dramatized the
situation so that it caught the attention of government
officials, and shocked them into a realization that
drastic actions were required to simplify and reduce
the paper work. and to speed up its processing.
KOREAN EXPORT PROCEDURE
REPORT OF AMICUS MOST DEC. 1964
I
...
Q
...
I
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PROCEDURES REQUIRED FOR BUSINESSMAN TO TRAVEL ABROAD
KOREA- AMICUS MOST REPORT
FEBRUARY 1965
...
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Table ~)
Summary of Procedures for Travel ''.broad other than to Japan
1. Foreign Exchange Expenses ~i.nd Transportation Costs Paid by Host
Total
Types No. of Estimated Days Required
Concerned of forms Copies
Steps 1\gen~:':i Hequired Required l\liflimum Maximum
1. KTA 3 16 1 2
2. MCr 3 3 ;) 10
3. iVI0FA 11 1 :) 3 3
4. Police 3 9 2;-) :30
J. l\lND 1 2 4 8
6. FE 1 1 1 1
7. MOJ 1 1 1/2 1/2
8. BOK 3 ;) 1/2 1/2
---
Total 31 43 40 ;) ;)
--
2. All Expenses Paid by Tra\'eHer
l. KTA 7 14 2
2. MCI 3 :~ ;) 10
3. .MOF 3 J 6 12
4. MOFA 10 10 ~ 3
Police 3 9 2- 30;). ;)
6. MND 1 2 -1 8
7. FE 1 1 1 1
3. MOJ 1 1 1/2 1/2
9. BOK ~ 3 1/2 1/2J
Total 32 46 46 67
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In addition to these three particular probletns
described, there were the dozens of other problen.li.s
in\"ol ving all types of activities connected with export-
ing. The .Joint Export Developnlent COlnmittee (EPSC)
set up a special working task force to deal with pro-
cedur;·:J problems. This task force included represent-
ali \"("S 0f each o( the \-arious organizations involved in
the paper work procedures.. For each area, a special
ad hoC' comrniUee was established to study each individ-
ual step carefully to see if a specific document could
be elirninated or abbredated. \Vhile these committees
did reduce the wor~: considerably, they were not as
erfecH ve as desired. It was difficult for any specific
agency to agree that its particular docunllent could be
elilninated. Also, each representative had to obtain
the approval of his organization before he would agree
to elilninate a docmuent. Nevertheless, progress was
Blade. The JMinister of Cmnmerce and Industry took
a personal interest in the elimination of paper work,
and psed the prestige of his office to assist. Pressures
fron1 the private sector also helped to reduce processing
steps.
As a 111atter of general principle, the writer belie,--
ed t..ltat activities should be carried on ty the Koreans
thelllSelves, and that outside help be used as little as
possible. Nevertheless, he became firmly convinced
that the only con1pletely effective way that procedures
could be reduced to a minimum was to call in a non-
Korean, outside expert who would be con1pletely objective,
and who coald do more, if given the proper backup, than
had been done by the ad hoc committee. This recommend-
ation was accepted in principle, bt~.t was never carried
out.
It might be well to study steps taken in some other
countries. \Vhile the writer has not himself witnessed
the process, he has been given to understand that Hong
Kong has developed an extremely expeditious system
for export-related paperwolk. According to these
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reports, an exporter goes to a single center where he
fills out one set of documents which are Ithen put through
the various required agencies by the center itself.
B. Passports and Visas
The processes of obtaining passports for Koreans
to travel abroad, and visas for visiting businessmen are
complicated and still need simplifying. DifficnulUes and
Brae losses in obtaiJiling a ",-lisa may not actually inhibit
businessmen corning to a COIL:~lItry, but they do create
annoyances and bad feeIlings evt:.H before entry. For
tourism, difficaH processing achmUy prevents tourists
from traveling in the oJffendling country.
Although the writer is aware of the security problems
involved, it is his opinion that these difficult procedures
do very little to prevent undesirables frmn entering a
country. He is very nnuch aware of the often expressed
annoyance of bu.asinessmen wishing to make quic~{ ani fre-
quent trips for the purpose of exploring and buying in
another country.
Fortunately, Dlany countries today have eliminated
visas, or have made it possible to obtain one in short
order during a single visit to a consulate office.
c. Samples
Difficulties were encountered with custODIS regula-
tions concerning both the importation and e}rportation of
samples.
Some buyers carry many samples of articles they
wish to purchase. The \\I'riter has seen a buyer come in
with four or five trunks full of sa:mples which must be
cleared through customs. Oc:casio&ally the buyers wish
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to leave the samples Il.'.dth the mam.ufacbUll'EH'S for study
and dupUcation. It ns muierslandahle Uwt: drafters of
customs regulation~ fear that "iuch '~T~kh~s ,dlre not
actually sanllples, hut hnports [(1'«' sale tUll Hue open EnaT-
kets. It is also understandable Huat the regaulanon:c set
requil'(~rnents for houlJdnng thenll and pkuC'ung thenli lin
ternporary storage, or other requirement,s I;"dlkh anso
cause annoying dela) s.. ['~velJ'U at the G'xpense oD possible
errors, it was suggested that the clLUstmns oUlichiHs be
instructed to lean over baclkvlards to eHm hoate such
delays and annoyances. The potentia] loss ]0 !axeswas
sunall at best in comparnson to the gains in good win
obtained by this len.iency.
Sending S311111pRes out of the cOILmtry iin'.roli yes
customs problenns where there Jis an export tax on the
type of product being shipped. In ord?t, to sen thenr
products exporter~ nHust display samples .nn centers
throughout the world. They nnust send them to potelJltiaJl
cllstpmers. and to fairs. trade shows. etc. which re-
quire theun in quantH~es For style items. importers
often need lau'ge m.ullllbers of sa.nnples lto distribute to
their outlets. In one case. a sweater importer in New
York stated that he requLj'ed 50 sets of samples for
each ne\"! style each season. Since he 'was selling
approxhnately ten styles of sweaters this meant 500
units hvice annually. Because some Korean Govern-
rneant officials had had litHe e~"Perience \~lith Anlerican
rnethods of selling. they wer~ slLlspicious of this demand
for so many saluple iteols. Fortunately. the represent-
ative of KOTRA in New York was able to investigate
and certify ~o the vaJlidity of the request.
As with in. :->orts of sanlples. the recommendation
was made. and to a large exitent implemented. that pro-
cedur~s and attitudes be lenient.
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lmpu'ovnng n;~llaUoU1ls bi;:twceull expou"tt.eu·'s amj UmU,MllU"~­
ers was es:seU1lUal nu-1I the d(~vcllopnlleU]t on" ttll"~ndl«~" MlisQmdeu"-
:standlhllgs appc:,u" hll ICllcvellopcd as 'l.~len as QuulIdleu"I(B\{:velloped
(,:ounl~"nes., The melh«1ds ott' opcU"~nUoU] ~,l!UUHm[g', llmSUUUi&ssuncn
lin any COQUlIh"'yy and u"cSQullitiiullg fU"uic:tt.U«mS lCW goodw liB. ~;'H)lll ~/e
oveu" HnUlIY y«l'au"$ or <e:ll«)Ise COnhll(~'t 'l.~dtthliUl! tthl[~ ff'r.]met..~·'(i)Ju"k
of a :SUuu~'lle ("QuUUUH"C aunR ll:.':UUlIr-nQUiflllCne.. Hell:a:ttii(f)JulJshliU»s on ;tllUlJIl-JI :1, ~,
nntt.eu"n:Hbonall hasiis. wntt,DlI «;I('UlItllmuOJl1u:s; e>:dli;[JUlJg«~s ;;utt lllD)~lJg',
dustattll!Cil.~:S, :<U'C HH»U"!C t(/JUH'UIC'tlUlit ..
\V!C:S~!C"U"UlJ u»\lu:sum~s::su'ulleuu (["«JJulilJnulJ~ ~llHJJu"«)I;ilId ~1lS: U)J~ll'yer's:" :a:u"c
COullstaullUy advuscd to llle~.uu"ull ll(()Jlc::rllll Cllusttouns.. nhY;'Vt~v<eu"" de-
vello~]luullg' cOllmltu"n«l'S :<llUCU1JlJptt.llullg tt,<OJ sellll ttllu~;:uu' m~w' proollu((;tts
':U"l(; deaHng 1j,9,;/uth a 1IIII!JJlluyleu""s"n nlJll~lu"keL He;fjjllustlicu;~Hy" »!hIe
seHen" H11IlUSt therc['ou~e ..Jl.dlaijJlt Dlluu1I1lseU tto tt.H1Je metthod~.i ott"
hns CllUS~iOJUneu"" J\ mUslluDllidtt;:u'·stt.:fllU1Kllliullg, ~'(\'Il1Jlldl! c;amses <ill C'llUS-
torner' Ito dUSC:<OJullUume hus: IbJuliSiu U'lless affects U1lott onliy Hlle'
nndfr vidual sellller buult CaD1l sett. back the wlllJolle ltu"ade oD" ttRlle
CiOiLmitu·y.. The CQUS l!.oU1l1lie U" w Ullll e :qn"ess h ~s oru UlIU OIfDS [0 o1tu1Je-r
bllUsuncssuncull abollut ll"CSIl»i()DlISU'iieUlleSs :and aUeu-lI[nolllJ tto hus
n"cqucsts and unstt:nuctt.U([)lUllS Expou''1t rU'oulilloftiiob1! \~i'hue-H1i lCOb1!-
central!.es eHorl!.s OUll eslt::ab~isH1Jtiullg. uulLiiltuall cOUllitaetts: and olbi-
taunnullg If'llrsit on.llers" Iinult ecHoes U110ft diSSll.lIU"e m;>ceSSdi]['ji' die-tEOll1lS
for repeat orden"s 1j,9JHll Ullot J111di'i>;7e ullHudll conttnnllunng UU1I1lPdiCit on
expoJl"tt. earnll.ii.D1lgs"
L CuUllural PaUerltllS
in Iluany instances Korean Itnusirnessmen fO!l..lIJl1l<C.ll
Un.e:nsel \iCb> ~~:'''''~l-.;ed in sE:riioll.us .111l1lusll.undleJ["stall1ldiings re-
g:aurding' the req1l.llirenH~ntsbeing placed llUpOD11 lhe.ll11ll by
foreign importers. O~d Korean cuHurall p:adttell"ll1ls aU11d
u1l1lany previi.ollns 'years of .llSo]aUoDll fro.lllf] !tIll'!:' outsiide \'I,I'oJdd
contribllllted to ulfuuhnaJL lack of corll.'llpreheD1ls]OD1 oj[ lhllUSlln'lleSS
patterns by both lforeiigullell"s aUlld Korearns..For exarDllJPllle»
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one of the reasons for unfulfilled promises is the
traditional Korean courtesy of responding' affirmatively
to the request of a visitor. A contract of1ten has a dif-
ferent meaning to a Korean than it does to a Westerner.
The \Vesterner interprets the words liter,aUy. The
Easterner nlay interpret the provisions in the context
of the situaUon wh~n they were signed. so that changes
which could not be cons:dered acts of God or force
majeure would sUU be acc(;.tt:.lab1p. reasons for non-per-
formance. Time schedllulles have a different importance
in different cultures" When Korean suppliers were late
in deHvery. they would give evasive excuses.
P I~oblerns also arise because of language dif-
ferences and because of inexperience. Exporters may
fail to meet specifications because their production con-
trols are inadequate or because they do not understand
the reasons for unifornuJity. Then instead of offering to
Inake adjushnents. they start the age-old bargaining
device of using hyperbole. A major difficulty which
KOTRA and Korean Ell1Illbassy repres entatives abroad
cornplained about was that letters were not answered
prOlnptly or re..:pons.h:ely. This \vas true both of in-
quiries to gove rrunent agencies and to private exporters.
It III us1t also be stated that there were instances
where the buyer was Ilullscrupulous. or attempted to take
advantage of 1the lack of experience of the Koreans to
nlake unjustified findings or clairns. Koreans often com-
plained that after expensive entertaimnent of buyers
they still receiv~d no orders. In their culture. accept-
ing favors or entertaimnent creates an obligation for
reciprocity - - in business as well as in personal relat-
ionships.
2. Education on Business Relations
JMany steps were taken to improve the under-
standing by Korean exporters of the problems of
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relationships with importers. Both the Korean Govern-
ITICnt and the Korean business organizations undertook
a program of educa~ion and propaganda on ways of con-
ducting business with the \Vest. This campaign was
helped by reports from KJTHA and by suggestions of
A. I. D. advisers.
Both the Korean T!'aders Association and the
Korean Chamber of Comllnerce established comrniUees
on bl.lsiness ethics. These C'ornrnittecs (h'C'~I" tip codes
of behavior and undertook super'vision of their mnl
rnenlbership' S cOlnpliance \",~Hh t.hese codes. \Vhile not
always effective, the ver'y existence of the codes helped
educate the business conunv..nnHy.
\Vithout question, the overwhelming majority
of Korean businesslnen conducted their affairs in an
honorable manner. This \vas a denland of their own
cuitural traditions. \Vhat appeared to \Vestern business-
rnen to be irregular conduct was usually due to misunder-
standing. lack of experience. '~'~()nditions beyond the
control of the specific Korean businessrnan i n\"ol ved.
SOlne of the BlOSt effective education for the
Korean businessrnan canle as 'l. result of his contact with
foreign businessnlen. Koreans quickly learned to adapt
their methods to those o~ their custonlers and to under-
stand the inlportance of rneeting terms of agreements.
Con11llaints fronl CU.3tomers and occasional loss of re-
peat orders were the best (orIn of education.
3. Regulations and Sanctions
As part of the stabilization program. and in
order to prevent over-e:x-pansion of credit. a Korean
Government regulation prohibIted an exporter from
accepting an order which was not acconlpanied by a firm
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letter of credit. The exporters received payment in
full as they shipped goods. This made it difficult for
overseas custolners to get satisfaction even on legiti-
11late cOInplaints. In the event of a complaint. the only
recourse of the buyer was to rely on the goodwill of his
supplier, or in extrenle cases, 4:0 sue hiitn in the Kore~.n
courts.
In an attenlpt to prevent delivery of poor quality
goods, the Korean Government issued another regulation
that penalized the seHer whenever unsatisfactory goods
were not accepted by the buyer and therefore returned
to Korea. While this regulation was helpful. it was not
very effecti ve in preventing shipment of products that
did not Ineet contract requirernents. However, it did
nlotivate exporters to agree to penalty rebates or to sell
at bargain prices in the recipient country.
Another sanction was to renl0ve from the accred-
ited list of traders, exporters who were persistently
guilty of failing to Ineet contract requirements. This list
conlpiled by the Korean Traders Association (KOTRA) and
the govermnent. established eligibility to export. This
sanction was seldom invoked.
4. Ailediation and Arbitration
\Vhen disputes became insolvable through direct
negotiC'.tion, KOTRA and Korea:a Embassy officials would
often intercede and successfully mediate.
The EPSC r...:commended the establishment of
an arbitration procedure for settling complaints withuut
recourse to the courts. In the United States and other
"'o1Jntrip~ Clll"'h 'Tnl .. ~f-"'''''''T "' ....h.; ~-f-.;"'- ~- _~.L •••• -.~- ••
'.- • - ~ ~~aa u..L J .L U.L .L o. ...LVII ~;:, UJ. Lt:: 11 I-J.l UVlUt::U
for in sale contracts which specify who the arbitrator
shall be. American courts have ruled that. where such
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arbitration is agreed to in advance, its decision shall
be legally binding.
As a result of the EPSC recommendation, a
commercial arbitration law was enacted by the Korean
National Assembly. The lVIinistry of Comrnerce and
Industry designated the Chamber of Commerce to under-
take the work, and the Chamber established a separnte
arbitration organization. EPSC had also recommeuded
that a technical consultant be brought in to assist in
establishing the necessary procedures. The American
A:-bitration Association offered an expert, but time and
expense prevented using hiln and the Chamber of Com-
merce established the system with its own resources.
5. Other Possible Actions
Two suggestions for steps to improve exporter-
importer relations were not inlplemented. One proposal
was for a university group to make a study of the way in
which the tra~itions, mores, co des and history of the
Koreans affect business dealings. As mentioned earlier,
the writer was convinced that cultural factors were very
important, however, he could not find that any qualified
analyst had ever examined the problem. He felt that a
better understanding of thesE. factors would give clues to
better means of educating Korean businessmen, and would
also facilitate explanations to foreign buyers who became
exasperated by situations they did not understand.
The second proposal was to establish in Korea,
an Expediting Center which would receive complaints from
Korean trade centers and embassies abroad, and also
directly from customers. It would try to speed up the
handling of legitimate problems through its direct access
to the goverrunent agency, bank or businessman involved
in the complaint, and by getting the facts promptly. The
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Expediting Center would not settle claims or substitute
for any existing private or governmental authority, but
would:, ttelnpt to elilninate bottlenecks and red tape.
The concept of a single center for all relation-:-
ships with a governmental unit is not original. It has
been put into practice in other areas of the world, Hong
Kong being one. While the situation in Korea has greatly
ilnproved, it is still the writer's opinion that such a
center could be an important step towal ds the improve-
n1ent of trade relations.
In addition to the two proposald described above,
the idea of a study of customer turnover rate occurred to
the writer while preparing this report. One of the handi-
caps in ar01... sing concern over the need to improve busi-
ness relations was that exports were growing so rapidly
that neither g0verrunent officials nor businessmen could
always be convinced to take seriously the complaints
frOln KOTRA and the buyers. If some way could have
been found to show· the percentage of orders \vhich were
cancelled, or the nmnber of single orders \vhich never
brought a follow-on, the educational process might have
been more effective.
6. Reputation Study
In connection with the development of a foreign
investment program, A. 1 D. financed a study entitled
HKorea's Reputation Study", which was made in ""l1e
United States by a private consultant firm. 'Vhile not
directed exclusively towards trade, this study obtained
opinions from American businessmen as to the reputation
of Korean business and trade methods. The report rein-
forced opinions often expressed by overseas representa-
tives of KOTRA, and U. S. and foreign businessmen.
While it repeated many of the complaints mentioned above,
it also stressed that the reputation of Korean business-
men had improved.
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The consultants did a competent job, hut the
facts presented were generally known to both Korean and
American officials located in Korea. It is the opinion of
this writer that this type of study can more easily be
undertaken through a canvass of foreign businessmen and
visitors by those persons already working with them.
E. Shipping Information and Rates
Transporting raw material and supplies into Korea
and shipping Korean products out presented special prob-
lems. With the exception of transportation to and from
Japan, all goods have to travel long distances by sea to
keep Korea's trade Inoving. Korea had only two major
ports. Inchon on the west coast is close to the major
Inanufacturing center of Seoul, but has a 30 foot rise and
fall of tides so that no ships could load or unload dockside.
Pusan on the southeast coast of Korea had no such prob-
lem, but its docking facilities were unable to accommo-
date ships over 10, 000 tons.
Few steamers made scheduled and regular trips.
Korean flag ships were lin1.ited in size and number, and
could not cope with the growing export requirements.
Korea had to rely for a good deal of shipping on tramp
steamers with lengthy delivery time and frequent and ir-
regular stops en route. This made it difficult to get
customers 3.S firm delivery dates could not be given. As
an inheritance from the war, stevedore charges were
higher at Korean ports than at nearby ports in Japan.
To cope with this situation, the Korean Govermnent
organized a program to finance the developme!1t of ship-
yards and shipbuilding. It also set out to en- Jurage for-
eign shipping lines to make more frequent visits to Korean
ports.
The scheduling of shipments to provide larger freight
loads for each ship was one of the methods utilized to
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encourage the shipping lines. Much manufacturing for
export was done by small companies. To obtain suffi-
ciently large freight loads for each ship it was, there-
fore, necessary to coordinate the activities of many
companies.
The companies required easily available shipping
information so they could plan shipments. For this pur-
pose, the Korean Government established a Shipping
Information Center financed jointly by the government
and the shipping companies. It was located at the head-
quarters of the Korean Trade Promotion Center in Seoul
where freight rates, schedules, and other information
to assist shippers were easily accessible.
Korea was not a member of the Pacific Shipping
Conference which established freight rates for regularly
scheduled shipping. While there might have been many
advantages in joining the Conference, in some respects
the non-membership was advantageous. For example,
Korea produces and ships large quantities of plywood to
the United States ($32 million in 1967), for which the cost
of shipping is an important factor in lneeting competition.
The volume is sufficiently large to permit aID, 000 ton
ship to be fully loaded with this one item. In 1967, a
shipping cOlnpany owned by Koreans was able to ship ?ly-
wood for about two-thirds of the regular Conference ra.tes.
On the return trips these ships could bring back raw
materials and supplies from the United States.
The United States Govermnent has no control over the
established Conference rates. Through the initiative of
the Senior Export Advisor, a number of conferences were
held by representatives in Korea of the international
shipping companies. They unanimously decided to petition
their respective companies to exercise their best efforts
towards equalizing freight rates and eliminating discrimi-
nation against Korea. As the story of Korean export de-
velopment spread throughout the world, shipping compan-
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ies took more and tnore interest in the possibilities of
expanding their businesses there.
In the long run, the new ships being built and
chartered by Korean companiLes, and the increase in
volume of goods being shipped wBI serve to redlluce
expenses of shipping- from anrri to Korea.
F. Export Insul~ance
One of the risks that diiseollurages exporUng is the
difficulty of obtaining' legall redress h~ a forcus;n cOllmtry.
Any losses during lransportaUOJl through fire, theft or
marine accidents al~e easllly ilmnured by h~ten'natuonal
insurance cmnpan.iies. But losses inllvolved w!hen custom-
ers legitimately or i.lLllegiltinll:altely faUl to accept delivery
or fail to make payments, ami when other simHar situ-
ations occur, can only be protected by a special export
insurance systenn.
The risks for Korean sH1l.npnnents were 1l1J1linimlUlnn. This
was because Korean Govermll'llellllt regu.uJlaUons requiired a
firm letter of credit to be gh!ellll at the Umc an order was
placed. Paynnents were, therefore. made 1Ulpon shiipunent
from a Korean port and delnviery of a bin of lading to the
Bank of Korea. This reg'u.uJlatnon was established as part
of the Korean stabilizatiion p:ll"ogranl all1ldnlll order to pre-
vent an over-expa.nsion 0[' f01!.1oengn credi1t. This created
little hardship for those traders do.hng bu.ns]ll1Iess willi the
larger foreign cmnpannes. The large c01l1l1lpanies request-
ed no credit arrangennents and '},'.I~ere perfectly '},'l.iining to
issue letters of credit at the 1lirne they placed the.iir orders.
When dealing with sunaller foreign cOllnpanies and
traders~ and in smne off the less developed <C'ountries, Lh.le
abili~y to sell on .credit ternJl.s undoubtedly helps illlcrease
the volunle of business. J1\'lIaQY traders thl!.'ougho1l.llt the
world give preference to placing their orders in c01Ulntries
or with companies which can extend thenn credit. SeUing
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on an LID (Lettel' of Delivery) or LI A (Letter of
Acceptance) process also nlakes it possible for the
purchaser to inspect his p'-lrchase at the point of
delivery rather than at the point of shipnlent, and puts
him in a position to reject unqualified goods. Selling
on credit, however, is a Inixed blessing. While it
encourages quality shipments and more trade, it also
opens the door to unscrupulous buyers who may reject
goods for reasons other than bad quality.
Nevertheless, as Korean exports expanded anti
their foreign exchange holdings grew, it became in-
creasingly evident that Korea would have to make it
possible for her exporters to Ineet international com-
petition by sellIng on credit terms. In order to do so,
it was very ilnportant that an export insurance system
be instituted. EPSC, ther,..,.r()~-, recomnlended that a
special stlldy be nlade of such systems existing in
other countries, that the necessary legislation be
enacted, and that con"1panies be organi.;,:ed to establish
an e:-qJort insurance systenl. KOTRA was assigned the
job of making this study~ and it is hoped that such a
systenl will ~e established in the near future. In the
Inea.1Unle the iln~act of Korean regulations regarding
:Letters of credit ha ve been somewhat alleviated by
permitting the importation of SOlne materials before
export orders are received. Thus, it is easier for
Korean exporters to meet delivery dates and foreign
irnporters do not have Ll].eir funds tied up so long.
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CHAPTER XI
MARKETING
Fortunately, Korea had a trading community so the
export development program did not need to generate
this activity. It did have to help Korean traders adapt
to the demands of distribnUng hundreds of new products
to thousands of new customers.
Koreans lacked knowledge of the steps necessary
to put their goods on the international market. Con-
versely the outside commercial wor~d had little knowledge
of Korea and its possibilities. Even though the country
was already manufacturing many acceptable items, these
were little known or appreciated. Overseas activities
and budgets of the Korean Trade Promotion Corporation
were limited. Travel by private Korean businessmen
has been hampered by many restrictions, and difficulties
in obtaining foreign exchange. Few bUyers were interest-
ed in coming to Korea. It became obvious that an exten-
sive progrron of overseas marketing activities would have
to be developed.
While Korea already had many products that could
be sold, she had many more that were close to meeting
the requirements of the international buying community,
but not quite up to par. With her low-cost labor, there
was a danger that the anxiety to sell would draw many
bargain hunters, i. e., people interested in one-shot
deals, requiring only the lowest quality goods. The first
perioo of Japan's export development had been precisely
along these lines, and it took Japan many years to over-
come the reputation it acquired for producing low -priced
low-quality goods. As a matter of policy it was deter-
mined that efforts would be made to prevent Korea irom
going through such a period.
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A. Bringing in Major Buyers
One approach to marketing was to attract buyers
from the large chains \'/ho were interested in purchasing
articles in the Iniddle-price levels, and who would take
a developmental approach to purchasing in Korea. It
was hoped that large companies would be willing to assist
with technical help and guidance, and would be prepared
to put their time, effort and possibly money into initial,
smallscale purchases to hellP create permanent sources
of supply.
It was suggested that an attempt be made to induce
the top executives of the leading U. S. retail store buying
chains to COllle to Korea. To do this it was necessary
to mobilize the leading business organizations, KOTRA,
and the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea. For
educational and psychological reasons it was important
that this project be finan~ed by the Koreans themselves.
Because of their inexperience, however, the Korean
business organizations were reluctant to invest funds in
a l-roject in which they could see no immpcliate results.
The sum involved was not large, but it took considerable
persuasion to convince them to agree to the project.
Finally, a committee was established and the funds pledg-
ed.
Although there had beeL considerable correspondence,
the American buying chains evinced no great enthusiasm
for participation in this project. It was, therefore, de-
cided that Mr. Oh Pomsik, President of KOTRA, and the
writer should go to the United States to visit heads of
iInportant buYing chains and deliver personal invitations
to come to Seoul as guests of the Koreans. The assist-
ance of A. L D. /W, the U. S. Department of Corr.lmerce,
and Korean Consulates was invoked. Through the U. s.
Government agencies, the door was opened to meet the
top executives of the buying chains. l\IIoreover, R. IL
Macy & Company, which had previously opened an office
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in Seoul, was very helpful through its personal sol icHations
of the many other chains.
Mr. Oh Pomsik llnd the writer also took advantage oC
their pre lience in the U. S. A. to meet \..~Hh In<uIY leading
banking institut:uns to discuss potential trade and ,invest-
ment in Korea. Conferences were arranged lin Washington,
New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco and
Seattle.
The trip proved hig&lly successful. In October, 1965
the representatives of ten of the largest Anllerican buying
chains arrived in Seoul. These chains included J. C. Penney,
W. C. Grant, Sears Roebuck, 1\1lontgonllery \Vard, the 1\Iay
Company, Allied Stores, 1\1acy ft s, GhnbeP s, Annerex C'lr-
por:-.tion and Woolworth ft s. Several others, among ..."hich
were included Associated Merchan.dizi ng Co., 1\la:rshall-
Field, and Gottliebs, c:.Juld not cOlne at that tiulte, but
arrived later. The to~~al retail business in the United States
represented by these groups \"fas in the neighborhood of
$15 billion annually. An extensive program of exhibits,
factory visits and conferences \llere arrang""'d by the Koreans
under the leadership of KOTRA. Meetings were held with
top level Korean and U. S. Government official s.
While it would be a gross exaggeration to claim this
trip opened up KO.i:ea, it nevertheless paved the \vay for a
great many of the buyers \'.rho subsequently went there.
Some companies, finding a potential source of supply, car-
ried out the developmental approach by sending full-time
technicians to assist Korean factories in bringing the qual-
ity and design of their products up to an acceptable standard.
Others assisted through their buying agents, and by sending
in professional buyers in the various lines of interest.
R. H. l',.':Iac:r! s decided to include Korea and its products in
its "Far East Festival" which took place in September,
1966 and which '.'/as a higWy successful merchandising event.
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SInce this original mission came to Korea, many of
the conlpani~s \vhich were part of Jlt nave established
permanent offices in Korea, or have made arrangernenls
for Korean trading companies to represent them in mak-
ing substantial purchases. In addition, the acUviUes of
KOTRAw s overseas representatives, travels by the
write.", and word-or-mouth throughout the world induced
many Inore b".lyers to cmnL to Korea. At the sarne time,
n1lany KOt'eans visited world centers since Korean c0J1111-
panies had been given tax aUowances for their overse~:o;
expenditures in sales prmnoHon, ':1nd proceduJrE~s for
obtaining visas had been siunplHied.
B. Trade Missions
During their aforelfnenUoned trilpl, the Ptt"esident of
KOTRA and the writer visited the Chicago a~u...i SeatHe
Chanlbers of Cmnnlerce, both of which were p1:amniing
Far East trade missions. Plans for the CHllicago ,group
hdd already advanced too far to perJrnJit a change, but the
Seattle group was persu«:llded lto include Korea in its
itinerary. Governor Evan-ltb of the State of \VashingiloJrll
accornpanied this tour which proYed to be rnutuaHy suc-
cessful to Korea and \Vashington.
The Koreans were themselyes organizing trade
missions to various parts of the ',,"orid includipg Japan,
Southeast Asia, Africa and EIIJrope. The Korea Business-
inenl s Association sent a large trade lnission to the United
States follo\'1ing the trip by the President of KOTRA. This
rnission nlet business leaders and merchants and bankers,
visited ::>tores and factories, and in general made excel--
lent contacts. Arrange.lnents for this trip had been made
\'1ith the assistance of the A I D. fvlission to Korea,
ALD. !\Vashington, and the U. S. DepartuJlent of Comrlller-
ceo
These visits by Korean businessnlen to potential
luarkets served. not only the purposes of creating contacts,
-J12~-
and prounoUng and seUllrug~ llJl\lult also affoll'(]ledl lhc (()iPpou"-
hunUy to <)bse !"ve and stllJldy Plll"odllJlcts~ ll1rH~UlllQ,odls ott" Ul1l1:alUnU-
facburung and mreVhods of condlJ.llcHn,g llnllsinelSs. Mmllji'
grollJlps traveUed especiiaHy for" thus P~llU·BJHO!:S~. Sm1l1ll[~ ott"
these missnom; were composed of a '1Illb:cd g~"O)\lllP ott" tOHll-
~cvr- ~ counp:fHuy orncualls Jr'eprestf]u1Ithllg dn veu"su ['lied :Di111!.!
varied unduustr'h~s; others 'l.y;ere counposed 0[' U"cpll"cseulItt-
aUves of a sUU1lgh~ und1l.ustu"y 011" lOlf preopillc nUlIllC'u'c:s:ttJ~(F nUll :ill
snullglle ijJiHuase or h"ade. "f'he ll~llUCU" tt.ype or' ftll"~llde: U'll1lllSSll([)JUlI
'l.9,:as B1l0U"C erfccUvc.
F'ott" a m nssul(m to ll))(f~ Uuou"ou.ug,HllHy e neett,ll vc u"Cqll.Ull u"ed!
a r~T'cat deal of ij:wclllin1JUUll~llU",:¥, \\Y$ou"lk. COll1ltt~1l1(~1s frwIlldl ttVJ 1J:)H£l'
u1I1Iadc :alL c:ach pou"t of IC':Cll.U. lltt.Ull1lCu":Dl.u"ues a.U"U":£llll1Jged!» and!
Ulllllcq:u"cteu-s SllUppllll:-tdl" UUlI ~ll«Muft,li(()JU1l to tthe Ilusum] (£llU"tt";fbll1lg~:\'­
un ents ~1(p2" tu"a '1;/(" ll" ~~\O>tt.C II S. t.Ctt.IC~. KO'T H~ u\ andl Kou"<Q:mll
ernbassy o[fk:li.aus u.mdC'u"It<OlIQlIk Ithus wou"lk. UU1J.HedJ State's
A~ L D. M u:SSUOtt1lS a:ssustl<c«:UUUll V:D1U"UO\Lu:s CO\lU1!llttu"llCS. hll lLIhe
U ~lU1ted Slates. J\. t D. 1'\,'0// andl lHllC' Dcpar'ftuneulil of Cmn-
lll'neu"ce ':I\'cu"e of gu"cal lll}(ellpJ ..
UnforllUlmltell.y. the tt;u"&:'1ld«~ lI1l11llSSll«:))U1JS dud not dL11'.;/ays
give tb~ repnesenl3.U':I'esun the p~ac'es tthey tllere to v:lisH
slIJIlf:lficient bnll'lle to prepare tt"<clll" ttfrlJem» and! il.lfidl ll1lott speU OIUlIt
deftaHs olf 1tttlleUU" own SU:l>ccuJnc: uuuterestts. l\JLsO. Koreall1l
overseas oUiicials over-scJJled!uled. cc:remon.naJl vllsnts aUlldl
conferences Ij,9Jiith Koreaull eU1I'll1l:mssy oHiiciiah;; and. frlJost.-
,governmllent ag·encnes. dOU1I1leltnmes at itfrlJe e:..:pem3:tfb of tiu1l1le
that Jrnnght have been Jt1l1lore ILlisen.lI.uy devoited to conil~adts
with host cOlUntry blLUsiinessmten. 'These 01lferSeas o [j"lidiah;;
appan."enUy tirn.ou.nght that ii.u1I1lp0ll"tanlil KOll"e,i:Ull bu.usi nes&men
unig'ft'JJt feel sH!;hted H' th(1'y were not receuved and eJl1lltcT-
tanned nn this nnanner. In I/llltany instances visits ito SlPec'hlf'-
ie cities were llU1l.Uch. too sholt"tt~ too manlY C01l.mtrJies aUld!
cities having been inch[dcerl iill1l one ttrip. In his Ifulfllall re-
port the wrHer stated as follLmws:
""Korean cOllupanies sholl.uJld send a g'reatt 111l1lany
representattives overseas and shOll.u:n.d participate
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"in organized trade missions. Such
In issions should be "/ell planned and i r
sufficiently large. should send an advance
man to plan and prepare for thennission.
The mission should be cOIuposed of per-
sons thoroughly familial" with the products
to b~ sold, who can'ry wiUlI them samples
and literature, and are prepared to quote
prices on the spot. These trade rnissiollls
should reduce their cermnonia.l visHs to
an absolute rnininnum. devote their Urne
to visiting potential custonneu's and develop-
ing business contacts~ and spend s'..iffjicient
Unne ro,~ useful activH,y at each stop. rr
As nnany trade nniSSllODllS as possible frmn other
countries \'Jere encouraged to 'In sit Korea, onen at the
invitation o[ various Korean blluslineSE' groups and KOTRA.
In one of the reports of the \1,~~Tib~rns ~..~o.r1d trip he stated:
'Field offices should be in eJose contact "",Hh
locaJI Ch~ll11bers of COll1!llJllllerCe~ state govermnent
trade ,,:ligenci.es, etc. to Jlearn of potential trade
nlJissions to Asia'l.\rhen they are in the early
stages of planning. \¥ith the present widespread
interest lin Korea, it is sometimes possible to
get Korea on the itineraries of such \'isits.
However, unless thi.s is done'l.velJl in advance of
finIal fornnal announcemlents, it is aJl.lI1Jlost im-
possible to get the leaders to revise their plans.
nrConversely, Koreanll field offices should be
notified wen in advance of proposed visits of
Korean trade llnissions ana other business
groups, so that they can make the local plans
accordingly. There should be sonlle system of
coordinating the various visiting .nnissions, as
it is often awh.'"'\vard for local 8taff andl consillar
officJlals to repeat contacts with goverrunent
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"officials. banking officials and busines~
organizations when visits follow each other
at close intervals. \Ve cannot 'wear out
our welcOlne. ,'II'
C. Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA)
The Inajor responsib.ility for the development of
overseas Inarkets was assigned to the Korea Trade
PrOlllotion Corporation (KOTRA). a public corporation
founded in. 1962 and ,"'.Tholly subsidized by the Korean
GoverlrnenL
KOTRA helps manufachurers and exporters to
locate overseas luarkets; }rovides marketing education;
and advises on the requirernents of these markets through
its market research activities. local publications and
counseling offices. KOTRA is also used by manufactur-
ers as a check-point to deterJnine \vhether the trading
conlpanies are providing adequate service and overseas
111.arket coverage.
KOTRA is the agency most directly responsible for
distributing ne\vs of Korean products to foreign buyers
through its international publications and overseas trade
centers. It COlues under the jurisdiction of the :Ministry
of COlnmerce and Industry and is, in fact, the overseas
arm of that wIinistry.
KOTRA's activities in carrying out its export ex-
pansion objectives are briefly as follmvs:
Conducts Inarket studies;
C(Jnducts expo... t industry research;
Prornotes Korean products and firnlS to
ioreign buyers;
Maintains trade centers abroad;
- - Participates in world fairs and trade fairs;
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-- Operates the UNatjonal Exhibition Center"
located in Seoul and Pusap;
- - Publishes trade periodicals and pamphlet~;
Produces trade films;
Provides instructions and guidance in
packaging and labeling;
Advises Korean Govermnent on Jllatters
affecting exports;
-- Operates an EXPOlt Training School;
- - Provides foreign firms with information on
Korean manufacturers;
Produces magazines, brochures and mono-
graphs to convey information on the quality
of Korean products.
1. Organization
The KOTRA organization consists of a main
office in Seoul with overseas trade centers in New York,
Chicago, Los Angeles, New Oi'leans, Montreal, Hamburg,
Milan, Tokyo, Osaka, Hong Kong, Bangkok, Saigon,
Singapore, and Djakarta. It maintains overseas research
offices in Panama City, Anlsterdam, Londolll, Tehran,
Lagos, and Johannesburg. It a.lso maintains part-time
111arket research correspondents in Peru, Brazil, Colom-
bia, Belgium, Sweden; France, Australia, Taiwan and
the Philippines. See Chart III \pages 126 -127). Its
total staff consists of about 250 people of which approxi-
mately 150 are stationed overseas. Its 1967 budget was
approxinl ately $1, 500, 000. This budget is provided by
the Korean Govermnent, but administered as a separate
agency under the general direction of the l\iJinistry of
Comluerce and Industry.
2. Home Office
The home office in Seoul is housed in a building
in one of the main squares of the city. The shipping
information center mentioned previously is located on
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the street-level noor. An exhibition room on this same
floor displays Korean manufa'.;tured products availab ,..
for export. The displays are directed towards the \"isit-
ing buyer or busine SSlllan. \Vhile the attendance of buye I'S
frOlU abroad is not large, they see a cross-sectional
display of Kore::l!1 products. Other organizations such as
Korean Traders Association and the Korean Chalnber of
Comlllerce lllaintain their own displays. The Chambf'r cf
Comluerce also has displays in each of its centers in'~g
cities in Korea. Siluilar but smaller displays are rn :~i n-
tained at each of the KOTRA overseas trade centers and
at the KOTRA center in Pusan, as well as in the lobby
of the A. I. D. headquarters in Seoul.
KOTRA publishes an attractive monthly trade
magazine, Korea Trade, which is distributed world-~.\"ide
A prolllotional page frmn the April 1967 issue is shmnl
on page 127. It also prints a buyers' guide which lists
every cOlllpany in Korea together with the products it is
prepared to eXllort. Sinlilar guides are published by the
Korean Chaluber of Conlnlerce, anc Korean Trader's
Association, the Korean Bl1lsinesSnlen
'
s Association and
the American Chan1.ber of Commerce. KOTRA publishes
a weekly bulletin which lists sales oppcJrtunities through-
out the world. The Korean Traders Association also
publishes such a bulletin and has a daily edition telet,yped
to its Tokyo office.
3. Overseas Offices
Staffing of the overseas offices varies with
their itnportance. New York and Tokyo are the largest.
Inaintaining a Korean and local staff of eight to tel) people
each. The balance of the offices each nlaintain staff of
three to five people.
These overseas offices have h",'o basic jobs,
One is to undertake nlarket researdl for Korean nlanu-
facturers both on specific products of a particular cornpany.
1. Horne Office
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I-.. Accounting Sec.
!Advisory Group I
•
1st Sec.• P-
• H Research Dept. •I 2nd Sec.
I L...-.. 3rd Sec.
•IBoard of Directors I
I - 1st Sec.MarketingrPresident II Services Dept. 2nd Sec.
'--- 3rd Sec.
IAuditor I --Public Infor- P. R. Sec.
mation Depi. 1st Publication Sec.
L....- 2nd Publication Sec.
,--- International Fa:rs Sec.
Exhibition Dept. • l\Ierchandising Sec.
~ Display Center
Trade Training Center
Korea Export Promotion
Center for Vietnam
Library
Trade Information ServicE;
& Shipping Center
Pusan Office
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New York KTC
Los Angeles KTC
2. Overseas Network (1967)
Chicago KTC
New Orleans KTC
i\Iontreal KTC
Tokyo KTC
ri 1 Osaka KTCTrade Center I Hong Kong KTC
Bangkok KTC
Singapore KTC
Djakarta KTC
Saigon KTC
Milan KTC
Hamburg KTC
London
Amsterdam
Panama City
Hi\larketing Researchers; Johannesburg
--
Lagos
Teheran
Okinawa
Belgium
Sweden
France
Peru
--1 I BrazilCorrespondent I
Colombia
Philippines
Australia
Taiwan
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...., .
DOING' 'BU.SINE:SS' W'ITH, "KOR'E.A., ?
, ~OTR'A' c-bn j be of 5.ervi~e !
• Tntk Ccnl~r
* Ma.k~tiog Rneucb Pou
11 Maktt Rcseuc:h Co.roponJ.:ot Post
Send your Inquiry /lOW!
Korea's t.xpon--'
!don' and more importel'll are diaro"ering that Korell is the
lateet AIIian country to enter the international export market.
Technical inlpro,'ement8 plua modern manufllcturing facilitie8
ha,'e placed Korea in a position where it can compete with AIIian
trade countriea as a supplier of 10'1\' cost, high quality product8-
Sf"t' full addresses of KOTRA's or'e,'seas network
on Page 65,
Whal is KOTRA."
The Korea Trade Promotion Corpora,
tlOn (KOTRA j ....-as eSlablisbed by the
Go\'<?rnmem In order to promote
Korea's exp<lrt trade and to offer
dependable free II'_o.mation concerning
Korea's exports 10 all foreign and
domestic traders,
KOTRA dlrecll, offers accurale miorm
allon concernmg manufacturers of quality
products. pnces. hetel accommodations.
and all otber p:Jims of Importance to
businessmen, All inquires are prompt!}·
referred to compNem rranufactJJ:'ers
concerned, Whatever your business, it
pays ,'ou w investigate Korea as a
source of suppiy for }'our 'equirements.
FH01\i KORE.~ TRADE April, 1967
and n.. encral calc-got'nes or eommoduaL~~s" T'li~t{;,.v ;:d,:-:n :S,ldi:)I-h ~ . "~ ~
pRy ~he home office ,vHh statistical d<:lita "'.. 'UtUchi h; ("On~\,tted
and puhlished in the ,'..,eelklly bllUllh;-UulI ron" the IlUSl\:~' of U1;ij'
Korean e>;porting cornnnunH,,y"
The other major taslk lis to llocate speiCH'lie C'll~sttomleT,;~
for specific prodlucts and COfallpannes - - to :31ctt as <:Ii gn,-
between. Overseas (offices (nO Bi(llt uuslluall~y P~H"UCllpatte un
actual sales negotiations which are pu"opeu-lly llettl to Hw
specific cornpany invoR 'Wed. Hr()l",\'evcu". nn sonlie c~)'mllttJrlies
where new p ..'oducts 3rc betin'lI,g lltrlltt,u"oduuced. KOTH/\ ",,"uB
occasionally bccornc invollved un achua] salles w'((lJd-c LUll
order to open a nc\v ttlHurlkett" Bull C'\."q;-Ull nn !i~llo:se nUlistane'es
the KOTilA personnell do nott, theulJ1!sell ve~: sign ()lU' acc'eplt
purchase ordeu's. bllutt, refen" theun 110 the conllpany.
KOTHA peu'sol'mell allso engage null gem::rall pf'onllfAuQm
work and pliubUcHy. and assnst 1,tilsHUttllg KOh"can busin(~:::;,s­
rnen. They give linfott'llnaUon to forengn busiineSSUl1llen \.\"j:sh-
itlg to visit Korea fou' the puq))ose of ilUll'\."estligaHng the
p0ssibilities of h'ade. and they partticipate in Itrade fairs
when this is deerned advisable. Of greatinlJpon'ttance an'e
U'e reconunendations that KOTRA field offiices make to
the hOlne office on such ~ubjeC'ts concenlling trade devel-
oplnent as buyers" conllplaints. produiC'~ qualH,Y. and rules
and regulations which unay inJI111ibH or PU'fHi:tote trade.
By agreernent wHh Hne I\Hn~sth"Y of Foreign A,Hain's.
KOTRA took on the trad.e proliTIotiion duties that normaHy
fall upon the Cornulercilal AUach(;s at clTIhassiies or con-
sulates. It does not beconnll':' involved in the diplornatic
a .....Uvities in this area. In such c01Lmtries c_nd pRaces
wh(;l'e there are no KOTRA offices. the COllrHTIerch~l
Attac~es still do the work of trade iJrornotion. Unfortunate-
ly. Ihnited staffs of the elll1lbassies. and the rJl1lany duties of
the Comnlercial Attach~s lllake it difficult for thenll to do
as nuach work as is required in this field.
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4. Areas for Overseas Activities
The nature of the consumer "over-the-counter"
goods in which Korea was concentrating dictated that
efforts should be directed towards the affluent countries
with high personal inco!nes. First on this list are the
United States, Canada and Japan which together consumed
over 75'0/0 of Korean exports in 1967. Next on the list are
the Northern European countries which took 11% in 1967.
In the earlier days of export development, Korea
dIrected much of her effort towards Japan and Southeast
Asia. IN ow that the developing nations of this area are
building their own new consumer goods industries, the
possibilities of Korea greatly expanding trJ.de to these
markets is limited by the competition.
5. United States Activities
Giyen the circumstances above, the United States
market increasingly became the most inlportant for active
development. In 1963 the United States market absorbed
approxinl.ately $24 million of a total export business of
$86 million. By 1967 this figure had reached approxi-
mately $137 million out of a total of $320 million. Korea
was producing a very wide variety of products attractive
to the high-incolne North American market. KOTRA
maintained four Inajor centers in the United States. Since
New York is the chief buying center in the United States,
the biggest office was located there. Beside) the smaller
offices in Chicago, Los Angeles and New Orleans, repre-
sentatiYes, were alSo located in Houston and San Francisco,
as well as in l'vlontreal.
6. Japan and HarIg Kong Offices
The two centers in Japan, located in Tokyo and
Osaka, plus the one in Hong Kong had a double job to do.
One was to promote exports to these two countries, and
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the other was to deal with regional representatives of
foreign firms.
a. Exports to Japan
Second only to the United States is the trade
with Japan, which absorbed approxirrlately 26%
of the total exports of Korea in 1967 and supplied
45% of Korea's total imports in that year. The
potential of th€ Japanese market for increased
Korean imports has not been exhausted. As
Japanese wage scales increase, it becomes ad-
vantageous for Japan to import certain partially
completed and completed manufactured goods
Which can be produced less exp( nsively in Korea.
Many Japanese trading companies have world-
wide sales outlets, through which Korean goods
can be re-exported.
Because of its proximity, and tl~~ fact that
many Koreans havE a knowledge of Japanese, it
is easier to carryon Korean sales effol ts there
than in any other country in the world. The large
colony of persons of Korean origin who live in
Japan form a sympathetic nucleus which can help
develop trade with Korea. Since the Normalization
Agreement (1965), relationships between the two
countries have improved and should continue to
do so. An increase in tourism and travel between
the two countries is assisting in the process of
building business relations.
b. Working with Overseas Representatives
Japan is also a center for representatives and
traders from the great buYing organizations of the
world and especially of the United States and
Europe. Buying in the entire Orient by these
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traders is in 1110st instances directed from
Japan and! or Hong Kong. While the final
decisions to purchase in Korea are made by
the home offices, they are very rnuch influ-
enced by t.he representatives in Japan. In
addition, these representatives usually carry
on the day-to-day work involved in the pro-
cesses of purchasing.
During the writer's visit to Japan, he
accompanied the Director of KOTRA! Japan
to meet representatives of the following
companies:
Amerex International Corporation
J. C. Penney Purchasing Corporation
F. W. V/oo1worth Company
Dodwell & Con1pany (represents mostly
European stores)
Associated ~IerchandisingCorporation
(represents U. S. chain stores)
1\ilontgOlnery-\\lard Company
lVIitasco Con'lpany (U. S. chain store)
Sears Roebuck Company
National Silver Company (U. S. trader in
flat table cutlery. )
Almost all of these companies have begun pur-
chasing in Korea. Some have opened or plan to
open their own Korean offices (sometimes as a
branch of their Japanese office). and some have
arranged to be represented by local Korean
cOlnpanies.
The Japan trip also afforded occabion tc
rneet the Tokyo and liong Kong representatives of
J:u"dine. lVlatheson ~<; Company. Ltd. Their main
office is in Hong Kong \vhere they are the largest
traders. After the Tokyo lneeting. the director
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went to Seoul to open an office there.
In Osaka, a meeting \vas arranged with
the P resident of J. KinHltrai and Company,
Ltd. This is also a large world-w ide trading
cornpany. The fkrnn is opening an office in
Seoul.
These are cxmnples of rnany other nnter-
national Asiatic h'adell's and counrnissilon
brokers who are now beconning interested in
Korea. They are not connpeUtors of exnsting
Korean traders. They have estabHshed out-
lets and an intenlatliionali sanes force that can
augluent Korean trade. g:dsting Korean traders
rarely have entree to the clLllstmners of these
cOinpanies.
The qInternational Group of Deparh1rlent
Stores'" includes sOlne of the largest stores
in Europe. It's Inelnbers exchange infon'rrliation,
undertake purchasing fOJ!· each other, and assist
visiting buyers fronn other meni be JI'S of the
group. The Tokyo ltnennbel' of this group is the
Takashinlaya Oeparbnent Store.
A constant streaml of buyers (;mnes to Japan
frOln Anlerican and European cOBlpanies which
have no direct representation in Japan. These
buyers are contacted thrl(;ugh the KOTBA Tokyo
office which now sends a fonn letter to every
visiting buyer arriving in Tokyo.
7. European Activities
lVlore recently Korea has begun to dev~lop the
European ltnarket. New centers \vere opened in Harl1lburg
and acti \rities were expanded in England and the Scandi-
navian countries. \Vhile problenls of dis\tance, penetrat-
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ing the Common Atlarket, and competition with other
developing countries were nlore severe in i!;urope
than in the United States, nevertheless, the European
market presented the next large potential area for
Korean exports.
The Int.ernaUonal Tl'ade Center of GATT
offerc'J to make a European market survey to furnish
the oasis for promution "Jorlk. KOTR1\ assigned a fu11-
Hlne representative to Geneva to workwJlth UNCTAD
and GATT. In addition, KOTRA has conferred with
executi ves uf HarrodRsand SelfridgeRs department
stores in England, and with chain store n~anagers and
traders in Stockholm. Hannbll.u.rg, Arll1sterdam and MBan.
Most of these are represented in Hong Kong and! or
Tokyo by local agents. and are guided oy the recommen-
dations of these representatives. Many of them send
their buyers who work with trading orgalflizaticns in
these two cities. and KOTRA has urged that the buyers
visit Korea.
8. Other Centers
\Vhile the llnain efforts were ~Jirected tm.vards
the high-income countries, there was still much work
to be done in other areas of the world. The first offices
that had been opened by KOTRA inCHtded Bangkok,
Singapore, and Djaka.rta. These centers ,,,,ere maintained
and in SOlue instances were even expanded. As the staff
gained experience, their work improved and their activi-
ties pla.yed a very in'lportant role in the development of
Korean exports.
9. Research and Sales Prolluo!ion
Field research was essential to the develop-
ment of exports. Research activities in the field served
a double purpose of sll.upplying information to the Korean
businesslnen and goverrunent officials, and giving field
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personnel the opporhmUy to ttnaintahll and expand their
t~,ontacts with the buying cOJnununity in lillie process of
obtaining informaHon. The hOtt"ne orrice prepared vari-
ous forols and ttnade requests for inform:alion to the
fneld offices.
However. saU,es promoUon work was more
important than research. 'T'he home orrilce smneHmes
made demands for researchinforJrn1latllon that occupied
the time of the field orifices al Uue expense of pro-
moUon worlk. This was :at p(~rpebuaU probUem. Budget
HmitaUons omy permitted smaJll staffs. His extremely
important that the locaJl neRd! onnces be given discretion
as to \vhat prio,riln,es are gi,Vettll to the v:fu"nOll.us activities.
'The size of staff. their skins. and the areas in which
th.ey are located nnu.ust be talk~Dll hulo consideration. In
countries 'l.'/hcre there is a single staff !nember and
litUe existing' trade. it might be even wise to permit
the representative to devob~ aRmost aU his time to
creating new business.
An. interesting' exaunpJLe occll.nrredl in Tehran
where Korea had no diiplonnaUc or consular offices. A
single KOTRA represeu]1tatiive \"~as sent there in 1965 and
was probably the om.)" Korean living in tJnat city. Because
of budget limitations and restriicUve loc:atl regulations,
his only office was in his borne where he had no telephone
or secretarial assistance. He maintained a sort of out-
door~ roving office in the wholesale trading area of the
ba:2:,aar. making himself known to the traders with offices
in this area. He devoted ahnos! his entii]!."e tilr1Ille t.o t.his type
of pronuotion 'i."rork and was able. in the course of one year,
to create $1 Dllillion worth of annual business for Korean
producers. Subseqll.lle][llUy, an Ambassador was appointed
to Iran and KOTRA opened a f!lnll-time office.
10. Financing Trade Promotion Activities
Financing overseas sales promotion presented
-1:36-
dnffkuHies. J\.s.lJ W)J\j~'U"nnle~ll a~~em~,v, KOTHV\ had rlJO
nUllconne ()f ntg c;:n~ ancl !{OU"lf:'an hunsnUlleS$U1iWUll ;and govcu~n­
rnenl ofn(,:uall.;;" \"~'Hh BUlle mull(:I":Stt.~:rr1Jdungor fthe vast.
::u"cas to he tt"e:ad~t:;«i ancJI Ow great expcuuse um!oh:ed ]n
(oveu"s;ij"~~~ !womoUoull, 'l.',;'CU"C I"CllWC't~llUllft to :a,llh))c';(~h: f~mdls
for thig pm"~)o.se" Mott"l(~o\'e'I". pay sc:alles f«)u" stt;:llff hn
r()VCU"fwas cmnnln~ies: ~.'.'eU"e rrHucU1l hugh~,:r' thaul for Lop-lle';,:el
per'snumeH nUl home ~,u~.l{_~uwnes to ::'H.~((~OIlI!Ullt rOM" the (f"ost of
un VB ng nn the aungaueu~-um:~om«~' c'i(m~lIh'nes.. 'Tau II S 'l.vas a di rn-
il~':lUH cOttllee~]Jt for ttHH~ GO\'l{"U"UllnJH:U1ltt tto gyasp. Juli H~66 KOTHA's
enU u"e hllldlget \'.' as appl~ce»Xumatelly .$:L ;:» rlfll ill HODll "",-Hh Vi hnch
til maintained a starr of all}>l(Hut 2;5)0 peoplle. 'TUllUS was llUll-
ad(!qmutte and :siH.mlld H1!:;u\"e brC'~~~ll :at lle:as.t dOILuhRe'd.
KOTHA did ohtpjrll a 3rrliallll par#. of uts linC'oJnr~e
;'n"onll fees dll~llTged r~»n" llllter';ahuu~e. dnsp]ays. etc.
Som~~ govc)t· ~'Ull1lerll1L «)Jflflicll~lllls: aUlld! pruvate hlJ.usnness-
rlllll'n all"gw,·d that KOTHlA, should act as salles agents
amd eollh:ctt (C'omnullSSllOU1JS ~"((JJtl" lifts wod\'.. Thus pfi:;Hll
,o"ras I'ejjected as litt "''''O\Lu1d1 ij1Ja've seJI"nolLuslly affected
KOTRA" s Illlsefullness. Pn"iioriHes \volluld have be-ern
given to nnanntannhllg, exist]ng contacts for com-
panies aln~ead)r doling busiin'lless and WOILU]d! have
n'eslluUed lin negllectt.lllllg sJInalll anlid newer accounts.
It also ,v.oulld have nneant beconniqg iinvolved in
connpllaints frOlJllll J!~iivall companies ,,-"hI[) JInight feel
that. their partii.cllullar ll:msiiness was being neglected
or that othen~s were being favored. Promotion
worlK is a slow process and must be subsidized.
In other cOIlHll1trJies such as India. Taiwan.
Indonesia. etc. there are state it -ding conll-
panies \\rhiich are actllnaUy nUll the )\UsiDlless of
connnnodiity trading.. The wrHer has insuffi-
cienft knowledge of 'l.'i."he1ther the tradiing COrlI1l-
panies are in therrllseh"es an effecUve
struchllre fOl' iC'xporL pu'ounoUori" in
KOI'ea, howeve I", IW i th uts pd \~ate ente 1'-
prise econorny, he is cODlvinced that such
corrllpanies wound have been mlslLUccessflLd,and
that it was \~dsel' to ~(~ave ll'ading in private
hands.
b. Other Financing Methods
There al'e oUlIeu' ·~.."ays of financing
this type of activHy" in Hong, Kong:. for
exarnpne, a oBle-haH percent tax is placed
on both impou'ts and exports and these
revenues are ILUsed for pl'oBnolllona] work..
In CoUomlua (SouUu A!1Illerlica). a one and
one-haH pel'cent tax us ph.::eed on an
innpol'ts and the fmllds coHceted are ILIIsed
for both pron1l1loUona] 'l.'lrork and fhnancnng
of export industries.
It was reCOIll1J nneliHded that a SILUlllJ equal
to one percent of the ~"J)ta] e:':pn·d h'ade be
allocated for expo,rt promotion by KOTRA
and the overseas trade acthiHes of the
]\'Hnistry of Foreign ",~I..HCllirs. In 1968 this
tax would have annoll.ullted to $5 InHlion.
Another possible Jl1l1lethod of financing
this work lllight be a iCOllubination of fees
for certain types of services plus a tax.
But in any event, adequate funds r.nust be
supplied if this work is to be successfw..
11. SuggestedF1l.1lrthel Irnprovenlents
The fonowing observations and suggestions
were addressed to the Korean Govermnell1t after the
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Senior Export Advisor' 5 final lour of Kore~,n overseas
operations:
a. Public Relations
Efficient public relations is a prime activity that
Intlst be carried on throughout the world. News releases,
announcement of trade missions, visits of important
businessmen, and general infornlation about Korean prod-
ucts require publicity in the right places. Professional
PR men who understand and know this work are expen-
sive and can only be justiried in countries which have a
large Inission and a large volume of business with Korea.
Nevertheless, the importance of this work requires that
specia~ steps be taken. Each KOTRA center should have
one Jnan who has rec~iv~d special training for this pur-
pose. He should understand how to ",rite news releases,
how to mak~ contact with the press, how to make speech-
es, prolnote selninars and nleetings, and carryon the
~ntire work of public relations. \Vhile the present staff
in Juany instances does good ""ork in this field, they
generally have inadequate knowledge 'lnd training of the
work to ~e dor:e.
b. Capitalizing on Good-\\fill
In a nm~1ber of countries there is a great deal of
iriendship and good-will for Korea by local organiza-
tions. SOine countries have cultural groups interested
in Korea. For example, in S\'leden, Norwa.y and Denmark
there are 'lKorpan Associations. "' The Swedish organiza-
tion has 60l' nbers and publishes a monthly magazine
called Jot ~Hello l!l Korean}. Officials of this or-
ganization a1 ~ eager to oe of assistance. Full advantage
should be taken of this good-will. It could take the form
of Korean publicity, Korean displays, etc.
In Japan and in some cities in the United States
there are substantial colonies of Koreans. They alnlost
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::l]ways have an organization of their own. Their activi-
ties should be geared into assistance with Korean dis-
plays. publicity. cultural activities. etc.. as well as
trade assistance. This requires organizational help by
KOTRA and Embassy staff.
In a number of places local Chambers of Cornmerce
and trade associations expressed a willingness to assist
Korea. For example. in Hamburg, and in IVlilan. they
offered to set up meetings for discussion of Korea by
Korean speakers. Local businesslnen would be invited
to these 111eetings. In both Tokyo and Osaka the American
Charnber of Conunerce proposed to have Korean semi-
nars to which they would invite the Korean Ambassador
and representatives of KOTHA. KOTRA representatives
should pr01110te this type of activity with as many organi-
zations as possible. ..
In New York. there is an organization called the
HKorean- Anlerican Trade ancl! Industry Association. "
An attenlpt to organize a similar organization in Chicago
was beginning in 1967. \VJ--.ile these organizations can be
of service. the assistance they can render is limited.
American businessmen are surfeited with organizations
which. unless they perform a real service for their
menlbers. tend to become either organizations of local
businessmen of the home country or of the representa-
tives of big companies who attend as a matter of routine.
The organization in New York is active and does per-
form a service. Unless there is a real interest by busi-
nessmen of the particular country to fornl such organiza.-
ti0ns. KOTRA officials should not devote too much tirr.e
to attempt to actively organize such groups. Each
situation must be judged on a case-by-case basis.
c. Training School
Because budget limitations have restricted the
possibilities of employing '::>utside professional consultants,
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it is lleeessary for KOT H:\ field staff 3.lld Cornrnercial
l\Uach6s to be 'Jackf;-of-all-trades." They also should
be pcoficient in language. Thel'cfore, personnel of
KOTRA, anJ Crjllllllercial Attaches should attend a
tl'aining school befot'e being sent overseas. The school-
i!ij; might be followed by one imonth of visiting Korean
f;H.:tories to become i nforrned as to Korean products and
;)utentials. :\t intervals of, say, three years, each over-
SC;i::' staff !nemiH~r shc'uld, during hl6 horne lea",'e, spend
on, :~onth in retrai nj ne:.
Coucses sugge sted included i nt,-.: Hsi '.C \\:ork in
Engl ish dnd possibly othec tilllajor l<.<ng'-~<.Lgeswith atte nOon
tu business leUe:r-w:citing and speech deli very; in market
research; and in practical problems of displays and pub-
11c relations, including \,1, dUng of lk"\\'S releases and
new sietters. Training in salesrnanship, organization of
meetings, bookkeeping, and other housekeeping probleols
\\ as also reconunendeJ, a;-:; 'o'/ere spe(- iat orii:ntation
courses for the wi ves who acconlpany their husbands on
overseas jobs.
d. Foreign Language Use
English today is an international trading language,
however, signs, posters, pallnphlets and literature should
be printed in the native tongue of each country rather
than in English. In SOlne areas it might be wise to use
both languages, but in every instance the native tongue
should be 111.ade 1110re pro111inent. This approach not only
reaches lnore people but is also more effective with
people who are sensitive to the failure to use the language
of their own country.
A first-rate knowledge of the local language or of
English is of great inlportance to Korean trade represent-
atives and COl1l.mercial Attach~s abroad. In addition, it
is helpful if the wives of Korean representatives abroad
also have language ability. They are called upon to partic-
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ipate in entertainment and visits, and should mingle with
and take part in the activities of local women's organiza-
tions.
e. News Letters. and Advertising
Advertising in publications aimed at the general
public is expensive and unless done on a continuous basis,
is not too effective. Advertisernentf' in connection with
specific trade shows or events could be carried in trade
magazines. Even these can be expensive and should be
limited.
In order to direct publicity to the buyers, it was
suggested that each Center publJish a monthly news letter
to be mailed to a selective list of traders and Ctlstonlers.
These letters would contain information of a general
nature as well as specific inforlnation directed to the
country in which they are published. The iInpact of a
eontinuous monthly bulletin can be effective. DepeEding
upon the location and the size of the mailing list, this
activity can be carried on for a budget of behveen $2, 000
to $5, 000 annually~ including the services of a profess-
ional writer.
f. T ravel Staff
In a number of countries and areas of the world,
it would be wise to elnploy a full-Unle staff member who
would travel fronl city to city in his area with an adequate
supply of samples, literature and other display material.
Possibly he should utilize a statiomvagon or a small truck
for this purpose.
After full advance publicity, he should set up his
displays in a major hotel or other suitable location. Con-
ceivably the local department store might be induced to
house the exhibition of Korean goods. Important traders
and buyers of the area would be invited to the opening,
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which Inight include a ceremony and cocktail party.
\Vherever possible, representatives of the Korean cOln-
pallies whose articles are of particular interest to that
area should be invited to send representatives. In
addition, traders of that country who are buyers of
Korean goods should be invited to participate. After the
initial showing, there should be a follow-up by personal
visits to the nlajor traders and merchants of the city,
and further follow -up should be done by the nearest
KOTR1\ office. The travel staff nlelnber should renlain
in each city fo~' a suffir.ient length of titne to adequately
cover it.
g. Local Staff Employees
A serious shortcmnir..g encountered in the KOTRA
offices was their hesitancy to hire local top-level employ-
ees or to give thenl responsibility. This hesitancy re-
flected forces for economizing, national pride and other
factors. Nevertheless, just as it would be difficult for
an illnerican organization to have a trade center in Kore2.
which would be nlanned entirely by Americans in its
leading positions, it was equally difficult for 2. Korean
organization to work in other countries without employing
top-level local staff. In any ~vent, it is almost essential
that at least one top regional trade expert be employed
in each country. lVloreover, local employees should be
given the responsibility and prestige in proportion to the
inlportance of the work they are doing and should be
invited to participate in conferences, either at home or
in regional centers. It would seem wiser to employ one
good n"lan, paying hin"l an adequate salary, than to have
two or three ineArperienced enlployees of a lo"er grade.
In areas where there are multi-racial business communi-
ties such as in Singapore, Indonesia, l\IIalaysia, etc.,
there should be one employee of each of the major racial
groups involved.
It is not necessary that each overseas Trade Center
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have more than one or two staff people from the horne
office. In each country, local employees can be utilized
to carryon Inuch of the work of the Center. Taking into
account the cost of transportation and of maintaining a
man overseas, it would, in many instances, be less
expensive to hire local employees, especially for the
clerical and research work. It should also be possible
for unusually good local people to be brought back to
Korea and trained in the work of KOTR1\.
D. Other lVlarket Developlnent Organizations
In addition to the activities of I(OTRA many private
organizations and businesses participated in the nlarket
development process.
1. Korean Trade rs Association
Forenl0st an10ng these was the Korean Traders
Association (KTA) which represented the entire trading
comn1tulity of Korea. It had some quasi-official duties,
but was a privat:ely financed organization.
Government regulations required that every
exporter obtain a trader's license and be a nlember of
the KTA. As of 1966 there were over 700 companies
and individuals engaged in selling abroad, although only
about 300 were qualified to obtain a trader's license
under the rules established by the governn1.ent. Others
\yorked through the licensed traders.
lVlany trading compames engaged in no other
business, but the larger companies were also engaged
in manufacturing and other types of activities. Even so
these large compames, with few exceptions, handled
itenlS other than those pr::>duced by their own company.
However, none of them were similar to the Japanese
trading companies which are giant self-contained empires
that engage in finance, banking, shipping, manufacturing,
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insurance and a great many other activities.
KTA Inaintained an office in Tokyo which publi-
shed a daily traders' newsletter translated from Korean
into Japanese. It also maintained an office in New York.
wlost of its activities were in Korea where it devoted
itself to lobbying, assisting buyers, and furnishing in-
forlnation to its Inelnbers.
2. Korean Chamber of Commerce
The Korean Chanlber of Commerce carried on
illOSt of its activities inside Korea. It was the only
national business organization that maintained headquar-
ters and staff in the 18 important cities of Korea where
it served as the link between the business communities
in t:.e provinces and Seoul. It had its own export pro-
illotion di vision which in sonle areas duplicated the work
of the Korean Traders Association.
3. Anlerican Chamber of Commerce
The American Chamber of COlnmerce was an
organization of representatives of American companies
doing business in Korea. Originally, most of -these rep-
resentatives were engaged in importing into Korea. As
the export drive developed, they became more and more
involved in exporting and in representing American com-
panies interested in buying in Korea. Non-U. S. com-
parries seeking permanent representation in Korea were
luore inclined to use Korean traders than employ the
services of resident Americans.
4. International Trading Companies
In addition to the Korean and American traders,
a number of large inte-r- '1ational trading companies had
representatives and branches in Korea. There are many
such companies throughout the world who have branches
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in many cities. SOlne act as comnlission brokers, others
as direct traders, others as representatives and sonle
combine several roles. They may also represent ship-
ping conipanies, iiisui'ance co.mpanies, investrnent corn-
bines, etc. Many of these companies have had a long
history of trade in Asia, some as far back as the early
colonial days. l\Jlost have their home bases in Europe,
India, Hong Kong, Singapore, and other historically
important trading centers. These cornpanies can play
an ilnportant role in any developing country.
There was a tendency by Korean Goverruuent
officials to discourage the establishment of other than
Korean traders in Seoul. This \vas a Inistake as they
are not necessarily cOlnpetitors of Korean traders.
These companies have established outlets and branch
offices which can open up rnarkets not now available to
Korean producers or tradel"s. Since they have already
acquired customers who have confidence in them and
will rely on their judgment and assistance, they can be
invaluable in increasing Korean trade.
5. Private Company Overseas Offices
A few of the large Korean manufacturers were
able to maintain overseas branch offices: in New York,
Tokyo, Hong Kong and Singapore. The cost to maintain
such an office required a large volume of business.
Some cOlnpanies occasionally sent their directors or
salesmen abroad for sales and contact trips. 1\lost
Korean cOlnpanies, however, did their business through
their custolners' agents in Korea, and relied on KOTRA
or private direct correspondence for representation
overseas.
In some of the major \vor~~d centers, young
Koreans who had finished their overseas studies were
attempting to develop a trading business. 1\:108t of them
were inexperienced and had little operating capital.
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Korean businesses were reluctant to give thenll exclusive
representation. However, these businesses would be
bettcr off to enlploy Koreans living abroad because U:.e
Koreans would have more incentive to push sales than
would foreign representati ves serving .many clients in
many countries. (KOTRA, which needed local ernploy-
ees, represented only Korean goods.) Korean businesses
should assist young Koreans now living abroad who wish
to become traders or brokers for Korean products.
6. Co-operaU~~e Trading Companies
A possible approach [or small conllpanies would
be to establish cooperative trading companies, each
representing a mnrnber of cOlnpanies seHing non-competi-
tive products. GovermnentincenUves Inight be developed
to encoul'uge this.
E. Deparbnent Store Exhibitions
In recent years a mnllll bel' of the larger department
stores bave organized exhibHions of products from a
specific country. The trend started in 1950 when R. H.
JiVIacy's and Cmnpan - organized the first Italo- AmericaI1l
exhibition. It not 0nly displayed Italian products; but
attracted interest through artistic and cultural exhibitions,
including dancing, newspapers and native foods as weU as
a conlplete array of handicraft and style items. This show
attracted international attention and gave a major boost
to the opening of the Anlerican market for Italian-made
itenlS.
Since that tilne, l\Jlacy's and other stores throughout
the United States have had similar exhibitions for many
other countries. These shows not only attract consumers,
but attract buyers fron) other retail chains and individual
stores all over the United States, who are eager to learn
what itenls are 'being displayed by an important store
such as l\ilacyR s.
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In 1964, !Vlacy' s had a fi ve-country gast Asian
exhibition in whi.ch Korea \'.tas included. The other
countries were Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Thailand.
iVlacy's officials spent over a year and a great deal of
money for this exhibition. Each cmmtry contributed a
cOlnparatively small sum to cover adver'tis.ing and also
contributed both personnel in Ithe form of dancers,
.cu'hsts, and st~ rf, and ar'Ufac Its for b;;llcli{groun.d dJisp!<;4y
purposes. This was the fir's! large-scalle exhihition of
K(wean goods an...Jl Macy" s sold OILUt the enUre Korean
stock which it had pur'chased. Bau! rnore irnportant the
exhibition opened the eyes of New York and the huyers"
community to Korean products.
Subseq\UlenUy, other~ stores in the UnHed States
organized shnHar exhilbitiolliS. Discussions have been
held with deparlltnent stoa'es in ElLurope and Asia. sonne
of 'Nhich have expressed thelin' \..rilHngulless t<::Ji tLmdclr'take
exhibitions. Store ex~clLUtiii\res h. c01Lmtries such as the
Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore and TailwcHli thought
that the!'e was an inSlLUfficlllP'Bllt quanltHy and va~~liety of
goods frmn Korea that \\'olLuld be 0[' iintcrcst to the local
!narket to justify large scale exhibitions. but they I,'.."ere
~.viUing to have a ""Korean1l cornett'. "! AU of ~heun required
SOlne contribution by either Korean busi.nessmen or
KOTRA.
Preparation for such an exhihit has 10 be organ-
ized \',JEli in advance. Products to be exhibited nnust also
be on the shelves ready for sale. The value of the se
shows lies not only in the goods that are sold during the
exhibition, but in the promotion and publicity given to
Korean products. The cost invol'!ted is sltnaU in com-
parison to the pronlotional rebnrns.
F. \Vorld and Trade Fairs
International world fairs take place sonllcwhere
in the ,'{orld at alnlost any given Inoment. JMany of thell1l1l
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are of major importance" They 'IJndOlUblecUy have deveRop-
ed linlcrnalio'~~'~ knowledge of the work, c1U~hure and tLmdcr-
standing of othctt~ countries .. PolHicaHy and c:uHuraUy
they play an hnpott'tanl r'ole nUl <,vodd a rfairs.
i\Uendancc at lhes~ '.\ n.~r.d fairs is largeJy U1l1iade
up of the genet'al invbHc '\.vhich j,nchvd .s Hue lLuRtlinu.llte, indi-
vidual pllu"cnascJ's ;)f consutt1rllctt' goods. 1\!hHlIj?' blLus.iness
tt'CIH'csentatnves also aHend. Fab's e~.HlI cre:ah: :Eli genett'al
acceptance of the cxhlibHor" s ptt"o(huc:ts.. UUlfi"orl.umale]y,
paTUcipaUon is very expensive. It is d01J.ijl!pUllJlli I:,.~.... hether
sl1l1luHe.' countries 'IN nth Rhlll1Hed hmdls ::~ vaib.lihle can obtai n
sufficient com nne u~c liaR henelfH. to jll.~stHY the cost: \1vo] ved.
For exarrq)le, lit cost Korea over a m HHofli doHan"
above incorne received, !La pa.ritkipate .iUll the New York
\Vodd l"air. Her total! overseas hmJlgct for plr~mnoUc"1l
during that year \'.las Ress ILhan :,$1 mBHon. Therefore, Hue
annount spent fox· parUcipatlionin the\Vcr1dl Fair \\;"olUihli
have been unuch better utHizeedl for .:or1d proolloHonal
acUvities.
Korea participated nn the lMontreal fair where her
pavilion \\1 as one of the unostt. beauti ful andl ]interesting.
Il olade a trernendolLUs poliitncalL and cuUurali lLIr1IJlh::.act and
made Korea known to HlliiUioll1ls of people. The cost was
over $300. 000.
In contrast to worlid fairs, t.rade fairs, which are
devoted exchusive~y either to a particular Jindtustry or
cOnll1urnodity. or divided irnto sections for specific products,
attract professiornal bll.uyers. The cost to participate im
a fair with a booth or even a larger exhibition ranges
frc;Y~$3, 000 to ~SIJ, 000. plus the ad jitional costs of trams-
porting the goods to be exhib:H:ed, arranging the displays,
providing personnel dmd.ng the Exhibition, advertising,
and doing the follo\'l-up u'ork that must be undertaken to
assure the best results. It is sonletimes possible ~:> get
the exporters or local importers 'INhose goods are on
dfis~)b:j'. lo be:':1IJ' pi8lll~l ~»f' Hue cosL "ru':.:udf0' tt":ruiu"s lC'~1iUll b("
VC!'Y prodllucUV(~ and 1C'~llU] c~}'!"lallU1l.lly bn"uuug U'lrH1JU"e r(?'s~l!litts
per' doHar spcll1l UmlT1l ttJ\lI[~ mou"c gcneu":allUy afiu1J1JlC'<t:D W'«)Ju"lld
fa urs.
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CHAPTEil XII
SOME gil ECIAL P HOGHJ\M j~LE1\iHENTS
A. Inchustrnall, Parks
The cODllcept of cn"caUn;g huhnstrnal parks has ganned
hutcr'natllonall acceptance bccall.nse of Hue S1l.UCccess of such
an'cas hu rnany C01l.nDllh"ues. An itndunstrnall parlklis at sman
geographfic enUty, estabHs~lled enther by governmen~ <CU'
pD"n vate devellopeD's to aUu":rJl<ct a grou.np of factories by
provndnng 1l.UUHUes and ((,)lIther connmon facHntiies, and by
noaknlt1lg lland avaBabllc at n"easonablle prnces. The chief
p1l.UD"pOSe of such aD"e:auF' us to enllcourage iindlUlstria] devel-
opment. Depcndn ng unpoDll Une nabnre of the :nndlLustries,
industruall padcs nuay lDellplinlicrease the number of poten-
Hall exporteD"s for a cou.mtry. On the other hand, they
may aLso have no nnJ1lpact att, aU on exports except to
divert attention frOn'1:'ll nUlleD" efforts more productive for
expor t de ve Ropnne nil.
In 19615 there were lh,\70 such industrial parks in
Korea. The ffiilrst was developed on the s01Ldheast coast,
a short distance north oj[ P1Lnsan. This was a large com-
pllex designed to cater to balsic, heavy industry such as
an oH renner'y~ a ffell"HllizeD" plant, and several o~111er
hu'ge en.teD"prnses. The facHiitDes being developed :nn-
clllluded a deep water port for ships up to 20,000 tons,
\~1ate:a' reseD'·vOnlt~s. railroad slidiings and highways; future
plans in~hnded a steel rollin and other major industries.
This industriial area served a major need for industry
requiring a location wH.h direct access ito ocean trans-
portation. The hlldustrynn burn provided an infrastruc-
hnre basis of on and cellnent for oither enterprises. HO\l.r-
even', the Pusan indllllsltriall park had no direct connection
\9; lith e~l)orts and had not been started for this reasOJrll.
The oither industrial p:aLlrlk: was in the Seoul area. U
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was designed to attract successful Korean residents in
Japan to undertake new, slnaU and middle-size facto-
ries in Korea. It succeeded in doing so. Some of these
factories looked to domestic markets and others to
exports, including sub0ssernbHes and parts \,..·hich were
shipped to Japan for finishing.
wlany other cities in Korea were fascinated by
the idea of establishing industrial park areas. ]Many
officials had visited Tahvan where a number of such
areas have proven of great benefit. Because of publicity
given to this concept there w'as a tendency to proceed
with plans for such pal"ks before careful studies had
been made. Studies \vere needed to determine whether
the availabHity of reasonably priced land in industrial
parks would actually attract new industries that would
not otherwise corne to the specific area or country, or
develop on as large a scale. Since sufficient land was
available in good locations at reasonable prices in many
parts of Korea, the Joint Export Development Committee
recolnrnended that a teann of experts be brought to Korea
to make a feasibility study of developing other industrial
parks andlor free zones.
Special sites provide no ]neans of increasing
production if an arnple. reasonably priced supply of
land with public facilities 1S already available. or if
they merely offer special benefits to existing plants
located elsewhere in the country. This point should be
stressed to counteract the glanlour of industrial parks
which has sOlnetilnes helped land speculators to con-
vince govermnent officials to grant them unjustified
tax benefits and special financial incentives.
B. Free Trade Zones
A country wishing to develop n1.anufacturing
industries which inlport 1'a",;' materials, assemble these
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mater'ials, and re-export the assembled products \llill
dcvclop frce trade zones which f? "ilitate this purpose.
Sueh zones are established near spjpping or aviation
facilities, arc physically enclosed and declared a
customs free area. wlany have bec.n established through-
out the \'Torld. Imported raw materials go directly into
the free trade area, and the finished products are ship-
ped from the zone without passing through the country's
customs balTicrs. If sOInc of the finis;'wd products are
to be used locally, then cllstOlns officials check these
products as they leave the zone.
\Vhere sufficient rnaulUfacturing of this natul'e can
be concentrated in a single area, a free trade zone can
be extremely in1portant in developing entrep8t and re-
export trade. Industrial parks are sometimes developed
as free trade zones for this reason, plus the advantages
discussed in the previous section. Land cost, number
of factories that can be attracted, and voluITJ.e of business
Blust be considered in developing such free zones.
Often the saIne export advantages can be realized
without special facilities or grouping of plants. In effect,
each plant can becOlne a free zone where this is impor-
tant for the developlnent of an export industry. Korea
did this very successfully in the case of the electronics
indust.ry. where foreign n1tanufacturers were attracted
by special arrangelnents that allowed them to bring in
cOlnponents and export assembled units without either
passing through customs. The Customs Bureau did put
surveillance personnel in each plant to assure that im-
ported cOlnponents did go entirely into exports.
C. Foreign Banks and Credit Information
The banking system of Korea consisted of a govern-
ment-owned, central Bank of Korea (BOK), five com-
rnercial banks, and four speci~l purpose goverrunent
banks. The whole system \vas closely controlled by the
govermnent through the wIinistry of Finance.
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The Bank of Korea maintained branch offices in
New York, Los Angeles, Tokyo and London. These
carried on no banking activities except those concerned
with foreign exchange. The Bank of Korea also had
international correspondents in other banking systems.
In 1966, the overseas activities were organized as a
separate bank known as the Korean Foreign Exchange
Bank.
Until 1966, there were no branches of foreign
banks located in Korea due to government regulations.
The Bank of America Tnaintaiined branches on U. S.
military posts which were permitted to do banking
business only with U. S. personnel. It could not, there-
fore, be described as a foreign bank doing business in
Korea.
While not disastrous, the failure to allow foreign
banks to Inaintain offices in Korea was a handicap to
trade and investments. Businessrnen throughout the
world, and particularly those unfamiliar with Korea,
preferred to rely on information obtained ~hrough their
own banking institutions. Financial transactioas are
carried out through such international banking facilities.
One of the problems of conducting business inter-
nationally is that of obtaining financial and credit infor-
mation, and other information regarding the reputations
of the companies with which business is to be conducted.
Experienced businessmen throughout the -.vorld will seek
to obtain such information before they agree to sign con-
tracts, place orders or establish a line of credit.
Among inexperienced and smaller Korean business-
men there was a tendency to accept any western business-
man at his face value without obtaining any background
credit information. In addition, it was difficult and time
consuming to obtain such information through the Bank.
of Korea which had to depend upon its bank connections
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in the country frOlu which the information was sought.
Foreigners wishing to do business in Korea often
found it difficult or even impossible to obtain such infor-
Iuation on Korean businessmen. There were no regular
credit rating bureaus similar to Dun and Bradstreet
and other business information gathering organizations
which exist in the United States and other countries.
Anlerican businessInen often gave orders and signed
contracts with Korean companies without first making
an adequate reputation and credit check. One of their
reasons for not doing so was the fact that, justly or
not, many cf them had no faith in the information they
could obtain through the Korean banks.
In 1965 the Korean Governnlent made the decision
to pernlit foreign banks to establish branches in ..(orea.
As of the end of 1967, six such banks had been licensed,
consisting of three American banks, two Japanese banks
and one British bank. At about the same ti:rr..e, in 1966,
the Bank of Korea converted its foreign branche s into
the Korean Foreign Exchange Bank.
D. Snlall and l\tledium Industries
Legally, a small industry was defined as one which
employed less than 200 people, or was capitalized for
less than ten nlillion won ($3610, 000). But the t".Jverwhelm-
ing majority of these factories were in a class of those
with 50 enlployees or less. A large pe!'centage employed
ten workers or less. These small industries, and med-
ium -size industries, however, played a vital role in
Korea's developnlent both for internal markets and for
exports.
In the first place, small and medium industries
produced a significant proportion - - approximately 40
percent -- of the total manufactured products. In the
second place, the hope of expanding into new product lines
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rested in large part on the ingenuity and ambition of
slnall entrepreneurs. Such expansion was likely to be
directed especially toward exports, because credit was
nlore easily obtained for exports than for domestic
production, and the slnall entrepreneurs were more
dependent on credit. Also, ambitious businessmen could
find a more ready market for new items overseas tha:!
at home.
This situation p~"esented a dilenlma to the govermnent
officials interested in developing exports. Administra-
tively, more effective results could be had, and exports
increased at a higher rate through the large companies.
Their plants were usually more modern and their manage-
ment more advanced, plus their ability to engage in sales
efforts overseas and to cater to the volume requirements
of buyers from the advanced countries increased the
possibility of obtaining quick results. Because of their
size and financial positions these companies were also
in a position to maintain full-time contact with the Gov-
ermnent and banks, aLd could exert political pressure
to obtain assistance. Those sections of the ministries
th.at were eager to produce records of export increases
tended to favor the larger industries.
Nevertheless, it was important for the future of
Korean industrial development, and for political and
social reasons to give help and encouragement to the
smaller companies. Development O)f a middle class,
and with it the Jeveloplnent of a group of management
and technical personnel, is iLlportant to a viable,
democratic private enterprise system.
Small and mediulTI industries were organized into
65 trade associations with a total of approximately 7, 500
small businesses. These 65 trade associa.tions, many
of which were also cooperatives, were in turn organized
into the SOlall and Medium Cooperative Federation. The
Federation and its constituent associations provided Cl
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channel for lobbying, education, and promotion of ex-
ports. Special attention was necessary because of the
relative lack of experience of these entrepreneurs, and
hence Inuch of the technical assistance described else-
where was directed to thera.
\Vhile no export incentives were designed especial-
ly for small and medium firnls, they were often used
more effectively in developing new small industries and
new products. Three government banking institutions
devoted their entire att~ntion to the smaller industries.
These were the l\;Iediunl Industry Bank which gave loans
not to exceed $200, 000 to anyone company; the Citizens
National Bank which gave snlal110ans to almost any size
firlll; and the National Association of Farm Cooperatives
(NAFC) which was an agricultural bank and which gave
loans to both farmers and to food processors. The NAFC
also had a handicraft dcveloplnent division which pro-
rnoted household farm iindustries during the winter season.
There was constant conflict between representatives
of the snlaller industries and the larger industries. Bl>.t
in balance, the goverrunent pursued a middle line which
gave support to the larger industries for quick growth,
while at the same tin1e assisting the smaller industries
toward further developlnent.
E. University Re3earch
The A. L D. lVIission had for some time sponsored
a progranl of developing research activities by Korean
organizations. Counterpart funds were given to organ-
izations and universi.ties which undertook research
projects. The obje.ctive was to train Koreans to under-
take research activities, and to develop permanent
research institutions and staffs. The organizations were
encouraged to prepare programs for research and to
undertake the work with as little foreign assistance as
possible.
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An expo::'t marketing research project was under-
taken by Yonsei University, one of the leading and oldest
educational institutions in Korea. Since the research
directors had had no previous experience in studies of
export nlarketing, the A. 1. D. Mission ga ve them SOIne
guidance and advice. Their first draft paid considerable
attention to statistics and theory, reflecting the academic
background, but limited practical p.xperience of the staff.
It was therefore suggested that they seek advice from
traders and manufacturers, and develop the balance of
the program on a comrr.odity-by-commodity basis.
The final report was ]printed in both En~lish and
Korean, and on the whole was good. While it was not
highly sOphisticated, it contained a great deal of useful
information end formed the basis of further work by the
ministrief., and by private and public organizations
interested in exporting. Even more impor tant, it cr0 ated
a small cadre of technicians who became fanliliarwith
the methods of research and the problems of export de-
velopment.
F. Korean Marketing Association - Domestic
~Iarketing
Early in 1966, a new organization known as the
Korean lVlarketing Association was formed. The leader-
ship in its formation was taken by a professor who had
p~rticipated in the Yonsei University market research
project, and who had attended the lVlarket Research
Institute of Stanford University. A committee consisting
of 15 business executives and 15 economists and pro-
fessors formed the first exec'.1tive board of the organi-
zation. The business execlLltives were principally from
companies engaged in domestic marketing activities.
This combination was particularly useful because it
combined the acadenlic theoretician with the practical
businessrnan.
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The first proposed program included a very wide
range of research projects covering problems of export-
ing and dOlnestic marketing. But, after a short time, it
was decided to Unlit acti \rHies to the areas of domestic
Inarketing about which little or no knowledge was avail-
able.
The movement of products fr()JH the producer to
the conSUlner was an uncharted eu'ea. The reasons for
large price di fferentials between producer and consumer
were not clear. The internal credit structure and the
num.ber of hands through which products passed varied
[rOin industry to industry and from product to product.
\Vhile there was little real knowledge, there was general
opinion that the whole internal process was inefficient
and costly. This in turn affected the cost of production
and export marketing.
Organizations do not grmv in a vacuum. The general
developnlent of Inanufacturing and exporting created the
need for the above infornlation, and the Korean A1arketing
Association appeared for ihe purpose of fulfilling this
need. Its developnlent should be watched.
G. Disselnination of Information to Korean Exporters
As has been stressed previously, the export program
required mobilization of the entire business community
and activation of all sectors, both large and small. This
nleant every businessman, every community, and even
the n10st remote areas had to be fully informed of the
arivantages, incentives and facilities available to them.
BusineSSlnen also needed to know financing, and about
shipping, licenses, inspection~ quality control, packaging,
new materia.ls and Inethods, cost systems, and 111uch more.
In addition, exporting required marketing information,
special design and technical information, and contact
with the international buying community.
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Since the broad progr.lIll described in this study
covered such a wide variety of facilities and systems,
it was often difficult for srnaller businessnlen, and
particularly those not located in the city of Seoul, to
have real knowledge of all that was available to thern.
The Korean Government structure "vas centr.~.hzed
in Seoul. Commodity chiefs and lower level staff of
botl. the :Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and KOTHA
seldonl left the mail. office to visit the factories and
towns. The Alnerican Chamber of :ommerce, A. 1. D.
and all of the international organizations and the foreign
consulates were; also located in Seoul. The only nlajor
business organizations that had branches in every city
in Korea were the Korean Charnber of Cornmerce, some
banks, and the agricu1tlH~aI co-operative organizations.
A few of the trade organizations, p?rticularly those in-
vol ved in the seafood industry and agriculture had their
headquarters in Pusan and in SOBle of the other cities.
At the beginning of the export program, the insuffi-
cient distribution of inIornlation became quite obvious.
A special working task force of the Joint Export Develop-
ment COllllll.ittee (EPSC) lnade a series of recommenda-
tions, and other 11loves to be undertaken, including the
following:
The Government was asked to print a
ilalllphlet which would describe every
facility and incentive available to the
exp.orter. This never happened.
The Chanl.ber of Conunerce arranged meetings
at all its branches, at which the export pro-·
graIn was described.
The Cham.ber of Commerce, together with
the local governrnent, established an export
cOlllmittee in every nlajor city.
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The two members of the EPSC steering
committee, the Assistant Minister 01
COlnmerce and Indu.stry and the Senior
Export Advisor, made a series of visits
throughout the country to address local
businessmen, members of the Chambers
of Commerce, and local govermnent
officials.
Every provincial government devp.loped
local information sources through its
industry developlnent office.
The K0rean Trade P 1'"oro oUon Corporation
(KOTRA) printed a weekly bulletin which
was wid~ly distributed.
The Korean Traders" Association did the
same.
A nunlber of meetings were held by the
Ministry of Conlmerce and Industry, the
l\IIinistry of Agriculture, KOTRA, and
the various busiaesses and trade organi-
zatinns. These were attended by repre-
sentatives from all parts of the country.
KOTRA established a branch office in Pusan.
Each province set up its own export
developillent conlnlittee, and each pro'vince
was given an annual quota as a target.
This general type of activity spread a great deal
of knowledge, in addition to that: which businessmen 'with
initiative would themselves seek out. Nevertheless, more
could have been accomplished. It was often difficult or
very time consuming for a businessman to obtain infor-
-mation. There was insufficient contact between the lower
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cehelons of Minish',Y sttaffs and U~e :sun:!ijBeu" bm";[!'t<'\::-;:-;rnl"'"
and srrnaHer corrllBumnlUes. nn ~llddHll(f),U~, KI()Ju"e~llUt ttu':;lidtttti·m;
o~ ""iCH'king UU'mllgh per'smKtl Ic«mt;H'b on/en m:.:ude litt dLt't'l'
cull to reach aQlU1jou'utt~ulh;'~~ som'l("e.3. on- 1nlf'ou'unaUouli ..
\VhBe theu'e \'H~U'C o~H'ioqu:s: :;1jl[h~lInttagiC~s lin unStuug ~~'~;d;!'~,
possible channel and in h-ying liD) bulild :JJ sem-i;e of n;SptOtrliS [,
bHnty in aU agencies ff{w :S:ptt"«~~lidting ii~~tt"f{)JU'mattll«:m. ~u C~:rrttt~"'lr
bureau should have becull csl:;uhHsUuI':'«:'u fff{' Wcuttheu" Hue rn::lik nat
and to do the p~'irotlnllll~" D~:s;lItt11!)Ju;'H,,),u',; ,(,,f t':]j«lr'~"hUhd b~:ttkt'
Hlef'ahun.~ aUld info:nllllallloull lC:l(m~u tthl[~'Uli h,ll\'l' tt':d~en pta~-:c
through lLhe Pllany ch:£.1lttllUllels d!escu"ubcd ~lIb(D''\.'~;',
A special probllenn \~Y,,'a:; that ott" rn=ulknlf]~ h:chnuc:2tt
inforrnaUon avalillablc nUll Uw K-Jwe;;:m l:hliU[llllL:.tg:l'_~" rhe u::P;--:(
.,_.J'; .-'
\\.'/,7oddng lask force on qlluallHy unnoU"o'\.enned and tr.echrLic.,l.~
assistance ll.'eCOnllnllllended Ulla1L a lC'enaen~ be ~,'."str.abllish<i:d
\vhicRlI \vO!luh:i galLhen" h:chu1Jucall ll1l1Jagazllnes and books ft"o:'.:~
throughout the "':[H·ld. have theull1l h":L1llr1lsLa.ted" and chstrr£ '~:b
thern to !the Korean ltedHlllica~ COnllU1JH:;nHy. SOB11i:: ,[)f ttl!;:',;
work was done through Hlle \:adous unii,,"eJI"sHiies and nattL"c,-
all laboratories, but agaiin, not enolLugh rnateriial \'/as pll'O-
duced. The ben"efHs that cOILalld ha '/e been derh:ed ':,v..'olLuld
have n.1.ore than ]lLUstiified the sllllllaU costt liHvol ''.:ed,
The A. I. D. JMJlssiionft s Export Oeve]oprnentr. COH1irnnUee
recolnnllended the prJin.ll1tling and distribution of a Korean
language panuphlet \\7hich"i:ould! hst the assistance that
A. I. D. itself \'Jas able to g'Jive in the way of IPdullicaJ
infol'lnation, guidance, books. etc. U;;lljf'ortunate~y. no
centralized Korean agency .c:oul~ be found to handle the
distribution oj[ this parlll1phllC"t and process the iinquurfes
it Knight generate. so the project ""as dropped.
Despite shortcOluiings. however. an amazing anllOlLl!rrllt
of inforn."llaUon diid reach its final goal. and the excn1terrllllCllllt
generated regCt~'ding the export drJi,"e did ha~{e ills ett"fectL
The basic initiative, intelhgeruce and pe tt'sis1tiP'uliCC ott" the
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Korean businessmen cauu:i:.iicd U.enll Lo seek Otlut and "bake
use of HP.uch of this nnJott"unaUon.
II. 1\:1000n Pictures
The producUon1l of U1IiloUon pJlchures for export can
l"cpl"escrllt a rrllcthcd olf cal"Hung, forelien c;.~change \vhHe
shnuHaneotlUsUy «"Jl'calling; a CtlUHU1"a] impact En the coun-
tries in which these pkhull"CS arc exhibited. This form
of export is so different lfu"om Hllcu"chandise exports ~lllat
it I"eqtloires an entireU.y different pl"Oll1r1lotllona] approach.
\10 speciall eff(H"t \\':JlS ll1J1ladc to push Lillis in Korea, but
Uw indlusb"y is nH~ntionedl ji11list to b"otlUl1ld OIL!'t the total
fwescnblllllon on KOll"e~m exports.
There is a slLub:staulIHal prodUCUOllll of flI10~EJii: ~ictures
in Korea. They are H)lll"oom:~ed \'lHh low budgc~ts and
directed ah1l1lost whoUy to) the Korean JnrllRrket., which i!·
protected by Uegal restriiC'tkons on hllllported rn:.~') c: H~c.::'
can be shovln in Korea. Korea was able to sen some
01rns to other Asiatic cOll.mltries, hllc11l.llding the Philippines,
Indonesia and Tai"v"ran.
AnoUacr 'I.'_'ay to earn foreigrn exchange tllrough moHon
pilc:hores is ito encoura,ge foreign producers to do their
shooting on location in the llllost country. American and
European nnotion picture producers have, from time to
thne, produced pictures in Asiatic countries. Recently,
there have been hnportant films produced in Japan,
Tah'J an and Hong Kong. \Vll1lile a large scale development
of this idea is hnprobable, it nevertheless deserves
attention and effort.
'1" &":C Hi NBCAL ASSL'ST j\ NC H":
---,--, ..-........... ' .........._~----
Betr::cuuse til \'J:BiS m'~~«~l("ss:<U"Y lo d((~"/lC'~<C)Jij)) ijlTl(){':~ldWlii:t}':u
tedulluwuCS ~um:~ pu"(oIChucls tt,Ull:111tt l['Otllili<£ij trlJlieelt llUll[':,;U'U1J:zeujolf]r:I'['
U~(~(ijQUUtt",C'nll((~U"J~:S~ l'ifJIU"e:<ll u"((,;'ifBtUlunf:,d:;\I ilm"~' iiuliUJJU!'tt ~)Jf ttli~Thn:( It
:.lllSSti shunci(~ foll" Hs eXij))(O>u"~ ((lk~",{:)(8'lloJ!l)lun(I:'ulltt PU'Vi;;.,u'mn, 'Tliw
tett~ulll. ""~edHllk:;ull :<~:S;;S:ustt:illUlll["lC"'"" us ;,used U))((:U"C' iiu] lifts bl1,,({)::l;tl·
cst Pl(~SStiUJJlllC\ S«.ms«~.. DUll :,lllddtittllcull tt(!)) :;ll:s:sii::,;.Il:;bU1iC(~' un sttu c(:u1~,:
tt.cch HU C';lLll :cuu"e:.cllS hy eU1l1~u nw'(e~U"S" ll))I!"l!');«hllc·tt.u «):li expK'T tts., l!;;uliJ,-
on":rulou"y mlld ~'ese".u"IC'Ull (e'Xp)(L~nS. lift uUll(:'lltt!«JJ~:5 Uwllp tin HlJe
:::n,rC::JlS of man:i,ll.,gcrwcud. «~u)S~ m~q;«)Jllllullttll UlJ,~" ll:ill\.I:\'. U1JHHke,tt im~f.
aJi ve It''Usn Ullig. llH"ounott.i i()lUll. '(:\(C'«(»U~(c))ul1ln (c s" tt U";;H~S~)J(()I d~1! tth OUlI
pRanm.tiulg. S~llUppUU1lg, U":;'ll~<e':s; :31ulld scUlle'd!lllIJle's, nl!li~.lIullQ.;'liu~gy llKllUUk-
jingo ti~1lSll11U"anCc anc~ (oUu(C'u' ;(llU"iC'aS or llJ)\l.lIs,um:ss ::Ht(~ the sod;;uli
sciences. TedllUll,nc:'ll.ll ;(ll:SS~:s:tt;(llUlll(:'e tis: tthe !11J1l«);stt llU1J1jp~)Il'n,aU1ltt
con1tn"ub llUn,U«.'IUl the de\'ell((jJll)HLd C'(()lm~ttti'lle's \(;':;1JlI'n offeu',
'Tluc U nti ted Staltes cll..mttrullJJl.luttedi lin assL ,\:\0' tt(i:cHli nlle:,tn
assl!stance thu"ollugh utts j'lt,. n. D. PU"Il)£,li":~.lJUJl1j ~,~.dlillcr::H1J llliUtt"lf.:di t'lil;i1l1lJY
consultants and eXIJ)(en'l:s «:.lIUll"t2'cttlly, aUld allso tt"jjnancedl 8llU-
visoa."s n-u,"ou1lll Uue Oep;(ll U"ttUlfU \'?~Ultt of :-\gtt"ti l[ u.tlll hUH"e,. lBlLU li'ea ILU (l,t"
l1\Hnes. Oeparbnenlltt. of C(OJI!'ntineu'ciE" and otbl.;-u" l". S. Gv\."';:u'uu-
uneut agencnes. The lln .. s..~li"u1l1Jed IP'cDJu"ces aJs:o LfiJlIade cmlJ-
h"Hnuhons \l,'l;,'hkh \~"lillll be dln:s:cl.lllssedl nUll :a s:ep"llr:,de dllap1tter',.
Other technllcall. assllslLaUlJice tt"U"OUl!1J tthe Unutted States:
cmne Ullll"ough pri I'{ate Olqg,dlUllii :z.aholl1ls aUlid ft"ollm((llatlloulls slLue»lJ
:as the Asna FOll.mdaUoull. Korean-","nnerncaull F«JJ\LUU'lld8:hcm~
auuft a ll1l.m1l1lbelt" of reHg-noni aUlld llmll\7eU"sllt,y ,gll"ol.lnps. THlle
bllternaHonaR Exec1.lllltllve Seu"\"nce Corps (lESe) tt"IlITuullsll1ie((ll
u."etired tedUu.ii.cnaulls anrll llJ!1.lusiiness exectntllves to asstistt
iinclljjyiid'!.uall Korean conllpaniles Un'll speciifll(:' prohhenUll a]'·e~S',.
In addliiUolll. Hliany AU1l1leJr'iican.1l cOlrlJ.llparrllnes gdn.:e '1,.:ery uunn:v((lJU"-
lLant tecHuniicall assnsta[1Jce U1lU"ol.llt~h ttheir bll,lIyeu"S" aU1Kll l!"«"Sll-_. .,
dent tedull.llcllans.
F r~nwe. Gw; r';n:Hu:,'., ..11 ~~p::m mud-\ ~nstt U"~li~ U~~ pu"o'\,"udcd
.iuu uiC :;UU ijn.r~ ~p:md t U":Jlll nUli un.~. auud e :·:du:a n~~. u); tt"())g U';:U U1lJ So.
, ::li)''' u"tt ~> nmU",'n 11 \1") U"f;~ nuu z:mlUl()U1i:S (J!;[U \"\r;- ~l! :s::s:u Sl:r'HW,0 to
·,r"(u~u.. Tijne huh'u"uli~nU(l"),u'U~li~ Labou" Oq~:I:Hlill'Z;[~UII)tt1lOLO).
3':i" H"'i~".·d \::tlttUons D~~\'eJ\(),pU111len~ FlLmd. and Hue V\"odd
B:u:ljil. ,.~;.'''un~ r\'cdmkumus" THulls: H:s:ll ott" dOUJIllIII"s us mlil[~otnbled-
"Ituup~·"le llml ut coun"iC'Ys :n gem~raJ ide::ll of UH.> scope
,I' If":fToII"L
\\Hh ledliUlilii("a~ :russusl:ruuw'e COHllUttli!f! fu"onll unmllY S,OlLnrccs
;\1':11 11", ~("r,"'>.'unu!l.2 nu:<Uuuy p"llrp\l»:r-;:q'~s" trhC(~' p«)Jll(>U"'lItllall ron" d1uH)illllcatLllon
f eff(H"t~ ::nnud \l"~."llbU1J fnu" «"«)lulltt"llulI:;'ls ~'1,::::~s Il:::n'ge" Ttuus us :.'\i.
:f ';'7iI111ll ~;U" n»ll"Oih~enu tto (CH«:'''''I'll o pnllcuutt. :::ussusttaullce.. The A. t D.
\ll;j~~U!iJll'u ~und 1(lI~llH:'U' :tu:ssu:sl.:cmcc OU"g:,Hlluza[fiOUlls ~"~:! varnolLus
~·uo(" c'(»un m uUecs and Ull ll"u"ued Ottll lC'xcha~'ll~es of linfornlla-
.' "'-...J
~uqnu unn ':llttU i(-ffl(1wtt, h:v ~h."hll(e·\{~' ~:::o«)Jrd!UnmUonll of Uuelir o'iteraH
p tt'(i)~U"an1j s.
\\7utthnttll tllue A. t ':J. MlisSllOU1!:Eli stattT rlllleunben w'as assJlgn-
,.,J ILo :;;!i>:('P un eouutt;H."tt 'I,,'1~ fitth alill ((»nll(~'U" unHnnlla~era~ and bi-
)J:,h(~U"(n];~gcnllcue:scngag('<ellunll IClle\'(dopHlIlient assustance and
ij:I;';'1 '-::--':jnn"~ coou"dnnllaUon of aU A. l. D. projects (L e. not
" stt. iI":-:p0U'O ~,'Hh those (of oUuen" orli',an.iizatL'Olulls.. The Korean
•.. jllnll~ttr'\" ,of EconOUllllnc Development. headed! by the Deputy
un'"II:" U\Hnnst(lT, aliso had a Ikey n'qy]e iin c(\l,on:lLunatiion"
\\'HhuDU the export neRd!. tthe c0nnuniiUee structure
d!l"sc'U"nbed lin Chapten" Hr served as 00.2' nnore JnIlledlianiism
tlun":(~ugh I\,',:hnch to aUeu1lllptL cooll'dnnaHoUll.. Ho\ve~..er. Hue
\'.:J1Tnous \'1,7on'lking groups \\"e1l'"e \LumaUy confJined to Korean
riJ1J"":nb.. rs \~'."iiUll LI\. I. D. :ad'\,~usors. and seldoH111l nnchuded
'2l.ch'nsors fron1l1l other naftnom:il or nrdernatjom.lll dmbors. For
thus :amd othen' n3:aSOUllS:. the coordnnatUon ~9,;'as neven" entllre-
R\ 'S1uccessf\LuL One organ.nzaltiion diid not al'l,,9,;'ays kll1loW 1I",'hadL
,(\,tt}!uer <oqganiizaHons \'I,,"eu"e doiing. and there ,,',-ere 1tiiunes lI'l.hell1l
-.-:?C(»!IlllltC began to Ibe llHll\'oXved iin SllttllllHar and o'\{er-lappiiJIllg
pll'\QJ!!yam s"
\VHhin the I<ol'c,"m GtU':C'nm~~'nt, and :)~i(!.b lin i~or.
uni vcrsiUcs and other organizations rrl1]:m~; penpr,,' '.', ," U"
h'ying to develop export plt'ogl'.nn~;~·L Sorne i.'."o\'I~d:tp; h
simultaneously to a nmnber of outside oJ('gm~izaUoUls ~n
the hope that one of these \voauld acceuJt the-til' PIt'OgT;;J:UlL
and this led to (h~plne<1ltnon" SOUllllf;,tllUlnes ()tt1:(!' ~tiSSllst;;H~"'e
agency \'~·nl.;ld Jl'pject ;) pn'oJc'l(~t arter." ha'nng nli~lide ;Ll; can;,·
fHI anaiysis, \'tlhCI'C'luplfm P(~Il'Sll5leUll~. ,H1Jd ;-)o~r'..«~Um~':s I')n:~'­
~'.mbiUollUs sponson's Wl(l)ILUlld pre-scm Uw ,S;;Hl!ll~~ pl'·OJII!.::( t t,,)
another agency, whfich rn1Jllg'~~fi pr''',n:cd hll d'lpLkah: ~.h·~
study already Ic:ornpllelt.ed ..
Therl(: \'laS so HlIUcellJ 'l.'i(Or~~ nec·essan'.y lli) expand e:-qHwts
th:at duplication :sceIt1l1l~~Jl IUlnforlt.mualt.«~, bcr::l.li.mH': H mean1i
that some other nee".; mug,ht Uloa he ~;;:uU:sJ]e(L N~;verHH';­
less. Jl us aliso pm:,,;siblle that s.nfll1J .... <~pp,) rentt cevrrfi p~:'t i t ~ Hl
snmplly pl'ovuded an addHuiOimJlll Ch;tHllUllC] of ~ ntt'()rn1: atH.m
about expon'Ung.. An c[fon't ILo enHstt ltlJ1lan,Y cnlLrepJ'enli:urs
needed nnany appn'badlJes" pal'tkll.llllady aptiH'oactH:s 'I.'."&u H:h
were nnade by Koreans lLH1Jemsell \:es.
C. Specific Export-Qu°ticnt.cd Teehltllllcal Assistance
In various chapters of this n'cpowt examplles were
given of the techraicall assistance appllliied to H1lc specufic
prograrn nnentioned nn that chapter. Presented un this
scattered fashion. the breadth and suze of the technlical
assistance contribution to export develloplflllent lflI1lay not
bereadHy apparent. Hm.'H~\'er it \~laS one of the conlttt"o]-
ling factors, along \~lith :( Ither essentials slLuch as sOlLmd
econonnic poHciies, 1the existence of entrepreneurs and
traders, and the Go\,rerrunenll1tR s adop1LJiol!1l of a baUer)" of
special export incenti \'es.
In order to give a better idea of the Irn1lagnlLitude of
[echnical assistance» this chapter brings together in a
list those projjects that 'l.vel"e directly associated ' .... nth the
export program, and which ell1/1lanated [rom the work of
the Export Deve.lloprn-nenit COll1JuuniUee of A. 1 D.» aU'lId! of
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the J~PSC. Only those that have not been previously de-
sc.'ihcd in another chapter are presented lin any detaiL
Many other types of technical assistance "vhich facilitated
general eeonornic developnnent and contributed indirectly
to the export devcllopnllc;llt program are not ollcntioned at
aU.
L Gene U"iJill A<h'isor",;' S(" u·'\·klt'~:
____......... - .•_~~...__...... .......... _<A
A. I. D. "s de1cu:s:uOUlJ tto gin:: e:-q:»lott't de\eliopn1cnt
hugh priott'H,y in the Mis:S:lllcm II~ij,:;t;;1luHcd lin a majou~ progcanll
of advisory assistance. ExanlJn)lh~s lluuc:liudc the for'nllabon
of the ]Mission":s Export De\'iC~llopuneij]lLCOHu1I1IH,ttee, and the
a:ssignmeh~:of A. I. D. starr technkans to each working
t n f f U E"'}'>S'('"~s.t ol'ce 0" ulJC • ". ,.
a. Mr. Jen'onne UdeH, retllu~edPres]dentof Graune:rcy
Cllothing Corporation, one of U11e largest J'tuner]can apparel
nnanufacturing counpauues, \'.<as eU1l11p~oyed by A. 1 D. to
H'llake a survey of the U1IlleUllII s garnncullt industry ll1r1l Korea.
This industry, as has been previously explaiined. \~'as one of
the best prospects for export development. 1\'1][". UdeU" s
survey provided ideas on the effectiive direction to take
to expand the industry. Thu·oll.ugh his m""ll1 contacts he was
also able to interest a nUJl1lllber of JlnllternatiionaJ companies
un corning to Korea to p>ll.un"chCllse cJl.othing, and:iin at least
one instance~ to fornu a joint venture w Hh a Korean COll1lll-
pany for the rnanufacture of lluen" s slacks.
b. A teann of nineteen persons cons:ii.st:iing of privat.e
business technicians lfrolln the clothing iinuh.llstry and repre-
sentatives of Korean Govermneltllt organizations were
sent for a three-\'Jeek tour of Japan, Hong Kong and Taiwan.
The objective of this temn was to study methods used to
develop the ind1lJlstry in the countries visited.
c. A great many !buyers representing AI1IJl.erican.
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wholesale and chain store organizations were encouraged
t.o come to Korea. The buyers themsel ves as wen as,
in some instances, the technicians they supplied assisted
many Korean companies to develop design, quality and
techniques in the clothing i ndush'y. "fhis was especially
true in the knitwear sector- of the industry, which ad-
vanced very rapidly.
d. In another interesUng case, a la.-ge i\.nerican
importing company stationed in Korea two fuU-tirne
technicians in the rnam.lfachDl"ing of foohvear.. This in-
cluded canvas, rubber and leather Henll s. These tech-
niciane worked continuollisly in thr-ee factomes to help
them manufacture footwe:cu' acceptable to the .4\.rnerican
market. There ..,Jere a nunnber of other instances not
listed here, of this ve!'y .nn1l1lportant type of private tech-
nical assistap~e.
:t Found ides
The foundryiindusitry is necessary to nearly
every type of rnctal productiion. Korea had nnany cast
grey iron and brass fOllmd!"u€'s.. An of them were sman
and produced poor qualiity casjtin~~..s.. f\. 1 D. financed
the cost of bringing to Korea Mr. Hobert Niirnan, who had
been the President of the NatiornaJl.Fm.mdry Corporahon
in Ne\v Y'Gck. SubsequcnUy. another technician was brought
to Korea to [oHow up on his \\7¢Jrk. They helped forrn the
Korean Foundryn1l1lenns AssociatUon and ~Norked with the
whole industry. They also assisted engineerirng and '0'0-
cational schools in their training progranlls.
A tem.1l1l. of foundry technicians led by lVIr. Niman
spent three weeks in Japan studying the foundry techrniq1l.u€'«3:
used there. A. 1 D. also CHI/anced the purchase of experil-
mental foundry eqmlpluent and test:iing devices for the
National Industrial Research Institute (NIRI).
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4. lVlining
\Ve have previously described in Chapter VIII
the assistance to the mining industry. This assistance
'.... as begun long before the beginning of the export drive,
but prov'~d instrumental in this effort.
'l. Handic raft
As discussed in Chapter VIII, A. 1. D. hired a
fun -Urne technician who was: an expert in the development
of handic rafts. His primary objective \vas to assist
!\.(wcans in developing designs and products in this field,
that would be acceptable to the international markets.
6. Taegu Developnllent Pn'oject
The Taegu regiomd development project
descTihed in Chapter IX, '-'las supplied by A. 1. D. \'lith
fOILu' fun-Un].e technicians for a period of one year, plus
staff assistance and financing of laboratory equipment.
7. \Vigs
The human hair ''''ig business discussed in
Chapter VII, was greatly assisted by American companies.
A consortiunn of French cmnpaniies who were
purchasing shrli.nnp supplied a fun-tiull€' assistant to hel{1
develop a product for the French taste ..
9. Quality Control
The eJf'forts for qualLity control and deveJLopment
\\'ere descriibed in Chapter LX. The technical assistance
hn 1tlnns area iinchnded two JfuJlJL-tiime technicians supplied
-ny A. I. 0 .• h,,
'
o tearn trips to Japan and Taiwan. and in-
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dustry experts from the I. L. O. and A. I. D. working
with the Korean Productivity Center. L~l.boratol·Yequip-
Inent was supplied to NIRI as well as to r~:~giona1 labora-
tories. Displays, discussions and exhibitions were
sponsored, and a quality control engj.neering society was
organized.
10. Taiwan Private Enterprise Workshop
Early in 1964 the Government of Taiwan spon-
sored a ten-day Asiatic private enterprise workshop,
devoted to problems of foreign investment and trade.
Representatives from all the Southeast Asian countries
att~nded. A. I. D. IKorea financed a team of 14 high-level
Korean Government and business executives together
with the Senior Export Advisor. The exchange of ideas
and information about each otherW s activit:iies was of
inestimable value. The Koreans were particularly
interested by- the foreign investment progrron that had
been so successfully developed in Taiwan.
11. Management I!,npact Team
A. 1. D. sponsored a team of top-level Korean
Inanagement executives on an extensive tour of American
industry. While this team was not sent .in direct con-
nection with the export program, the tour included visits
to department stores a.nd factories where the Koreans
were able to observe U:e requirements of the American
market. A similar team of seventeen Korean business-
men and executives, sponsored and financed by the
Korean BusinessmenDs Association, also rnade an ex-
tensive tour of the United States. ALD. IKorea, A. L D. I
Washington and the Department of Commerce helped
arrange the tour and supplied guides.
12. Marketing Techniques and Market Research
a. Mr. JerOD1.e UdeU \\Torked for several months
· '70-
11laking a survey of the Korean Trade Prornvtion
Association's (KOTIlA) organizaU0n, and its
acb vi ties in its lnain officei n Seoul. He recom-
men(~,~d many policy, struchu'a1 ".~nd procedural
changes. \Vhile not aU of the charllges w'cre
accepted ('1' adopted, KOl'HA did make iL"1'liportant
improvements in its organization based on infor-
mation supplied by Mi'. Udell.
b. A. L D. suppHed to the Kor'ean
Productivity Center, an expert in marketing.
who \'.lorked with Korean co~npanies to train
them in salesmanship and other BlI?4rkeUng
techniques.
c. On four succes:sn'l."e occasions, A. I. D.
financed four Koreans each year to the six-
weeks SUHuner course g-i ven by the International
Marketi ng Instibrte at CafJllbridge, lVlassachusetts.
Thes(' !'nen wer~' rniddle-level ollanaw' n'''..enlt. and
governrnent agency executi ves. They also spent
another six \veeks traveling throughout the
Unite"-! States visiting factories, stores. mer-
chandi~ing rnarts, etc. Upon their return to
Kore:J., A. I. D. guided a follow-through effort
under which they participated in lectures, radio
broadcasts, and sen-uinars and '''Tote many
articles to spread the newly acquired knowledge
throughout Korean indllllstry.
d. In 1967, A. I. D. developed and financed
a contract under which th.e International Marketing
institute of Calubridge provided fOlLlr technicians
for a period of two years to ass] st in the develop-
rruent of r1JlIarket research institutions. The four
f~~llds represented '\7ere industrial products mar-
keting, agricultural products marlketing, Jrnarket
research tra.ining, and domestic Ilnarketing. The
four-man temn organiized :Ee][ninars and stunly
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groups and worked closely \\1 Hh 1\:IC1, KOTRA. the
Korean Chambel' of Comrnerce. the Korean l'IIarkeling
Association, and the National ;\ssociation of Agl'i-
cultural Cooperatives.
(e) A. I. D. used counterpart funds to finance
the development of research training fOl' .I<orean organ-
izations. We have descl'jbed the Yonsei University
research projects on export developrnenl which bene-
fited fl'om J\. I. D. technkal help financec: in this
mannel'.
(0 The Senior H":xPOl't Advi:SOJ!' de\:o#.ed one year
to the Korean Goverm1l1lcnt 'l S OVCTseas tlr'adt, acU \"Hies,
during which he traveUed to h\'cnty-:six cHies in bNenty-
two countries to work 1\.\1ith tlhe Korean trade centers,
embassies and attaches. Hlfe assisted then r staffs lin
rnaking contacts with the Un.ited States Embassy offic-
ials. and in many nnstancl(>s ~sHh the inlcTnattonal buy-
ing cOBu1l1unity. A re:s:uH of this tTip \l,;as a se~'ies of
I'ecmnrnendations to the Kott"can Govermnent on the
problelns of sales de'\.celopn1!ent in each of the countrtes
visited. and l'econunendedl actions to be taken b,,- the
Korean Govermnent to dlc,,-enop ne",,; 3cUvihes and cor-
rect inhibiting practices.. (See C'hapteT XI. )
13. Consunner Oiisplay Center
In 1966, A. I. D. brought to Korea a ruunhe r
of sillorl-terrlll! consultants to develop plans for a con-
smner goods display center. Hong Kong. Ne'lN Delhi,
Copenhagen and other hnport.ant cities ha'\."e found it
useful to have a centrally located display area which
tastefully sho\vs thos€ products of the COuultJry which
are particularly attractive to tourists and conSW!"hll.er
goods buyers.
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14. Technical Publications
The Technical Journal and Technical Infor-
mation Service offered by A. I. D. IWashington were avail-
able to the A. I. D. Mission. Unfortunately, these were
not used as successfully as they should have been. A
Korean unit was necessary to channel the questions and
information, however, the Mission did not have the
manpower, and recommendations for a Korean organi-
zation were never fulfilled.
15. Other Technical Assistance.
In addition to the technical assistance already
provided, the EPSC has nlade recOlnmendations to bring
to Korea te~hnical consultants in export insura..tlce, inter-
national arbitration, industrial estates and free zones.
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CHAPTER XIV
MILITARY PURCHASING
There has been widespread international opillion
that purchases by the U. S. Ar.med Forces for use in
Korea and in Vietnam were a nlalor factor in the
.-
developnlent of Korean exports. The facts do not bear
this out.
The figures given at the beginning or this r~port
of an increase in Korean exports from $84 .:-niUion in
196:3 to nearly $500 million in 1968 exclude sales to
U. S. nlilitary forces in Korea. l'IIoreover, these
Inilitary sales did not incre~ase at a comparable rate.
These sales had been approxhnately $35mHlion annually
between 1960 and 1964. In 1964 the figure was $34, 410, 000.
In 1965 there was an increase in sales to $33. 5~12. 000 and
the goal for 1966 was .$50, 000, 000 '~lhereas exports more
than doubled in this tin1l€'. 'There is an obvious buBt-in
~hni.tation in the possibilities of large increases in sales
to the U. S. militalY because of the U. S. gold now
problenl, the inability of Korean industry to produce many
of the items required, and the lill1luited requirem ents.
The percentages of cOlll1lmodity exports to Vietnaxn as
c01l1lpared to total exports is as foUm,\'s:
136.ll.
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
O.I'r\ol
0.2%
14.0'fiiJJ
5.3%
8. 40/,)
5. 5o/@
2 3"Jr!!• b~
The 1963~ 1964 and 1965 figures reflect Korea's sll.llpplying
galvanized iron sheet wmch was in short stllppl,}". As is
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e'rident. these sales Inet a temporary military need but
did not add permanently to Korean exports.
Korea did gain foreign exchange earnings through
remittances frOl11 Korean soldiers and civilians station-
ed in Vietnam. Korean contractors were also able to
obtain service and construction contacts. \Vhile the
latter were helpful to her econonlY. they did little to
develop her export industries.
Despite the limitations on expanding InHUary
purchases. the possibilities of a further development of
sales to the military were investigated. :Such sales
could not only serve the purpose or a liJnited increa~e
in dollar ear'lings. but would also help Korean industr.)
to d<=velop products that could later be sold commerdaHy.
The U. S.Army had already done a good deal of work in
assistipg Koreans to p.roduce new products such as
rubber tires. auto batteries and processed shrimp accep-
table to its high standards.
Since this activity on the part of the U. S. nndUtary
was strictly liauited to Korea, it is not transferrable to
other countries seeking to develop their own exports.
However, there is a principle involved. that of the pos-
sibilities of developing temporary .n'1arkets as an interim
Ineasure while more perJtuanent .nnarkets for tile same
products are being locate.r!.
WiUI the cooperation of the Korean Purchasing
Agency of the U. S. Armed Forces (KPA) •. a list of items
purchased fronn non-U. S. sources was exronlned. Num-
erous discussions were heIdi in Seoul. Tokyo and Wash-
vngton. At the request of the U. S. Country Team (Armed
Forces. A. I. D.. Ernbassy) a team was sent to Korea
frolu the Department of Defense in Washingion to study
ways of assisting the process of increasing procurement.
KPA gave five Korean c:orrJlpanies contracts to pro-
--duce jungle boots and three cOllnpanies contracts for
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fatigue unifornls, both (or the Vietnamese h!'rn:i. To
make it possible for the Korean cOMnpani.es to ul1Jcel ils
strict specifications" the United States ArnllY sllUppHed
t<:chnical assistance of both a direct and hrlldirect, lllahlltt"c.
It is important to note that the cOullcHUons for granting
these contracts to Korean <:ompanies required thera to
meet iaternational price conllpetiUon. The U. S. Army
also helped in the developrnent of scvcrall other pro-
ducts which were later suitable for exporL
\-Vilen Korean businessI1I1lcn first lbec3l1l1le awarelliat
there m ighl be possibi.HUes II1If increasedl trade w lith
Vietnam, they tended to believe that ahnost any prodll.uct
could be sold at any price. Lists of Hems were pre-
sented which could :U(1lj(; poss.ilbUy meet t.he price and
specification requirenncnts. Subscq1l.UcnllUy, a Jrll1!ore
realistic approach to this problem was developed.
As a general policy.. eXllorls to Vie~Jl]anllwere
enL~uraged only for inull1l.llstries with idle capacity.. or
with a potenti.al for shnflthllg sales frolflJl Viet.1l1lmlll to
expanded longer-ternn dOJlnestllc and export markets.
illustrative of ~he first case was the galvanized
iron-sheet industry. Si.h~e l:here \\":alS OJrll]Y a very small
dOlllestic nnarket for galLvanized iron shE' elts.. it ,.vas
unwise to e}q>and thi.s industry. However, it was alright
to draw upon its other\~lise idle capacity. The strucwre
of the industry.. \'"rhich required the import of aU its raw
materials froln great distance.. with deli \,fery of finished
products over great distances.. \vas not eond1Ll((~ive to
permanence, nor to a significant g3in in ".-11: foreign
exchange. Eventually.. sales of this produ...::L to Vietnam
ended.
The uniform and shoe industries developed for
Vietnam were examples of the second possibility. Al-
though these were developed for ulliJLitary products.. they
were able to continue in and expand in the civilian field.
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CHAPTER XV
~roUIUS Jl\/1
The Korean Govcrm.'ent and the A. I. D. 1\iHssion
\'Jere pursuing every HJlOssible way to increase en.roings
of foreign e:;,:ehange. In sonne co'.nntries toudStt'llh has
bcr:omc the second or third largest earner (,r foreign
exchange. It is an expanding industry. ''I''he incl10ease in
the availability of ine,q:)l(~nsblfe air transportation has
opencd up nc\", rraad\tC:ts for ~,vorld tourists.
Itt1l addu Hon to earnlLii ng substantial amounts of foreign
exchange, tourUSl1l1l cOlLulld assist the whole cott11llmodLy
export progrann by spreadhllg world know]ledge of Korea
and its products, providing a tr1l1larlkel for sOll.uvenirs. gift-
ware, antiques and handicrafts, and b,:n p:u'oviiding com-
fortable hotel facilities aUn"active to buyers allrlld bushlflless-
men "lJho Bllight becorne nn1l1lporlers of Korean products.
Because Korea had brpen isolated frorn the outside
world and transportatiion to Korea was liiunHed, its
tourist trade had not developed to any great extent.
The best potential- souree of tourists was Japan.
\\lith the conclusion of the Korean-Japanese normaliizatllon
treaty, and the subsequent opening of Korea to the J apan-
ese, there was every hope that the Japanese would come
to Korea in large nrnnb£.r:s.
Efforts to pronlote tourism, 'l.'lithin th~ l\'linistry of
Transportation, were headed by General Kim n Hwan,
President of the Korea TOllU"ist Bureau. This is .at govern-
ment agency, under the jurisdiction of the JNlinistry of
Transportation.
Tourist developnlent watS not tied to the e:X1JoJL~t
prograDl or its organizations, and the EPSC was not
U
.,,,,,,
- H 1/ ..
"I"D .. ~ . D . . D.•• . "'t" .. U 't\U'Hl>U'~~ CXnSILC(U. OulJ ij1lapilC'U\ :nt Jr<..i()JU"e~11Ull H OtVU"USo nSsn)-
ceuaUon 'l.'Jiufic~'~ waS s~uG)ijJiosC'l(ll lo uUlJchude :ahU lt~-lliC'U'm::!'Ubfts UUll-
vnUvedi nUlJ h»llu"usnu, slln(C'~u :;lJ:b h";[ll \~eU ;;li)g.iC'ntt:s:" hottell ~)JU"g'(£1lUlIU ~
'1:,;;11 U om·;. h~"llro:S:>Ott"~aU oml. n~iC'sl(£mU":l.11 nfts:" (I~'nft<C' U"ft:Lli li UlU1!H~nllft"
i( .. llUHuu'''.lU anl(ll educaUom1JU nrm;Uhuttnom.;:. lhuJ({)Ju'tum~uttl8'lly. Huns:
ou"ga ron zalfi on ne ve u" bec::t.llu"O'Hl: U1I1JOU"iC' UIl~UU <£11 ti)i~Jjpe U'· sttTuvehvre"
Buu UmH. Ilmdeu" lllue su:»«)msou"shupi (t))f tt~~e UJ .. S, Dep;(liu"tt-
u1l1Icuul of COD1JllU'U1)(en"i(~I(~" :/.U stttLudy lC'ullftuU(e([~ "!'T~lI(f2' FUlihutt"(f~ Q'J)b"
T'OIlDu"usm h'd Hue P:t.ul(~·nniC· •.lmttH F;;n' EXllSII"!I h;;\lcrJl beiC'uu m;,udle by
CijulQ'cchfi :& Crc»mp:;Jltt1Iy «)Jf \'V:a:s:~ulluU,f~tt,(lm.. ('me' iC'~lI~lJpltP.'u~ «)1l1Itt of
n'l.\'enly-om:;' \\':a15 de\'o~i.~nll tt(()J KiD)U"«:';;U .. ·nUll~ u"'en)Jl[)wft pn;-d1tic,ttced
Ull:;R tt by r(~i£m lhe U"I(~ c<cmllcell lbliC' ll2«». !lJJ(l)HDJ 'i,"U s ij trou"S «':'<OIU1JU hug :a: HUm,]-
'llHy Ito H{ou"ll"a.. l\ll,UUllJillUgUll UlllC' U"CiC'«)JU"«.ll :s:H1Io'IO'l'eiCB tth~.utt uUlIll9651
appwo:d un~de lly ~r~;v ;;»(()HQ) \1ll s ti tt,<OJu"s C':'ll U1I1J I{~ tt (!)J K l[),U'Il:':a: ,. onll,y 8llb>OlUltt
n. ((])(())O wl£~u"e :'U:hU;lllHy ~{»lluu"nfS;tts;.. H":\"iC'Ull Hue ttott:iu.ll fugtulr'CC' seem-
ed srnunnll tin <couallpaU"USom lo tt~UlC' pOlssnij))ullnUes.
A casm1Lll evahu:mUoll1lu u1Jdlu«":a:ttedl ttlllJ:'lltt Kou"c;a poss:essed
the polten1lt~:fiJ ['OU~ sll.nij:vstt:aJulllt~all ft,oILUU"ustt eau"U1JuJl1lfS. :a:nd tt01l.lllC"USJrbll
deserved aUeuiitu0I111 :amd ",U<e)\'«~llopU'JJll1ett1Jt, SeolUl:;, :alllul! Kowea
havc ve u"y unaUllY uDlllteU"lt'sttu 1111g :L1Jn110 bHercll1J.uttll ['lUll pall:tllces. m ll.use-
11.l11111lS. pald\s. nnall."kets. aUlId ottlhlell" pllaces of hfistorka:ll
interest and nahu"all be:aululty.. K>:J!u~ea!l1l pn"o~h ..ucts. properli;t
displayed and wntlhl rU"On:»<e'll" stOiU"C' seTvilee emnh.B devellop
subst;amUall earnings If'U''onll11 lt01Lwusts" shoppull1Jg,,,
Itt: also dud not ttalke lo)u1Jg to dh;;coyell" tthat elteJlll from
a llayI1l1an" S pouflnt olf' vie,,,,". the Jf'acilHnes avaullablle \vere
unadequate and not Ilnp to llJlllU:erl11laHona] stculldards" The
condHiions. Jf'acUlHies rcllnd SIE'lnrnces descl!"nbed Urll nile Checc]
report as then exisHnll,g had hardly changed Jf'ronll 196Jl 'Ito
HJJ6'i. The:re Il.\ras JIllO dell1l.llxe class hotel in e:ds1tem~e.
Res1t:alLllrants" 1t:ransporlta1tii.on and tourn..;lt shopping were no1t:
1l.llp to th.e oe;;ltalrJldards th.at w01J.u1Ld Urllvite Uneuniterm,lltiiomul
l1unddJle -cl31.sS t01l,u-lisL For the practical reason of earmng
foreign exdllanllge. iit 'was inllllportant ito attract the pro.lfi1t:a]b]e
-118-
trade and to direct ,11 efforts towardsthosp. tourists who
would spc, ...:1 the maximum amlount during their stay in
K\lrea.
The Koreans' concept of a vacation which they en-
joyed consisted of going to one of the mountain areasl
often built around an old Buddlhist tenple l aYld resting
qUietly in sirnple surroundings l enj('jing the o(~auty and
tranqui1it}~ )f nature. The Korea Tourist Scrvh~~ ~:ld
built H number of tourist hotels in various parts of Korea
in the Jnountains ani remote (~ities. There were plans to
InMild additional isolated hotels and to spend nloney on
aeri<i.l trarTIways and roads to mountain I.,~nlples and
remote aL~eab. There was also a schenu; to develop
Cheju Island into a so..~·t of Bermuda. Such facilities
as tL.~se, howeverl did not meet the needs of international
tout"ism.
The effort to develop Korea's potential for tourism
began early in 1~6:: when the Pacific Air Transport
Association held d convention in Seoul. This brought a
great many professional tourist agents to Korea. With
the Minister of Transportation as principal speakerl
A. L D. arranged a meeting of the leading wholesale
tourist agents to discuss with them the steps that should
be tak~n to develop tourism.
Seoul was a side trip at extra cost on the internation-
al air route between Japan and Hong Kong. Ti:ese agents
introduced a resolution at the conference rle<tresting
steps be tC'.ken t\... include Seoul as a WI free stopH in air
travel. 3ubseqU€;l1tly, this was adopted by Internationai
Air Trd.nspC'l~tAssoci~tion (lATA) and implemented by
the ai'~'Plane companies. It has been very helpful.
A series of conferences was held with the whole range
of public and private officials interested in tourism.
Many suggestions were discussed and some were adopted.
At the request of the Minister of Transport:ation, A. I.. D.
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brought Mr. Morton D. Kauffman to KorE~a a8 a consul-
tant on tout"ism. After months of work, he prepared a
detailed report in July 1966, with recomnlendations for
action He predicted that in the year 1971, there win
be 200,000 vi.sitors to Korea who will spenu approxi-
mately $100 million in foreign exchange. If realized, this
will make tourism the second largest ror.~ign exchange
earner after manufactured goods. He clearly :i ndi.::ated,
however, that these predictions will COnH! true only if
suggestions and recom.mendations contai;.~d in his :'eport
are carried out.
The Korean Go ""ernment has taken lnany steps to
implement the suggestions made in the Kauffman report.
Am.ong others, they translated and printed it ir~ full.
They also printed and widel~f distributed throughout Korea,
chapters devoted to spe~:ial aspe(.:ts such as hotels, travel
agents, and entertainment.
In addition, hvo Korean hotel managels spent three
months at the University of Hawaii Hotel School, and one
representative from the Goverrunent Bureau of Tourism
spent three months tr~ rung at the Hawaiian Tourist
Center. Upon their return, iliey visited many Korean
hotels to spread the knowledge they naG ~eceived during
their training.
In his report, Mr. Kauffman found a need for a
mininlum 0': 500 new, deluxe hotel rooms. At the request
of the Minister of Transportation, the writer commGni-
cated with the three leading American hotel chains. All
three became actively interested in the possibility of
building a new deluxe hotel. By that time Korean Gove:-n-
ment authorities _-.ad decided that building more facilities
in the countryside would not be producti".re, and supported
irstead the possibility of a major hotel expansion in Seoul
The Korea Tourist Service~ following a Kauffman recom-
mendationJ sold their isolated hotels.
-180-
In 1967, American AIrlines entered into a partner-
ship agreement with the govermnent-owned Korean
'l'ourist Service to bund a $10 million, 500 room hotel
in the center of Seoul. In addition, with RtOK-sponsored
financing, a nutuber of existing hotels are expanding and
improving their services and facHities.
Tourism is already substantially increasing. In
1967, 84, 216 \-isitors came to Korea, exceeding Mr.
Kauffman's prediction of 61,000. l\Ilany groups of
Japanese are coming to Korea, and a number of impor-
tant conferences and conventions have been held there.
However, the nlunber of tour:sts, the length of their
stay, and the mnount they spend here will be determined
by the continuing positive action taken by the Korean
Govermnent anc.i the businessJmen involved in tourism,
to iInprovc their facilities, restaurants, transportatIon,
hotel service, mUf.emns, entertainment, culhiral attrac-
tions and all other facilities that are necessary for this
purpose. Much is still to be done.
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CHAP~rERXVI
CONCLUSION
Because of the number of problems presented in
this study, the reader may have the impression that the
whole export effort was beset with a host of difficulties
and setbacks~ and may wonder how the program was so
successful. We have set forth these problems in some
detail~ precisely to indicate that this development was
neither easy nor simple to achieve. Not all problerns
have been solved. Despite these difficulties~ the results
were successful due to planning, organization and desire.
While there ::'s no doubt that the Korean people have a
native ingenuity~ intelligence and industrious ability,
these attributes would not by themselves suffice to cre-
ate the tremendous increase that the export development
progranl achieved.
What the K"')reans achieved can and has been achieved
elsewhere. Al.~hough the writer has only been able to
study the export development activities in a few countries,
it has become obvious to hinI that in those countries where
desire, planning~ organization~ and incentives have
existed, the programs have been 3uccessful. Hong Kong,
Taiwan, Singapore~ Israel, and Colombia (South America)
are examples of developing countries in which mobiliza~
tion of the resources~ and planning created successful
eXJort development. In a number of other countries in
which export prograrl1s were attempted without the basic
elenl(~nts utilj~ed by Korea and the other countries men-
tion~d above, the prograrns have not been as successful.
.Although local conditions determine specific methods~
salient features developed in Korea can be applied else-
where.
Finally, lest there be any wrong impression~ it
should be noted that the success of the Korean program
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was Inostly due to the efforts of the Koreans themselves.
Government, private organizations, businessmen and
Korean workingmen have each contributed their share.
Whatever part we outsiders have been able to contribute
to this effort has only been possible because of the deter-
mined Korean drive to export.
It has not been easy for a people whose tradition,
philosophy and history was one of learning rather than
trade to combine the best of their old traditions with the
modern ways required to develop an industrial econOIny
They are succeeding beyond the fondest hopes of several
years ago.
-lS:J-
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APPENDIX A
Questionnaire on Conditions for Export
Development
For anyone undertaking or deciding to undertake an
export development program in a developing country, the
following is a list of questions which should hf·lp him de-
cide: (1) whether there is a possibility of launching such
a progralll with any chance of success; and (2) what he
lnust look for in order to implement a program.
It is not intended that every condition nlentioned in
this questionnai_'e must be answered in the affirmative.
It is intended, rather, that this be a check list to guide
in research and activibes.
1. B~ckground
A. Economic
1. Do economic policies and conditions justify
an export drive?
a. Is there a combination of exchange
rate, import and domestic price stabilization
policies that are likely to:
(1) keep domestic price levels cornpetitive
in international markets;
(2) permit !'elatively free and timely import
of esserr:ial production inputs for the
export induBtries;
(3) avoid comparative price disincentives to
exporters?
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b. Is there the ability to develop and
sustain growth in agricultural and indu stria!
products that could be exported?
c. Is there adequate financing facilities
for export industries?
d. Is there a govermnent development
strategy giving export a high priority, e. g. ,
higher than import substitution and pro-
tection of dome stic industr~i - - poJiclles that
generally induce actions that raise costs in
export industry and otherwis~ impede export
expansion?
B. Political
1. Is political stability ~dequate to suppo:ct
a sustained export drive?
2. Is there a real desire for and understanding
by top-level government officials, of the re-
quirements for an export drive? Or, is the
expressed interest merely lip service?
a. Are officials prepared to translate this
desire into organization, and to allocate suffi-
cient financial assistanc8 necessary to carry
on this work?
b. Are they preparc~ to make the necessary
economic policy adjustnlents and to create the
necessary business incentives?
3. Does the government desire advice and
•te~hnical assistance from A. I. D.? Will
it give full cooperation?
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C. Business
Assuming government willingness to create
incentives within a conducive economic environment:
1. Are businessmen making profits that
might be seriously disturbed by a shift
to export products?
2. Are there counteracting incentives that
can be used to mobilize business support?
3. Is the business community likely to respond
to such a drive?
4. Conversely, does a sufficiently large
sector of the busin(;ss community desire
to develop exports, so that it will exercise
its influence upon the government to carry
out the necessary steps for such a drive?
II. Implemt. 4~tation
Assuming a sufficiently positive response to the
above que stions to make it feasible to proceed, the follow-
ing questions should be considered.
A. Products
1. "Vhat pr~rlucts are now available for export?
2. \-Vhat products can be developed for:
a. export in the immediate future;
b. in the more distant future;
c. in the long-range future?
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Criteria for answering the second question
include availability of raw :naterials, trans-
portation, technical and mechanical know-how,
labor supply, and finance, and the possibilities
of products that can. be manufactured by in-
dustries that require small capital investments
for expansion. Generally, the best choi.ces are
products that use the resources that are in
most plentiful supr-ly in the country, or that
otherwise have natural cost advantages.
3. Is there an understanding of the nature of the
market for these products? Are there Inarkets
related to the specific available products?
B. Competition
1. What countries are the strongest present or
potential competitors?
What competitive products do these
countries sell? To whom? In what
quantities?
2. D0 indigenous products meet foreign com-
petition in quality, price, delivery time,
financial terms offered?
3. If not, in what products is there a reasonable
possibility of making the necessary improve-
ments?
4. What is the overseas reputation of indigenous
products?
Criteria include: quality, design, packaging, and
delivery tim;, and business methods, honesty,
stability, procedural time requirements,
handling of correspondence and complaints,
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credit facilities, financial stability and
re3ponsibility.
c. Incentives for SUL2.port
What inc~ntives ,;xist, should be strengthened
or developed to luake exporting attractive and legitinlate-
ly profitable? Within the bounds of reasonable overall
economic policies and budget limitations, study desira-
bility and feasibility of tl}e following measu""es and methods:
1. Tax incentives - incoffie tax ('eduction on
?xpanding export profits; tax free raw
!uaterial iInports; accelerated depreciation
on equipment for expansion; deductions for
overseas travel and promotion, research.
training of personnel, etc.;
2. Credit incentives - low interest loans on
LIC' s; raw material stockpiling; financing
credit to customers; capital and illachinery
loans;
3. Indirect subsidy incentives - .special rates
on transportation and power.: use of govern-·
ment facilities;
4. Tariff limitations - restrict tariffs to those
which increase incentives to establishment
of efficient export industries:
5. "ImpJrt substitution" - is there an existing
program and -.vhat are its inCe!ltive effects
on expol-ts ?
6. Direct or indirect subsidies - are all the
above II across-the-board", or are they
directed to specific indU!~tries?
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7. \Vhethcr thi.5 entire program (questions 1 to f)
will tend to create permanent subsid~es and
inefficient industries?
3. \Vhether steps can be taken if this probleol ex~stts
to reduce or eHm inate it?
9. Priority preferences on available raw
materials, equipnwnt, transportation, labor
technicians.
10. The deveiopment of research, prodllicti vHy,
testing standards.
D. Organ~zation for Export
1. Is there a govc=,mnpnt export organization'>
a. Is there one agency or Ininistry, or is
responsibility divided?
b. Is there an overseas Trade Promotion
Agency?
c. \Vhat other governmental organizations
exist in this field?
2. a. How is business organized?
\Vhat organizations exist for: Traders;
Exporters; lVlanufacturerb, Trade promotion;
lVlarketing; Accounting; Law. Are there
Chambers of Commerce?
b. Can these cooperate in support of an
ove ra11 export drive?
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E. Banking
1. Do host country banks conduct international
banking activities and have branches ail .'oad ?
2. Do foreign banks have hranches in the host
country?
:3. What credit facHiUes are available'?
F. Overseas
1. If there organized overseas private or public
export r"onuotion? Is this effectivf', amply
financed~ i, the personnel trained?
2. How erfecHve are the commercial attaches at
the enlbassies and consulates?
3. Are there any friendly overseas organizations
such as foreIgn c01l.llntry Chambers of Commerce,
cultural or special f01l.llndations, etc.?
4. Is there an overseas population of persons born
in the home country or their descendants, and
are they organized to help?
5. What interaational organizations may be utilized
to assist local export development, e. g. GATT,
UNCTAD. Conlffionwealth Nations, Free Trade
Zones, Regional 'Trade Organizations, Regional
Productivity Organizations, etc.?
6. How does relatiocship with any of these organi-
zations affect "rade"?
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G. 'fotal Mobilization
L \:Vhat steps must be taken for coordfirmUon, H lit
does not already eXR:f:1;t, of an elell1l1lents neceSS~TY
to form an aU-inclusive "'iJ~xporU. Deve]opmcru#.
OrganizaUon? ""
This might unchude E,conou1J1luc WUnush ie9;,Foreiign
Mini.strieb coraccrnc'd goverlJ1llrlJllcnt and quasi-
government agencies., Clluslor:llS offncialls. f:-"us]ncss
organizations, hanks., trade organnzaUons. anc!
pl~odlilctivity,inspecUon, standards, ed~ucati(yna1.
vocational, transportation :}nd trade tLlInion organi-
zaUons.
H. Collateral Organiizaltion and Agencies
1. Do any organizations or agencies ~~xistwhjcln are
concerned with the [oUm\7.nng problems, r "1d if not,
and if requi.red, what steps can be taken to form
such orgauh.......tn.ons?
a. Productivity,
b. International Arbitration of Dispute..>,
c. Export insurance,
G. Overseas private andI or pubHc sales
promotion,
e. E~xport inspection.
f. Stalldards,
g. Quality control,
h. Export research,
i. StaUshcal infornlaUon,
J. Cost cantro~.
k. Desig-il and product development,
1. Packaging,
Ttl.. Free trade zones:
n. Education and training.
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1. What trained personnel are available in
areas that affec1L exporting, especially
in Inarl<eting, salesolanship, accounting,
law, market r(~search, market publicity
and promoUon?
J. Procedures
1. Are thclt'e excessive red tape procedures
required for export, import, travel,
financing, licensing, custmn.ti ~learances?
2. If so. what steps should be taken to reduce
these?
K. Cultural and Traditional
1. 110\\' do patterns of native culture, and
traditions affect day-to-day business
relationships behveen native and foreign
businessnlen, for eXanlple: promises,
requirelnents of poiiteness, JIueaning of
contracts, etc.?
2. Are there any traditional dislikes of
c~rtain countries that affect trade?
3. In countries with several distinct ethnic,
national or religious groups, are there
conflicts that affect trade?
III. Other Export and Foreign Exchange Earning
Possibilities
A. Tourism
B. Shipping
C. Insuran~.C;
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D. Remittances from citizens working
overseas
E. Sales to U. S. Armed Forces
F'. Hemittances from overseas linvestlnents.
IV. Foreign Investments
How much are investments by foreign com-
panies related to exports? Could they be rnore so?
A study should be nlade of whole field of foreign invest-
ment.
y A. I. D. Staff Requirernents
A. The Director of the export development
effort should be a man with wide business
experience, and preferably with production
knowledge.
B. He lnllst be a person able to understand and
be tolerant of local country habits, business
m.ethods and cnlture, and the frustration
of working JeU difficult situations.
C. He Illust be placed at a high level in the
Mission, with complete support by the
Director, and have the cooperation of
every section of the l\iIission.
D. He lnust have access to high level local
gO'Jernment and business officials.
E. He must be given adequate "representationalH
budget.
!". He Inu3t be a good saleslnan and mixer.
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'I'he following Appendixes B thru G inclusive
are copies of detailed reports for 1965 and 1966 which
were made to evaluate progress and actions, and which
were used as a guide for further actions.
They are presented here to show the details and
variety of activities that were undertaken.
Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D
Appendix E
Appendix F
Appendix G
Analysis of EPSC Activities -
1965
Analysis of Export Promotion
Policy Program Actions - 1965
Analysis of EPSC Activities
1966
Analysis of Export Promotion
Policy Program Actions - 1966
Export Comrr..odities Exceeding
Target January-August 1966
Export Commodities Below
Target January-August 1966
Appendix B ANAL 'iSl S 0 F EPSC ACt I VI Tl ES - 1 f16'r,
n. b. e.
Favorablo Under Ito Ar;,tion
lrgpo/l:ll II! IMtnlct.iong or t{ocmnmqnrlt!t.ioD.a. Typo of Action Taken .1U!sul't:L. Act.ion bY; P"r,r1ine. I2,1,!!l
I. Fipnncf' ~ T:lxnHc:m
1. LenE;tl'l~ Roport & Rocommendntions b~ Steoring wIG
Committoo roforred for nnal~sis
2. !lew system on Qxport crodits MOr
). Abolishment of tho coiling s~Gtom Stud~ mnde, bat no conclusion. WIG
4. Distribution of export promotion funda with~n
various sectors of agriculturo Extended to mushroom sector. r,OK
S. Finnncin~ for marino p~uducts and manufacturing MOF consult with EPD. r'.OF
6. Governmont subsidies for swine k cattlo exports MOAF & MCl consult. wit.h EPB. MOAF & MCT
7. Stucl~ t.ho export usanco progrwm &roport. its
findings to EPSC w/r.
~innnco &Taxation WIG TOTAL 0 S 2 .:1.. ....CO
II. At~riellltHrlJ CJ'1
1. SiGninr; of ROK-US Sanitation Asrecmc!'It MOrA
2. Establir.h proCrnm coverinG the cntiro nrca
or ar;riculturo prcxluctivit~ XO,\F
). Rcques t for mnrkotins and qual:\. ty control
specialist from USA :1..,;\F
4. Export promotion fund to tho AGricultural products WIG
S. loluohroom inci\l:lt~ AB a :specialized export indu:st~ Accopted
'tllo6. Special development or sin:song oxports
7. A livoBt.ocl( ndvillor be invited from USA USOM
a. Report export program in~the monopol~ i~Ju6t~ !Wport~d
9. A foreign expert on animal hUBband~ be invitod for
lIix monthtl USOM
lO. Rel,aymentll £01' raw eill< export 10anlS bel extended
to lIix month:s thT
11. PL-480 whe.:lt b" proce:stlod into !l our in Koro,Q.
And trAntl:shipDo~ to Vietnam Ad hoe (USO:-l)
12. Mushroom cultivAtion problem ~:/G
l'. Propollalll for the development of mUllhroom:l, tomato
w/r;~nd Apple product:l !o~ elXport
AcricuJ.ture W/o TOTAY. 2 7 4 U
tl. b. c,
Fnvorabl0 Ur.rlcr ~Io Act.ion
?rClpCl;::l111. IMt:"11l1ti OM CIt Req0!!ll!lanrljltions TYpe of Agti~n Tuk~n R"~\ll t.~
.
f\~q()n h'l ?("~l~' ~f ~
III. Fjl!hod('ll
1. Improvement of fishing facilities USO:" (, EPB
2. Equipment for deep-sea fishing as raw matorillls
for export :'~r. :
J. Importation of raw materials tor export
prior to Llc MC!
4. Comprehensivo report on marine product
m~nufacturing funds F~·T
S. Investigation of .seed oyster exoort ann
shipment ~f samplo to US. 'vl/(',
Fishmrios WIG TOTAL 0 2 J 5
IV. !:Ll.Il.iM
1. Hinc:-nl cxpo:-t tn:-get for noxt J yoars bo
incroasor! by .$2 million nnnually Workod out
2. Government ::;ub~id ie::; for prico clif1'erence ....
between purchasing &market price 11CI :;tudying for nece::;sary nct.ion. ~:CI CO
J. Govo:-nment restriction on export of lead ~
concentrato to Japan NCI studyinG for necessary action. HCI
4. Incroase dolomite export t.o Japan 1'rom 12,000
to 100,000 tons MCI referred to 110FA for action. HOrA
S· Speei.al inducement to minos producing oresfor import replacemont NCr
, 6. Overall plnn lor development of mineral
processing facilities Worked out
7. C~nsult with F&T WIG on:it, possibility
of exporting Gold NCr ,", Ff/i'
8. Detailed roport on minine export problems Reportcd to EPSC Reportcd
9. Mine owners soll one third of lead oro to
Changhang Smelter bo:or~ e~port Gov't. made provisions. 'los
10. Sales of gold to BOK 100% by Cha~r,hang Smelting Saleable Jnly 20% and rest Partial
Corporation to open market.
Mining WIG TOTAL 5 2 :3 1.2
i"jr';"":;,J ". J'n·',l.l"'"r:tinnr or R"lcnmmonrlnt:l,ons
v• !t.i,rh "'.. Trj!"~ l' ~ t r;l.
TYpO of AdiQn Tnkcn
a.
Favorable
RC~1l1ts
b.
Unoer
ActIon h'{
c.
lio Actior.
?enrHrlf' ~
1.
2.
J.
I••
lbt,irlMl EnndiC'rai't Centor & Technical
h~Di~tnnco for handicraft
D(]volopment of silk wcaving industry and
improvement of sowing indus trios
E:lt"b1:i.shmont of a cottago industry &
hnnrlicrnft display center
A p1:10 fol" ostablishmont or a cottage
imJ:lstl""J centor prepared by tho City or Seoul
LiGht Inrlw;t.ry WIG TOTAL
Comprehensive plan has been prepared
(US011 brininr.: an expert).
Full plan beinG prepared.
Review necosllary.
Yes
1
.".CI
KTS I, KOTRA
2
w/c
1 ~
VI. Hr·nyy rrvlu":t'r"',L
1. Rccr111.t:1 founnry expert from the U.S.
2. AI\::llj'~nmcnt of cnmmoclity chicfn in mechnnic:l.l.
olectrico'l.1. •tran:lport:l. !.ion equipillont
;. t1tiliz() Korean export tnsK force in Viotnmll
t.o explore export opport.unitioll
4. Rev i ow the oxport pror,ram to Vietnnm by I'Jpocitll
GNUI'
5. r.omprehcn::ive repol'1. on problems or exports
affectinr, heavy indust.ry
Ho:l.VY Induat.ry WIG TOTAL
VII. Simplir:lc"t.ion nl' ProcNlurn.f
1. EBtablishmont of ShippinG Centor
G. Study method to Ilimplify procorluroll for
export. :Hld import
;. Requirements for businessmen travol abroad
4. Noed for invitinG foroir,n expertll on
~impl1ricntion of procodurc~
S. Utili7.<ltion of KorelJ.n Re50:,re.1 In~tit\ltion8
fc,r simpUtien.tion of proconuro::!.
SilTpUficntior: or Proced'ul'e:l wIG TOTAL
1m oxport is ."!saigno·l to lJSOM.
Assillnod by MeI
Special Group moeting hold
8ntab1i::;hod a1 rC!ldy in KaffiA.
Partially 5impliticd.
Four stops out of six eliminated
Yos
'los
Yos
:3
Yo:!
Ye~
Yell
:3
MCI
1
o
wIG
1
~";/G
~f1IG
2
.l
.l
~
CO
-oJ

r-npMi\ltl, Intltmctjnnr' or RMprnmllndrlt1ool'l Typo or Act-11m Tn)(oo
:\. 0.
F~vor~blo Undor
Ro~Vlt§ Action b~
c.
No Action
P",nt'line: ~
XI, Quali t,Y Trnprovl"rnpnt &: Tochn1 Cf\1 Assist-nnel'!
Roeruit by USOM - ono horo
Portion of rundc made AvailAble.
US qu~lity control contlultnnt here,
Approved find reforrqd to ~CI & USOM.
....
co
co
II4
wIG
wle
wIG
WIG
:3
Mel &: USO/{
Yos
Yo:!
MCI !( USOM
YOll
MCI II: USOM
4
P3rtill.lly
Mr, Oh, MCI nnd Mr. Goodrich, USOM
,~orlt on it,
Mr. Oh, MCI :l.ncJ Mr. Goodrich, USOM
work on it.
Fin.mcod by USOM - dopnrto(\ 7/21/65
(1) :illnt),
1, MOAF & NIR't coordiMto thoir work on quality
inopoct10n of ~xport producto
2, Study nnel roccm."1000 tho ontiro !in;,d ot
tochnic:l.~ ar"ist(l,Oce requirement
), UtllizJtiol ot Koronns tr:l.ined nbroJd
4, Rocruit two US spaciJlistll Oil qunUty control
nnd pl.mt .' njo"+, HilY m:l.nfi/:ornont
S, Common util ~:1l.~i,n ot loc:lJ. iMpaction !ll.cilitios
6, Estnblillhrnunt of :J. N:l.tioMl Tochnic:l.l
InforM:J.tiJn Cantor
7, Sond rOllponoiblo ot'ticinll'l Abrond to obllorvo
inllroction tlystom
S, Spod.;~l 5turly nn qunl:!, ty control of Soodll
to l"Er::s m:lrket
9, Invitnt.lon ot' nn oxpftrt tor ttlchnic:l1.
lnfoTlll.'1tion :Hlf'V1COIl lUI ruqufttltt'itl by KORSTIC
10, Improvtlmont of tOlltlnr. fnci1.itit'i1l for NInI
find Kyunr,buk Provincinl rootins ~b,
11, Con5idor AGriculturo and fiohorioll field for
N!RI pnrticipant trninins pror.rnm
Qunlity ~lprovomont &Technicnl AOllilltnnce W/G TOTAL
XII, Export to ViAtn~m
E~tabli~herl _
1. E~tnb1.iohmftnt of n new work tABk force
2. Suboldy for trnnf.portntion on cement to Vietnhm
" itoKCi;/l NCOmmort1nt:l.OM on export to Vietnam
4, Renlifttie fttudy of level of potentinl
exporto to Vietnnm
S. To Ilhitt "US only item" to "liimited World Wiye"
which CM be Ilupplied from ]\01'1)1'
6. nenli:ntlon of tho US.nOK-S~l tri~nsle trade
by prOCe5/lins PL-480 itemll in Korea
7. f.llfliSl'lI\llmt or A permanent reprellentntive to Japan
to maintain contract with HPA &FEES
8. EAtAbUflhment or Vietnam Export Center in KOTRA
ElSpoT't to Vietnw ~-lln 'fOO'AL
Accepted by MOT, KSC for implement~tion
UndOl' con~ideration by USOM
Referred to Wallhington
E:ltablillhed
Yell
,
USOH
USOM
lfSo.V.
:3
\"/(',
Mer
2 ~
i'rnpnr:nlr. !n'lt,p..l!jtLi-nn:: ,..,r n...t"njf,i~l1ndat.i.nM
XIII. Stft~rlnr ~nmmi~tt"'" ~nrl p..... t".
j.;ro~ nf Acti,(")n T:'lk"o
•1.
r.worabl0
~(\~u1 t~
b.
Under
I~" t ~ cn h:::
c •
::0 ~ction
_tonrB ~C j() ...."'t1
1. Roqu(j~t rfiIJOrt frflm COVll!littoo of lioCI in
tochn:\.c:il tr<l:l.ntne progrillll
2. Proparfi full roport Il.rtor ;0 JUlIO on
antiro oxport pro~rillll
Jt~oring Committoo And n.o.c. TOTAL
To Co roportad by MCI tlnd KCll'RA y,,~
1
~~r:I
1 o ~
~
o
o
Appendix C bMhYSIS OF EXPORT ?jlUj1OfION POLICY PRCXiRAH ACTIONS - 1<)65
,Eropn.'\.11.'l. IM t.T'ud.ionl'l or Rer.ommcdil,tionfl
I. FinAn~n ~ TD~Rtion
':"cpc 0: 1\(;Uon TRkon
a.
ravor.lbl.e
i\esults
b.
Under
Action by
c.
:lo !.ction
Pend inc ~
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Enforcement of Export Bonu~
Revision of ForeiG~ Exchange System
Enforcement of siliglo flexiblo exchange system
Libcr,ltion of trade by gradual removal of
quota Dystom
Intensi.ve cneourClGemont of export commedi ty
production firms
Preferential payment of production
encouraGement funds
Raise or lORn percentagcs
Expannicm of runda for enCOUT'Rgemen~ of
export indulltrios
LowerinG or lenn intorollt r..tos
Ent'orcomcnt of local crodi t :lIJI:'ltom
1,'1.)( pri vilcGos for oxport industrit's
ExpaMion and dovelopment of ()VOI"S01\':I markotD
Enforcement of d i:lcount:s on public util i ty I'll tes
Report submitted to XCI & USOM Yes
Floating of the ~xchi\nge rate adopted Yes
Floating oxchange system implemented Yes
Im~lementod MCI
HCI
:ICI ,. MOF
l10nctary BO<lrd
MOF, MCI, TIOK
~;CI
HCI Pc XO'!'
BOi(
l'.OF
MOF
t-.:l
o
..-
TOTAL
II. ,l',: III. ACT'icultllr~ ,~nd Fi~,h(,ri():l
1. Signing of ROK-US Sanitation Agroement
10 2
}lOAF ,Pc ::OF'A
1 1..1
TOTAL
IV. Hining
v. Licht Inclullt.ry
o 1 (not ndded) 0 Q
Q
1. Tr:l.nllformation of :nedium arr.! 8mall firms to
oxport industry
2. Creation of oxport ind~:stry complexos.
TOTAL
}lCI
MCI
2 o o ~
Appendix C ~.t!l!.LYSIS OF EXPORT PllOi1CfrION POLICY PROORAM ACTIONS - 1CJ65
,frsmoM\1 ~. 1Mt.r\lctioM or Roc:ommc1"'.:'li\t'J,on:1
I. FinRnce ~ TRxRtion
':'ypc Oi I\<::t.l.on Tnkcn
a.
Favorable
Res'.11ts
b.
Under
Action by
c.
110 :.ction
2.enrlinr; 1!ll.:ll
1.
2.
).
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13·
Enforcement or Export Bonus
Revision or Forei~ ExchanGe System
Enforcement of single !1exible exchango system
Libcr;ltion or trade by gradual removal of
quotn system
Intansi.ve encour;l.{;ement or export cornmodi ty
production rim:;
Preferentinl payment of produc:tion
encouragement fundo
Rni~e or lORn pcrcontage~
r::xp.1n:lion or t'unda for encourngemen~ or
export indu:ltric~
LowerinG or loan intere:lt 1':1 tSI:!
Enforcement or local ercdi t sJ'ztem
Tn.x pl"ivi1e[:e~ tor export industri"11
r~xpnnllion nnd development or OVOI":loa' 9 marknto
Entorcemont or di:;counts on public utility ratell
TOTAL
Report submitted to XCI & USOM Yes
Floating or the ~xchange rate adopted Yes
Floating exchange system implemented Yes
Im~lementod MCr
Hcr
:-ICI & MOF
l10ne tR r".1 Boa rd
MOF, MCI, TIOK
~;CI
MeT t, MO'!'
10
BOr:
HOF
2
MOP
1
t\:l
o
....
1.1
II • .':: III. Ar:ricu1 ture ;;nd Fi1'.h(,rics
1. Signing or ROK-US Sanitation Agreement
TOTAL
TV. Hi ni ne::
V. Li.r;ht. Indu!lt.ry
o
:-lOAF p. ::O;;'A
1 (not added) 0 n
!l
1. Tran:ltomation of :nediwn and ~3.1l rirms to
export induztry
2. Croation ot export inc:h~"try comploxes.
TOTAL
HCI
MCI
2 o o z.
?r('lMM1~! Inr.t,ruct1onr 01' Rl'!COmnOMj\tions
VI. Hl'lj)yy !nrlu!lt.ry
VII. Simnlification of: ?rocl'!nurgs
1. Encouracement of private diplomacy and
modorntion or traveller's checks
2. EJtablishmont ot Shipping Centur
~. Smoother ~upply of domo~tically-producod
raw materials
TOTAL
VIII.~
1. Strongthoning of export publicity activitioo
TOTAL
IX. Exportor!Imp9rtor RoJnUonn
1. Etl'.icnl cducntion for qualitative improvement
of traders
2. Amcndmcn', ot Tr,'\de Law
3. E~~~~~:mont or oxternal credit
4. Intogration nnd settlement of traders
TOTAL
le. H,1rkott nr: Annlyi'tl ~ i..JJ,rroflrch
.I. • Export nllotmenl tor each ovoriHlas mi55ion
2. Export allotment tor each Ovcr~eas Trade Cente~
3. R05po~lI'iblt'l quota tor each export croup
4. Expan~ion of commerciAl diplomacy
S. Expansion ot export markets in Europe
6. Stepped-Up managemont ot KOTRA
TOTAL
TyPO ot Action Taken
,'\ b. c,
Favorablo Undor No Action
3~_~ Action hy ?)nrlinc I2.td.
0 0 0 1'1
Me!
KOTRA
MCr
---
3 ('l 0
.J
lleI. MPI ,,-JSQ'mA _
1 0 v ,
.1,
I
~
0
MCI ~
HCI
MCI
MC_I_
" -
:3 1 0 !:
MOFA
KOTRA
MCI
MCI &: MOFA
MCI &: KCYrRA
MCI&KOTRA t'
-
5 1 t) 2
TOTAL
TOTAL
XIII. St.onrinc Cnmmittno nod o.o.n.
XII. E:mn;·t tn Viot.onm lnt'll npnlicnhlpi
a. b. c.
Favon\blo Under No Action
-B.!! ;ml t.!, Ar; t.i n"...!l:l. Pt>r,r!.i..!lc:.. ~li,
};CI ,_ KOTRA
!·:OE
KOrn:., i\'TA, & CCK
Her
Her !, ~:IRI
KOiltA
MCl &. KrC
Hcr (lm,I)
KOTRA
K~
-
10 0 0 ~
0 0 () 0 N
0
~
I
Kcr.'RA & Ncr
MCI
Mcr
Mer" HOF'A
XCI & MOFA
XCI
NCh'
--
5 2 0 ..,..
Typo or Action Tnken
1. Entorco"lont or oxport in:3urnnco :lYIl1.0f1,
2. ThorouGh exnmination ann anulYllia or
comprahunzive export promotion policy
J. Soloctionll and encouragomont ot Ilpocializod oxport
indulltrio5
4. Enforcoment ot trade talk~
S. Strcnsthening ot economic activitio5 by over~ea~
mi:l:lion~
6. Strengt.honed :structure ot Commorcial Bureau
7. Sccuring And ofticiant mana~emont or export 5hip~
1. Practical trnde education
2. rnclu~ion o! trndo in curriculum or tochnical schools
). Utilizo.tion or trade loctuI'o:s
4. Movumont. to impro\'o qUI1.li ty ot oxport commoditios
5. Exptin~lon ot K.S. markinG
6. Stopped-up tochnical training tor oxport industrios
7. A:lsi:ltnnco tor rationnl management
R. En!orcomant ot oxport in~poction
9. }~nnGomont ot export S~hool
10. PackinG CUid:lflcO tor oXiJ0rl cOllil1loditio:!
Pr9pnM'1\, Inr.t.cud.inn:'l nr R"cnmm(.~j:.\t~Qn:
XI. Qur.] Hy TmprnV0m(!T'l! " 'J'Mhni~}l.l A:l1\j:'lt.:\OI;n
bNALYSlS Of' li.:PSC ~.cTJVn'IBS - I !)lHlAppendix D
I:i:2t:l::}:'l,';, ~L Trwtr\lctions
,"1'1'" E,9S£J:!!!!!~ni1<"lt~~.
StoerinG Committee
1. Simplification of trade
pr(')c~(lurc~
&: t.iQ.!LT..Ql$Ql1
Hcr to roquost tISOH
COliS1,11 tant
.1.
PI'OpOS,)}:;
Acc€:1',t("!L
:<
h •
Prol,osnl s h, .. ~.g
__...r._.CJ_n~.2.,i!~~
(..
Under ActiJH6
__",",():L-._
HC!
.
o~
:~() i\~l)'·"·:'
0(. Act:' (In, :frr.o;
!\Ol"oJpn Chambur or CC-lfl::iUT'CQ x
doiliG l'o:lQarc!l and dov(!l-
(')pinl~ plzmn
2. Improvement of tr~nsport_
.:t"d,on. ,,:ustom clonrlllicc,
ctovcclorlns, con~~nicDtion
.1nd othor si ~'Ii1.a.r activi tios
related to expert trade.
). Research on export
inzurMco.
Jj.. EstQblishmont of nrbi-
trQtion systom.
Special freiGht c~rs
Ds~agncd; other measuros
bs~ng considered
l~xPOj·t Irwu j',llIGIJ L,'\w
lWtl bgon (lrrll"tQd; ?-irI
I'ol!\wutlnr. rm;<Ji1rcn
Ol'S'Ulizi:l.tion
x
x
:-:O'l', He!
Her
KC of C
N
o
.::.
5. Dovolop bondod raw matorial HeI Notico 2498, Narch
3y'nt~m prior to rocoipt of 10, 1966
L7c.
SteC'ring TOTAL
E.i~ ,~ i'nxfltion
1. DQvolop export com~odity
production firms.
2. Irnplofrlemt muasuroo for
~pronding timo on L!C crodit
aYfltcm.
x
5
x
o
HCI
BOK
o
x
5
nMn~f1 ,~ 1':'l':(liHO'!1 (Cont.)
). If"lplornont rnonaure::; £01'
dist~ibution of credit betwe~n
expo~te~3 nnd producers.
4. Il'lljjl¢rnent rnea:mros to
consolidate nnd rntional1zG
fill export credits.
5. Study tho pOGsibilities
or cuo~orn duty exornption of
quality oontrol equipment.
Finnnce &Taxation TOTAL
A?':~'1,eul tur~
1. E~tubli~h oxrort inrlu~trifil
davoloprnDnt prioritioR.
flOX cJneourages n'\ ~tri­
butinn of orpnit
throu;;h oo-sign1\turo
systOli'1
No nnw provisions
neoded
Proposal rr jo to EPSC.
Acc(Jpt~d
x
x
..
A
4 o
BOK
EPSC
EPSC
1
x
5
N
o
=.n
2. l)~Vt:l(,p lfiOi\fj\U"OD find plnn:;; Referred to HeI
to devoJ,op tho dYQinC 1,1'\r1U~t.lj'
wHhln tho ~nk f'1'lbric ifi(hwtr~'.
j. :; til' l:r eul tlv,lr, if.n tt)~hf'li\iuQ:;
• 'I /' "h't~ ~nC1~naa o~por~ a. Clllncnc
ii('~'J~ i, l9d modie:Lw~.
x
.
.\
1'(;1
HOAr
4. St·~y mQn~uro& to 1nera~aa
luaf tobacco ~xpart.
,. ~tudy tho prohl~M of lack
gf fund~ to pv~eha~g eocggn~
!\)i' 1'(\W Bilk production.
A~riuulture TOTAL
?lan dNWll by Office
of :1~Mpoly
x
1 2
MOl"
x
2 .:J
F:l~b(H"Y
.. Est~blt~n export devel- Referred to MOAF X MOAFJo.
Opnt," ~ pri,o':ities.
2. Propnr,;· II paper 'to request Fisherios Working, X \4/0
MOAr' to sel'1O Q Koronri oyster Group
expert to 'l:.he U.S.
Fishery Ta,~AL 0 2 0 2
M..inine
.
,
1. Study and prl!sent imple- n~rerred to Minoral X mr.ing A::i9' n.
mentation 1'Ileu~ures concorning to'lborn tory of Mining
qunl1ty control of mineral A{;:;joelution of Korea
tlxporh. (E'll.i>ort Q,uo11ity
:rn.§po~to'f)
N
2. Study rn'oblel'lI of lack of RCquo9ted 420 million X MCI, m 0enco~l clovelopmont financing. 'Won in 1961 budgot
I
). Povelop moa~ur03 to improve X Mel
tho ttl,bul'ltion Qf export
stfiti:Jtico.
'J... Expand 'l"oehnic<tl trdning X !~I
procrfim~ for technicians find
~alQfi promotion stnrr.
S. F~nm1nQ the problem of Refornlll to KMSC X XMSC
copper cone~ntrato ahortngos
~t Chnnghnng Smolter.
6. Examino th~ truck ~hortago Reforred to Ottico ot X 005
in vnrioue mino oporationfl. Ooological Survey
:aninr; (C()nt.)
7. Sue~cst to Koren tungston
minos tlmt they Cibttlin
tochnical ,i.\ssistnn(,;o to aid
them in th,oir doop shaft
program.
Mining TOTAL
Tnclu~try
1. Dovolop plnns nnd f'oquost
USOi I to invito consultanh in
n'l"bitration, oxport inournnco,
inl'iuctrio'.l. 8,'llphic rlosiGn,
t;1Xport proi:oduro~, oxport
trnining si:hool, nnd IlGricu.l-
turo.
Re£errod to Koren
Tungsten Mining Co.
Mer hilS forwardod
roquost to EPD
2
x
x
s
i{orO<L Tungsten
Minina: Co.
Mel, EPn
o ?
N
<:)
-.l
I
2. Stronst.hon tochnical trllln- EPl1 is Bcrconinc;
inc for oxport industrio,. projoct propoonls in
order to moho roquest
to USOI1
Inclustl"y 'l'OTAL
g,~1. i tv 1m::,.,oetinn and Toehn.i::.
01'.1 AAr.~·W~
x
2 o.
Ern
o 2
1. Strengt.hon 6xp(')rt in:spect-
tion aysto",.
74 COmModities roquired
to be inspected in
1964; 149 in 1965; 162
in 1966
x :iCI
911:1'1 it., !n~.r2£!:.tion nnd T(Jchni~_
c.-il A~~il'lt",!lg,t" (Cont.)
2. Exhibitions {'or quality X MCI/?ri~l.e
improvomont. firms
J. Expand and Dtren~then X MCr
Korean St:l.T1dnrds (KS system.
4. Decide tho location and Roterred to MORA X MOfiA
operating procedures of Kyone;
::am Teshna: Laboratory.
S. Dovolop n language training
program for' AID participants. To be budgeted by MCl X MeI &: USOM
6. Develop a foundry training
program. To bQ budsotad by Mer X Mcr
7. Esto.bl:l.sh g. sbtor rolation- N
ship botwocm NIRl and tho U.S. HCr throush USO}f X HeI &: USOM 0
'Auroo.u of Standnrcls.
CX)
8. HOAF r(lquost USOl1 to nIO/C being procossed X MOAr & USOM
Msist in financ~ne $10,000
worth of tClStinC equipment
for r-:at'l Aeric. Products
Inspection Laboratory.
9. f{cqucs1~ Taiwan foi" :i~sist- ner~rrod to Export y !·1CIA
an~e in training inspoction Inspoction Soction, }iCl
experts.
10. ImprOVI) library facilities Under study by working X WIG
at tlmI. gIVup
Quality InlJpoction and Tochnical M;sistanr.o TOTAL 8 2 0 10'
!·farketinr;
1. Establish Handicraft US0~ Consultant arrived X lofCI. USOl-l. KarRA
:"'~"'''I';.~;:ll. CAnter and Merchan- Aug. 1966 to develop
dise Display Center. plans for merchandise
Display Center; Handi-
craft Technical Center
established in Art
College, SNU
2. Assist in developing KorRA, Privato X KarRA, Private
exports to Vietnam Associations Ass'ns.
J. Pl,an to invite foreign Referred to KOTRA X KarRAjournalists
4. Phn to furnish Korean Referred to KOTRA X KamA
inclust'rles information on t\:)
availa'::>le export assistance 0co
and ho',o/ and whero to obtain
this assistance.
5. Develop public relations Referred to KOTRA X !\Ol'RA
and pr(,motion program in foreign
countr:Le3.
6. Invite buyers groups from Referred to KOl'RA X KarRA
variou!. countries. '0
? AcUvcly utilize interna- Economic Missions sent X Her
tional economic organizations. ahrond
8. Tmprove packa~ing, design Draft regulation being X Mel
and elforcemont of registra- prepared
tion $~rstem.
9. Establish display centers Referred to KOTRA X KOI'RA
in hotclls and airports.
Pn::.l~~' Inr.;t,rur:tions
or R~mend~tions
M~rketin~ (Cont.)
10. Inv'ite a consultant for
one year' to assist and advise
KorRA ov'erseas offices.
Action Taken
KorRA &Her requested
USOM
a.
Proposals
Accopteci
x
h. c. .
Proposals Being Under Action
Considered bX
MeI, USOM
d.
i'ia Ropo.t
on Action ~
--
Marketi~lg Tetr~ 10 o o 10
N
.....
o
Appendix .E ANAL YSI S OF EXPORT PROMOTION POLl CY PROGRAM ACTIONS - 19G5
I Pt'ODor,.~:1<;, Instructions
Q..r Rccc>mmcndations
Steet'1.n[!; Committee
Action Taken
a. b. c. d.
Proposals Proposals Being Under Action No Report
Accepted Considered by on Action ~
1. Sir~plif.y trade procedures.
2. Improv3 transporl..."tion
system, custom clearance .. ste-
vedoring, communications, etc.,
related to trade.
Mer will requost a
USOi{ Consultant.
Special freight cars
havo been assigned;
other rncnsur1s being
considere6.
x
x
Mcr
MOO', MeI
J. Continue to study the Export Insurance La\~ X HCr
oxport insurance system. h~s boon drafted; MeI
requesting n rescnrch
organization. N
.....
.....
4. Strengthen the contro) Prt~si(lontial Docree X HOF, Mer
over c,.rfering firms. 2623 to revise trade
law enforcement r~e
whereby offoring firms
are required to re~ister.
5. Synthesize aid adjust trado MCI X
laws.
6. Pcmit thl3 import of raw MCI Notice 2498. X He!
materials for expCl,rt on 180 d~ys
D/A bD.sis and shipper's usance.
7. Create a prior ,~arehouse HeI ~lotice 2498. X Mer
otock supply system.
8. Encourage increased use of Adopted margin system. X MeI
domesUc raw materials. Restricted items - JO~
Unspecified items - 20~
Steering Committee
9" Inclul:e joint venture invest-
ments fOl:" export industries.
10. Enforce a reporting system HCI lJotice 2498
of manufacturers producing raw
materia1~; for export.
11. Enfol"ce the 'tracle arbitra- Kore:an Chamber of
tion ~ystem. Com''llcrce doin~ research
and developing plans.
12. Prov(mt excessive competi-
tion.
Steering Committee TOTAL
1..
x
'X
10 o
YAC!, KOTRA
HCI
KC of C
x
z 12
Fin~n~0 nnd Taxation
1. Strengthen the functioning
of market research and (,,"(,1'1 it
infonnation services in B0K.
2. Restrain excessive pro-
tective trade.
J. Adjust Customs tariffs.
4. Diver;:Jify means of finan-
cial sottlements
Foreign Trade Informa-
tion Section was
established.
Import items arp. gradu-
ally being liberalized.
Under review on the
assumption that GATT
admission will be given.
Mor Notice J61,
MCX Notice J71S.
X
x
X
X
BOK
MCI
Hor
Hor
t\:)
I'"""
t\:)
S. i:;nforc:e a system requiring Ccnfiicts with DlF
tho £oroil~ exchange certifi- regulation.
cate,as an attachment.
Rejected
Finnneo ,,: T~x~tion l~on~.J
6. E~pu~d tho BWT system.
7. Enforoe D/A imports
allocation by pUriod and
ragion.
Export - Warehouse X
under con~truction
in Viotn~m. Import-
For othor are~s than
Vietnam, MCl Notice 2499.
MCl
x
8. Erfoctivc1y utilizo local
c:-edit ~ystom.
BOlC ro&~lation was
chanGod on i1<iy ;1, 1966.
x BOK
9. rrovidQ erooH for lflixlern- NCr Hotico 24QO.
i~1ns oxport incluotry through
shlpPQrt~ U9ancc.
10. SQCUfo 1000 m111ign Won Sggu~Qd ~nd e~Qeutod
or KRB fncility loan runcl~ fer SB9 million Won by tho
~~oei~li:od export inclustr169. ond of Juno, 1966.
11. Rcactivnto the onto~'ri3o
rt':::orfO fund 6Y:ltom for tht'!
expon~ion of oxport indu3trlal
1'MllitiOlh
x
x
HeI
MC!
x
N
....
~
1~. Ex~m~t buoino~~ tnx fer
filt\f\ufi\Cturor:} producing rfi\1
ri:!t{li'ial~ for oxpI,rt and export
Sooo~ •
1). Enro.'co tho C01l1'11odity tax
exempt-lor" on rnw materiAls
imported tor export to replfice
rE:\W mGteT'ial5 imported tor
deffi~~tic eonaumption.
Pro5ident191 Decree 2557.
Commodity tax law wa~
Amended on ~rch 8, 1966.
x
x
MOF
MOF
16. }i~intain the prosent rate Boin~ maintained.
of tho export credit intorost.
Flnnnc2 ~ Tnxntlan (Cont.)
14. E~t~b1i~h fi more realistic
r~to of doprocifiti~n.
1St Exempt tuxes on oxpend-
nblo ouprlies ns applied to rnw
mtitori~s ~or export.
Special deprccifition
system h~s beon implc-
m~ntecl for designatod
export industries.
I,
x
x
Hor
MOF
x
17.
i n6·
Incroaso tho cree it cojJ - let and 2nd r,Ufil'tor, X
[\500 !r.illion. ;ro
qu~rtgr, 9500 million Won.
HOF
In. El"1forco the co-~ien€lturo The ~:l.:Jtom is 'boinS
S~f:'lt(;lffl by trndor:;J find prollucor~ oncyur<l~ed whon sivin~
in Clxp,jrt nnuncin~. cl-ol1its.
x DOK
t...:>
~
~
1? :;;~ront::th(jn th~ sanction T'l.Mo or intoNst l.!,l mndo X
a;'·Dt{'.~ €l~uinst exporters hnvint; subject to ordinary r·~~to.
eve,'rlUl:; c:xpnrt loEt:1s ani! tran$for
tho oVIJrduo loaliS to thu genoral
credit ('oiling.
20. :::11£,oroo the oystem of Lump ~UIfl loan - 60 days X
:iUerr.:\~o borrowing p<\ttorns in Installmont loan - 120 days
oy.~ort financing.
BOK
flOK
22. R(~lonso .fund .for r.ollect- Givon priority by NACF X
ing primary products on non- and ~isheries Cooperativo
L/C'bMio. 'lOl:lns ••
21. Incroaso operating funds
for oxport industries.
Financ() &: Taxation TOTAL
200 million Won now
available.
X
17 1
Mer
MOAt"
1 (rejection) , 22
Qun1.ity Improvement (Cont.)
6. Est.~,blish a .unction in
KOTnA fully r~spon3ible for
imp~ovem~nt of p~ckaging and
dosign.
Quality Improvement TOTAL
H~(lt:ing
1. St:..oengthen public rela-
tions :'lctivities for export
proiTlotion.
2. Enhance trade ethics
among the traders.
Established Commodity
Planning Section
KOTRA roquested funds
for P.R. firm in 1967
budget.
'I'rc,rie ethics commit te(~
w"-s estl1hlishe:i in K'rA.
1.
5
x
x
o
KOi'RA
MCI, KOI'RA'
KTA
1 6
). Conclude trade agreemonts
with Canc.u:l a, Hexico and U:.R.
Lh fIo::'d t:ril.de <.:onfcrtince with
Tai,nn, Philippinos, Halaysia,
Vietnr..m, ,Ta,pan f Hest Ge:....many
Mel Ito.1y.
Preliminary negotiation X
with Canada and provisional
agreement with Mexico.
x
Mel, HOFA
MCI, HOFA
N
~
rJ"\
;. ')il"Clct KOTRA activities
to f1.ol(:.; (lirectlj' rcl;d,cd to
eXijort development such as
f::,uid,nncc of business connoction,
prop,:l.canda, marl{ct rt:~earch, etc.
Mel, KOTRA x
x
r:. Iricrcaso trade centers.
7. Devote Kcr:i'tA publ ications
to Clalos promo'cion and intro-
ducUon of Koroan products.
Chicago, Milano Centers X
opened.
KorFf
KOlTh\
..
lD.!1 \l 5 t ry
1. Develop export specialized
industries.
2. Transform small-medium
industrial plants i.nto export
industries.
3. Est.a.blish export industry
si1~es.
Industry TOTAL
~lity Improvemont
13 categories of X
industry were selected
and individu~l selection
is under way.
350 in 1965 and 179 in X
1966 transformed.
Continually being X
created.
J o
HCI
NCI
MCl
o :3
lj.. StrenGthen t.cchnicA1 t,ra.~n- NIRI givos continual guid- X
ing prosrar r01' export u.:.:co.
incll.1::;tries.
1. Stren8then export i"lspect-, 74 con:moditi~s required X
ion system. to bo inspectod iri 64,
149 in 1965, 162 in 1966.
2. Hold cxhibitiona for
quality improvrnent.
J. Fxpand KS marking system.
5. Establish a. dopartment in
XCI to work on dosign and
implement the rogistration
system.
Sstablished sub-soction
in HCI to implemont the
dosign registration.
X
X
t"
....Mel 0)
I
X
Mel
Hel
Mel
10. StrenGthen the oporation
of th~l export school.
JNU
KOTRA
iCOTRA X
~tCI X
KOla:.. N
l-"
...:J
x
Il'i§ tl\llfJd t~l(ix trlciH- X
ty if: Na\>1 Y\'')rk, SilI'\
Fri:iliC iM:O, ikmr. l\\"lflG,
SJ.;jf;,~p()rO ;mf! Tokyo.
Bulletins aro publiohcd.
E3tablishcd in Arts
Collegu of Seoul
Nationnl University.
9. E::;tlibli~h ~n export, publi- Being operated by' KCYrRA. X
cfitiolilJ library.
12. Expand !~OTM cOflIDluFrLcfi-
titm ftLciliti~s and publi~h
monthly ovorDOli8 inro~tion
bullotin.
11. j~tJtt\,bHGh 0. milito.ry Goods
~upplj' displliy cantor.
1{,w',sottne (Cont. )
O. Estnb1ish a handicraft
center
j J. I::n':t,mrngc tho i?ot.Q.blish
m\"f1 t or ovoroo,:w branchM by
oxp"rl, u~tl()cintionD,KTA, an,j
lcndirll~ tlond" fima.
nOV1,:;;~d 1"".( I1lAMf~Gment
1'01',"\..1...tion \,l} allow tho
~f":'ta;i3ed UM) or FX for
1\Y'°.Ji t,'n travel <ind
opO!",\ tion of oN!nchos
OV01'son:;, •
x I{CI
1/1<0 C~nHnue to disrmtcli tr~do
IlIi:'!:; ~ (lW~ •
: mls~;,;'~ons oont to ~;outh- X
caot Asia and Hiddlc East.
MCI, MOr-A, KCfl'RA
15. PArtlciputo in oamplo
mnrkot find trado fairs.
Took part in Osaka Sample X lICI, KOl'nA
16. 1n,'1to foreign roportorlJ in
the ocwnomie r~ /'I"I,d •
KO'ffiA x
H:wkctlM (Cont.)
17. Do public rclntion~ work
and publicity in foruien tradejournals nn~ newspnpors to
p,romoto trado nnd encournl3o
tourimn.
18. Invito foreign buyers.
11). StrcnG'~hcn ut,ilizt,tit)l1
of int,ornut:Lonnl orlj<tnizntions.
20. r.xpnnd tho fund coiling
1'01' ovcrson13 trnvol.
2L Af:isi~l'l r··~ll-timo sorvict)
ntnffs for overson dopnrtment
otoro trado devolopmont.
M,.'1rrotin~ TOl'AL
Buyers groups hnvo
como in past; more nre
plannod.
Noto itom 13 abovo.
x
x
x
llr o
KOi'nA
J-rCI, KorRA
Ncr
MCI
x
x
'I 21
too.:)
r-
cc
October 1966
(ii')
~ r.h<l~""'G cf
Expo;,t.ti 6f}/G
ti:'ln. - Aug.
August 1966
(r::)
65 t\ctutil
r:xjJort~
Jan. - nu~.
(D)
~ or 'j:\rcet
Achieved
JMi. - AUCt H
(C)
66 A~tj;a.t
Expof't~
.1:\n. - AuSL
~T COM!10DITIES EXCElmINO TARGET REQUIREMENTS - ~Tamlt1ry _
(13)
66 TIlf'Ijt:t
:w Ad ju~tcd
in July
(Old 'I':t 'fl!~t)"
Appendix F
(A)
CommoclHy (Listed in
DocrcM:Ln~ Ordor or
~ o.£'..TIl:r(;ct AC~1~ ~vcd;
n (;01 \lml'l)
•• Z1nn ~nncentrnten
co;;;;nonts - (C)Ooo<:l production lind
lew domastia ~amllnd allow 101"50 Dmau~to
t~") bt"! (l>:portad, primAry IllflrKot, Jfipan,
is qu~,t,~ sti'on~; n potJiUvo MCl poUa:l
htis ",d.i.pOO incroMo oxport::l.
(0)
1,290 1,452 113 76S +'21
~. L~~1 C~naantrntftg
czmmant~ . (C) 500 zinc ooncontrntes
Rbov~.
(0 )
1,600 1,69' 106 1,'22 +111 t""....
~
"I If,\ ... ~ "000
..;. 'tl_.. .Itcmn;n;;nt~ .• (A) n\'u'in~ the fir'it, :;;ix
month~ or 1966, human hnir wn~ ?7(. of
tho t(lt{~l. (C) A ROKr. ombargo on rA\ol
hllmr.n hnir oxporta, Q!'foetiVQ July 1,
1966, will clrMticnlly docrt'a:lo hair exports.
2,627 94 ',7,6 ~2lj,
/. - Comfflent.~ b:f MCr
Po - CO!llffiQnt:3 '.by KOTilA
C - COl1lmont~ by USOM
• I~ig:urcs
in ( )
are ftOKG t.WgQtfl
orlGin:l.lly
establishod at
beginning of 1966
H Ar. Agaili;'t.
new tnrget..
( ) ri~r{;~
agnin;)t.
(H~iginM -1966
tarGet~
(A)
COf!iiliodi ty (Li9tfid L1
CDcra~Min6 Ord~r or
?~ or ":'ill'F;(]t Achi(lvod;
1J C('ilulf,n~
4. '!'UfH;;r-;t,tm
Comment~ - (A &B) International
pr-ictl incrOiHIO.
,. vltl)~ 7,000
COlfifflonttJ - (A) Import. prohihHiol1
'by U.S. on Hons Konc - m:1da wiljtj \)geaut\o
of' hUfllCll'l hili:- purchnl5~d from Red Chin.:t;
J'ilcili ty ~Xpilfl::;i,m. (13) Il'lc1'otltMJd dOlTlnnd;
Qufility improvomant. nn~ low priea. (C)
;t01\G ambnl'So on hUfflfin hni l' export::! hn3
for-cod mfinufileturQr~ to U~Q fill ~©cul
h:111' fiV~\nfiblo for wiS production. A
numbor or privnto U.S. tochnicifin~ and joint
vgnturQ3 nfiyG iffiprOygd quality ueeGptability.
6. f1uhbflf' ShOfM-l ), SOO
Commonta - (C) Export qunlity oxeol1emt.
hiGh production e~pacity; low, ~of!ipctitiva
priea.
(C)
0h h.ctual
::Xporto
,1:U1. - AU/l.:.
7,041
,;,461
2,970
(n)
~ or 7Q1'l:G~
Aehievc-d
.Inn. - /,ur,
- (112)
?4
92
os
,~)
';$ Act.uti1
~:\rort&
~"~ ."\n. at nue.
6,642
1,618
','74
(f)
~ Ch~lnr.l'j c'J!'
Export:; G~!6;
.Tn". - Aug"
+?4
+602
+l~S
tv
N
o
7, !·r"lybflfmum
Comment5 - (A &D) Fnvorfible trQI~
in intarMtignnl rrico. (C) Shortat~a
or w(wld :mpply ,hall Mused increasoo
d12mfii~J•
(1,400)
1,600 1,)65
(98)
as 1,G)] .--')"\""'--6:-d
n.
Lo~ onco
:~, 0500 2,076 0, 1,7'7 +1(
9. "ohl'lee(')
Co~~@nt~ • (A) Mult1rlication of
gV~r~efi6 markot6j lower price than Borno
compotitor6. •
;,400 4,212 78 2,)41 ,f1,0:)1,
10. Flshlr-r. N~t F~briQa . l,SOOCOI~onts - (C) Incroased availability
or raw materials.
1,127 ?S 1,137 +13)
11. ~!ot I"nee 1"ah1'ics
Comments - C/o. FnciLty expansion and
~norco~en foreian markots.
(2,500)
3,000 2,100
(87)
73 1, S41~ +161')
12. Ar,nr AfFL1'
Go~mcnt3 - (A) Inc1'eno~l rlom~~A in
J~'q,n:"lj ilitcT'Mtionn1 1'1'100 T'i~o. (13)
IncroasiliJ, rocoenition of (iUnlity or
:<orcmn nS'\'r near. (C) Do~pito incroMod
oXf'lortlJ, cl'i tichrrm hnvo boe.• mndo by
foroicn buyors tnat Koraan a~ar nSar is
'b~dly rtrooQ':!.
(2,500)
3,000 2,178
(87i
7) 1.600 +180
N
N
....
·60
+172
,.,nh
5,825
2,2;1
1,496
(81~)
12
(94)
7')
(127)
?2
2,510
1,407
10,123
(;.00(')
;,5°0
(1,500)
2,000
0\ ')no)
14,000
lSi Arrflwre,ot wl1npaper
Comments - (B) Prohibition of raw
mnteria1 eXP9rt to Japan; dem~d incroaso
and diverBifieat1on; quality improvemont
Qnd low pr1co.
14. §.~·nthl1tie 'l'Qxtilo r'ahrles
Commont'J - (C) PivorsU'ication of
product.:;} find markots.
13. 5\'IOFltt11"~
Cml'lm(llit:;; - (A) l.ihoraHznHon of
knittinc machino im~ort; trnininc or technicinn3;
ostnbHalul1ont or \%rk contoT'f'l in rofucoo villagos.
(C) QlvllHy l'o!'inemont.o hy bu~'ara havo mach)
i':orOM :')WQlltoro ',lntol'nntiomllly dosirablo.
Appendix G
-"', "·'r ('~"""tY'~'1'-"'" '!':Ij.'" Fl' ""'':'/{'-'- ~~;<>"'\t'~n~"""""'"~~.. lJ,.•,d:~~~~~i-:~£-.:~·') b~l.JtJ il\'._\:It':~,~,*,11~'~:'t.~.,; l ....:t,.~l'~ .."ri.jl. _
.0:=:::...- ~,'_1:0 t: '0.'*": 1: v £\ '.;t{u~'i f ~'~ ~~ H
1. ~t001.nBr 1,000
c=;;7;;;U;;;-r;-- (,\) Cc~sa tinl1 0 f
AID-l'iMMl'ld purchases.
22 2.2 ~. .., ~n /1,) -')7
2. l.r~ 6,000
Crn~nDnt~ - ~A) A6fCattiant
rcnclwd [\t Kti\·Cti-.japnli tt"t1<lo
rli<J~u:j:\i(ms to CXpOl·t J.7 million
bundle:> .1 t. ~2.?O (;~lch. (C)
SOQsonnl prnduct; in October,
.JnpM t'll"cnorl LIe's to impOl"t
npprnximntoly ~7 milliDn warth.
3. ~j"W1_f1:' ':'I'lxtnt~ T'rl'itllir,:t:'l
• (;")n~f~(:~"l t:, - 1;\) Import
ft1J[ltr1.ction hy U.S.
l~. 'rh rl')\"l'l ;;nk
C(lIn:J1IJlif.::; :(t~) Jnrnm:so
rrocl\lctll f~:Hlc 0(' "Ied-ChlncM rnw
sUk hava invndod flmi llk"l.rkQt.
5- '~lr-(! "\').'l
i';nrUtlf,H'l·t; - (II) CcsonHIm of."
Inn.n Mn~l~rl ;?ure!':ftt:1olJ.
o. .c:;Je:ir'u
CIW'HllClfltn - (A) Shortngo 0r
rnw rn:'\t.orinl.
1,600
1,000
1.200
1, ("lnO
,588
544
'57
It 50
Ij,(j9
~o
Jll.
)6
jO
1~1
),772
658
1,05J
lj.)
""'242
-.. '~.",
... "
-1.5
~:'.7
+.5. R17
N
N
N
(1 ? /\Of)
7. rnttnn ~nhric~ lJ,nno
(;ommcnto - rrr P'ncili ty shortnr:o.
(11) L.'lck Cl1" intl"fQfit.Qd by husint~~;mon in
i]~f'ort bOc:n.UfJO ot' Jow profits; o:Jlphasis
jJ1Aooe! on more prclfi tabla militory GUPP),Y
f\ nd domo::'lt.icl1li~l·kc t.
5,4SJj.
(;2)
42 9.~; -2.5
8. ShirtsCOnllTlonts _ Hone 16,000 7,437 47 lll,867 -2
,. Frosh Fi~h 7,000
Con~ents - (A) Shortage of vessels
for fresh fish transport; price rise in
dOlTlestic mnrkct and decline in Japan.
(B) Declining imports by Japan; delay
in import prier> determination by Japan;
i l'ro.:;ular tid a1 currents.
3,262 47 6,3?3 -7
10. C:'\rlnocl F1,sh 2 t SOO
Comments - (A) F\iso in price of £1::;h;
lack of seasoning techno1oc:.'J. (C) HiGh
prico of imported cans; small volumo of
prcduction; poor sanitation in cannories.
1,174 47 1,037 .,.nh
N
N
~
+0
-27
+))
.; Jri
878
2,490
2,708
11,01"'2
47
(1~9 )
56
(Jl)
57
(J5)5;
799
733
6,;1;
1,8804,000
(1, ';(0)
1:.300
(2,570)
1,4<)0
(18,000)
12,000
11. Hoolnn Fllhrinr.
COl1u:lcnts - W SC.:lsol'lt'll dOlllnml; U.S.
is cmly mnrkct. (C) EurDpcnn mnT'}:ei
should be developel]; reducinr: r;rclit GDP
betweon low export prices ann hi[..h domestic
prices could help dovelop a rendy mndc
domestic market: mass pronuction methods
WOtu,r! c:roatly assis t export rna rl~ot.
12. Sino' PlAte nnd or Sheot
rommonts - (A) Cassation of AID-
financed rurchnscs.
14. Other Clothinll
COmmOl'lt s - (C) This inclustry has Groat
potontial growth possibilities; requireo
inccntives nnd CliCOul'~Gomont; imploment;ltion
of Koroan Tochnical ToollTl and TJdell report
'ocom."!lcndations arc necessary.
13. Chinose Mcn1cino
COmments - Nona
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